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Abstract 
In Marxist movements theory played a significant role. Even after the 
Stalinisation of the various Comintem parties, theory was propagated as crucial 
to their development. The KPD was born out of the rich theoretical traditions of 
the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). As disillusioned Lassalleans, 
Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel chose Marxism as their theoretical guide 
to a Socialist outcome. As the political and economic climate in Germany 
changed the party grew and made parliamentary gains the nature of the SPD 
changed, much to the frustration of Rosa Luxemburg and the Left of the SPD. 
The final straw was, of course, the SPD's voting for war credits in 1914. In 
breaking away from the German Social Democratic Party Rosa Luxemburg had 
a clear idea of the type of party she hoped Spartakusbund would become. She 
sought a party that resembled the pre-1906 SPD - one that was democratic and 
non-bureaucratic. Therefore, one must ask - how was it possible that in the 
short life span of the Weimar Republic for Luxemburg's party to arrive at its 
Social Fascist end? 
First, from its foundation in 1919 the fledgling German Communist 
Party (KPD) struggled to find its way. A few weeks after its founding congress, 
government forces murdered Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. In the 
months to follow, other key leaders and theoreticians also died - either by 
natural causes (in the case of Franz Mehring) or at the hands of government 
forces. Finding itself in a weakened position the fledgling party turned to the 
Bolsheviks for practical and theoretical guidance. However the Bolsheviks 
were desperate to spread the revolution to Europe, in particular to Gennany, in 
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order to save their revolution. With this in mind Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
attempted to force Russian methods onto the German party with little or no 
regard as to whether those methods suited the German needs. Rather than force 
the revolution forward, Lenin's Policy of Uniformity merely served to further 
weaken the leadership's position within the party. The party leadership rather 
than maintain its independence from the Bolsheviks and fight matters, in which 
they fundamentally disagreed simply resigned, thereby allowing the party to 
become subordinate to the Russian party. While it was never Lenin's intention, 
his desire to force the revolution forward helped lay the foundations for the 
more repressive policy of Bolshevisation. 
Second, Lenin's death and the failed German Revolution of 1923 
marked a tremendous turning point. In the Soviet party the power struggle that 
ensued served to discredit the old Bolsheviks, especially Trotsky and any who 
posed a threat to Soviet hegemony. The Comintern's Policy of Bolshevisation 
was used to contain and control the revolutionary aspiration of its member 
parties. In Germany the failed revolution of 1923 and the "period of relative 
stabilisation" that followed paved the way for the Maslow-Fischer group to take 
control of the party. The Maslow-Fischer group officially adopted 
Bolshevisation and used it to purge the party of the Right and Centre wings. 
Armed with the Policy of Bolshevisation the Maslow-Fischer group launched 
attacks against Rosa Luxemburg, her supporters, and their Social Democratic 
past. The campaigns against Luxemburg were fairly successful. Although she 
remained an enduring symbol in the KPD, her memory as a revolutionary 
theoretician was successfully manipulated. 
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The Comintern's Policy of Bolshevisation not only served to purge the 
KPD of its Soviet opposition it also laid the foundations for the propagation of 
Social Fascism first as campaign against Social Democracy and then as a 
theory. In many ways Social Fascism was an exaggerated form of 
Bolshevisation. It began as a form of name calling - equating Social 
Democracy with Fascism. Later with the fall of Zinoviev and Bucharin Social 
Fascism was developed into a fully fledged theory. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how and why the political 
theory of German Marxism changed as it passed through its various phases, 
essentially how it progressed from a theory of revolution to becoming 
synonymous with the dogma and repression of Social Fascism. This thesis will 
argue that the theoreticians and leaders of the German Communist movement 
were overwhelmed and unable to develop theory that reflected their unique 
circumstances. It was their own internal weakness and inability to lead that 
allowed the movement to be over taken by the Bolsheviks. Lenin's policy of 
Uniformity served to weaken the KPD leadership within the party. Each 
Comintern policy that followed left the party weaker and ftirther subordinated to 
the Soviet party. While not a single Comintern policy can be blamed for the 
KPD's Social Fascist outcome, each played a role in weakening the German 
movement. 
iii 
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Methodology 
Without the combination of history and theory we are unlikely to understand 
either the past or the present. I 
Why Bother with Marxist Theory in a Historical Context? 
Marxist theory was intended to change and evolve as society, politics, and 
economics changed. Marx's method was derived from Hegel, in so far as Marx 
took Hegel's method and "turned Hegel on his head. " Hegel's dialectics was 
intended to explain where change came from. Dialectics is the process in which 
two poles of contradiction interact. Eventually their interpenetration reaches a 
point where their negation of each other is negated, which results in the 
formation of a new entity. This process is known as "supersession. " For Marx, 
the contradiction between labour and capital would ultimately lead to the 
supersession of both labour and capital resulting in the formation of a new 
social form - Socialism. For Marx the dialectical method was not merely 
intended to describe changes during historical periods, but rather it was a 
revolutionary dialectics intent on changing the world. 2 Therefore, "for the 
dialectical method itself the central problem is to change reality. -)ý3 This 
question of how to change reality then became the central function of theory. 4 
1 Peter Burke, History and Social ThgoM, 2 nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) 18. 
2 By revolutionary one refers to dramatic change in the political, economic and social process. 
In Marxism the revolutionary aspect of change is occurring and there is a force behind it. 
3 Georg Lukdcs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971) 3. 
4 Theory refers to an analysis of facts and how those facts related to one another. The term facts 
refers to those things we can tangibly identify and prove in the real world as opposed to 
abstractions - those things we can not see or prove. Lukdcs' description of Marxist theory is not 
a rigid explanation that merely creates categories. In defence of Rosa Luxemburg's theories 
Robert Looker accurately pointed out, if one is looking for "the enunciation of the universal 
laws of the historical process, marching and deploying vast and abstract categories - Proletariat, 
Capitalist, Revolutionary, etc. - across the world stage, then one will find precious little of this 
in Luxemburg's work - but then again Marx himself was hardly a 'theorist' in this sense either. " 
I 
The purpose of theory in Marxism was to solidify the bond between the 
consciousness of the masses and their actions. For Marx the role of the 
proletariat was not just to lead change but it was to actually destroy the old 
existing order through the overthrow of the state. 
"[The] proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as 
individuals have to abolish the hitherto prevailing condition of 
their existence (which has, moreover, been that of all society 
up to then), namely., labour. Thus they find themselves 
directly opposed to the form in which, hitherto, the 
individuals, of which society consists, have given themselves 
collective expression, that is the state; in order, therefore, to 
assert themselves as individuals they must overthrow the 
state. ,5 
Only in their unity as a "conscious" class would they be allowed to freely 
express themselves as individual human beings and only when the working 
class realised itself as an oppressed class could theory be converted into the 
vehicle of revolution. Once the "consciousness" of the working class began to 
reflect reality would it be possible for theory and practice to be united. 
6 
Because of the importance of theory in acting as a vehicle in the 
revolutionary process, it is crucial to Marxism that the theorists possess the 
ability to reflect reality for the purpose of changing it. However, this was not 
the case in the so called Marxist parties of the Third International. Marxism 
Robert Looker, ed. Rosa Luxemburg: Selected Political Writings, (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1972) 13. 
5 Karl Marx, "rhe German Ideology, " Collected Works, 49 vols. (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1975) 5: 80. 
6 it was at this point that theory became "the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process 
itself. " Georg Lukdcs, Histojj and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971) 3. 
2 
experienced an incredible transition during the Weimar Republic. Theory 
became detached from the working class and ceased to reflect what was really 
going on in the world. It changed from a theory intent on changing the world 
through revolution, to a stagnated pseudo theory intent on suppressing and 
controlling its member parties. This process occurred slowly until it arrived at 
its final conclusion - the theory of Social Fascism. Therefore, the purpose of 
this thesis is to examine "what happened to the theory? " How was it possible 
for a party (apparently) so committed to socialism and developing revolution to 
enable this process to develop overtly repressive propaganda that masqueraded 
as theory? I propose that within the historical context of the Weimar Republic 
that the German Communist Party (KPD) arrived at its natural conclusion. This 
is not to say that Social Fascism is the natural conclusion of Marxist theory, 
quite the contrary. The failure lies not with the theory but with the 
theoreticians. The theoreticians and the leaders of the KPD were overwhelmed 
by the events occurring around them that they were unable to develop theory 
that reflected the historical process. Thereby, leaving the door wide open for 
outside forces to influence and eventually dominate the internal dynamic of the 
German movement. 
7 
Georg Lukacs viewed the revolutionary process occurring in steps. Each 
step brought the masses closer to changing their reality. Analytical explanations 
(theories) assisted their awareness of not only each step as a step but also their 
understanding of their own historical purpose. This awareness of their historical 
7 Georg Lukdcs (1885-1971) was a Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic who 
played an influential role in the European Communist movement. Crucially Lukdcs pointed out 
"Orthodox Marxism ... does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's 
investigations. It is not the 'belief in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a 'sacred' book. On 
the contrary orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. " Georg Lukdcs, History and Class 
Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin 
Press, 1971) 1. 
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process brought the proletariat closer to revolutionary consciousness. If we, like 
Lukacs, look at the historical process as steps, each influencing the next, and the 
fluctuations in KPD theory as the conscious reflection of each step, then we can 
begin to understand the process of the Stalinisation of the KPD. 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand how Marxist theory changed as 
it passed through its various phases. Often Marxist theoreticians or historians of 
Germany attempt to separate the two. This only makes sense, if anything for 
the purpose of simplicity. It is not the intention of this project to offer a 
thorough history of the KPD. Rather than utilise the existing political, 
historical, or sociology theory to explain the KPD during the Weimar Republic 
this thesis will analyse the KPD's political theory and how this theory related to 
its historical surroundings during this specific period. The theory that this thesis 
will be referring to is the Marxist theory of political organisation and education 
for the purposes of guiding the proletariat to the overthrow of CapitaliSM. 8 
The study of the KPD theory not only allows us to understand what 
motivated changes in the past, but also helps us to understand the state of 
Marxist theory today. Germany was the centre for Marxism from the birth of 
the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) to the end of the Weimar Republic. 
From the beginning the SPD was influential in not only in the popularisation of 
Marxism, but also its interpretation. The parties of the Second International 
looked to the Gennan party for theoretical and practical guidance. After the 
Russian Revolution this changed. The Gennan party was superseded only by 
the Russian party, yet the party remained an extremely important party in the 
8 Marx attached some importance to the training of the working class so that they did not fall 
prey to becoming a "plaything" in the hands of the ruling class. Marx's followers interpreted 
this as the necessity of a party to train and guide the working class in their revolutionary 
struggle. Karl Marx, "Marx to Freidrich Bolte 23 November 187 1, " Collected Works, 49 vols. 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1989) 44: 258-259. 
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Third International, albeit in second place. Essentially this meant that whatever 
happened in Gen-nany would determine the fate of the revolutionary aspirations 
of the rest of the Third International. It was here, during this transitional period, 
that Marxist theory became Stalinised. That is to say that it was in Germany, 
during the Weimar Republic that Marxist theory became detached from reality 
and not only became dogmatic, but became a theory of repression. These stains 
still remain within the Left today. 
Outline 
In order to understand the past we must also understand the theories and 
ideas that motivated their actions. The German Communists based themselves 
on Marxist theory. Therefore, it seems extremely important to understand the 
theory that guided their movement. Their interpretation of the theory during 
each critical transitional period influenced how they reacted to the next phase of 
their existence. That is to say, how they interpreted (theorised about) past 
events detennined how they would approach each consecutive step. 
Stylistically the thesis is broken up into four chapters, each showing how 
disjointed the Marxism of the German movement actually was. Where possible, 
the body of the text consists of theoretical analysis and much of the historical 
narrative is in the footnotes. There are, of course, exceptions. In cases where 
the historical narrative was crucial to the change in theory a more detailed 
description of the events has been offered. Each chapter serves as a stepping 
stone to the next - beginning with a historical overview of German Social 
Democracy, then to Rosa Luxemburg's contribution to German Social 
Democracy, then proceeding on to the influence of Lenin and the Comintern, 
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and concluding with the theory of Social Fascism. The point is to show the 
historical progression in which the focus of German Communist Party theory 
transformed from seeking the emancipation of the working class to the divide 
and conquering of the working class. 
The history of Marxist theory is inherently tied to the history of the 
German Social Democratic Party and its offspring German Communism. While 
the length limitation of the thesis does not allow room to offer an in depth 
analysis of German Socialism, the first chapter offers a historical narrative of 
the German Social Democratic Party during its Imperial Germany phase. The 
first chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis. The purpose of the chapter 
is merely to offer a historical overview of where the KPD came from - it is 
meant to paint a historical picture of the conditions in which the German 
Communist Party was trying to develop as a revolutionary party. 
Following on from Social Democracy the second chapter - "Rosa 
Luxemburg's Contribution to German Socialism" - discusses the role that 
Luxemburg played in the development of the German Communist Party. Rosa 
Luxemburg was a journalist, an activist, and undoubtedly a Marxist theoretician. 
She played an integral role in the fon-nation of the German Communist Party 
and attempted to build a mass party that was grounded in Marxist theory. 
Luxemburg attempted to build a party and theory that reflected the German 
situation. Unfortunately, she and Karl Liebknecht were arrested and murdered 
by govenunent forces while the party was still in its infancy. Her influence as a 
symbol of Bolshevik opposition was enduring, particularly among the young. 
Therefore, when the world economic and political situation changed the 
Comintern attempted to destroy her theoretical influence and reinvented her as a 
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"mistaken" martyr. It is ironic that in their polemics Luxemburg and Lenin 
disagreed on many points, but they both agreed on the necessity of theory to 
guide the movement. So what happened to the theory? cp-- 
Luxemburg's murder marked a significant turning point in the theoretical 
development of the German movement. The victory of the Russian Revolution 
meant that the leaderless movement looked toward the Bolsheviks for 
theoretical and practical guidance, while at the same time they attempted to 
remain true to their own traditions. Essentially this is the point of the third 
chapter - "Crisis of theory in the Comintern" - examines what happened to 
German Marxist theory after Luxemburg died. Chapter three begins with 
Lenin's attempts to create a uniform party structure and theoretical uniformity 
in the German party. Lenin and the Bolshevik were desperate to spread the 
revolution throughout Europe, in the hopes of saving their revolution. The 
German workers' movement had been the strongest in Europe - both 
theoretically and practically. If revolution were to spread the obvious country 
would be Germany. Lenin believed his party had demonstrated that they 
possessed the "correct" theory and that all the Comintern's parties should adopt 
their model. It is clear that Lenin sought a Socialist outcome, albeit by force. 
Lenin's attempts to replace the German party practice and theory with Russian 
party practice and theory were unsuccessful and hindered the fledgling party 
from developing. Rather than fight the Bolshevik's attempts to dominate the 
party, the KPD leaders resigned their positions. 
The devastating defeat of the "German October" in 1923 marked the end of 
a revolutionary era. Up to this point it was believed that the world revolution 
was not only possible but imminent. However no successful socialist revolution 
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had occurred in any other country except Russia. All attempts had been 
systematically put down by counter-revolutionary forces and were followed by 
severe backlashes. By the end of the revolutionary period of 1919 - 1923 many 
Communist parties throughout Western and Eastern Europe operated on a semi- 
legal or illegal basis. Capitalism had firmly managed to re-establish itself. This 
period became known as the "period of relative stabilisation. " The Soviet 
leaders were forced to refocus their attention on rebuilding the Soviet economy 
until the revolutionary tide turned. Lenin's death in 1924 changed everything. 
In the CPSU the power struggle that followed served to discredit the old 
Bolshevik's and paved the way for Stalin to emerge as the premier lone leader. 
In the Comintem, Lenin's death and the "period of relative stabilisation" had a 
detrimental effect on the development of revolutionary theory as well as the 
political practice of the KPD. 
In an effort to contain and control its member parties the Comintern 
introduced the policy of "Bolshevisation. " Bolshevisation attempted to pick up 
where Lenin's Policy of Uniformity left off. It was a more exaggerated form of 
the Policy of Uniformity. It insisted on loyalty, obedience, and sought 
theoretical cohesion. Unlike Lenin's Policy of Uniformity, Bolshevisation was 
not about the revolution. Bolshevisation took place in the midst of the power 
struggle in the Soviet Union and served to russify the Comintern's parties and 
stamp out all international opposition. It was also during this period that 
Socialism in One Country began to gain popularity in the Soviet Union, 
replacing the internationalism of Marxism with the nationalism of Stalinism. 
It is under these turbulent conditions that the party become truly Stalinised 
and Marxist theory became completely cut off from reality. The fourth chapter 
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- the Third Period and Social Fascism - describes the origins of the concept of 
Social Fascism in Germany. The Maslow-Fischer reign and their pursuit of 
Bolshevisation created the appropriate environment for the concept of Social 
Fascism to flourish into a quasi-theory. Social Fascism as a theory and 
campaign picked up where Bolshevisation left off. It was an extreme form of 
Bolshevisation. Like Bolshevisation before it, Social Fascism served to divide 
the working class movement by creating a constant enemy from within the 
working class - the SPD leaders and later the SPD workers. But it was not until 
the declaration of the arrival of the Third Period that Social Fascism became 
truly destructive - where mere name calling was transformed into a fully 
fledged campaign. Masquerading as a theory, Social Fascism was justified and 
validated as an effective weapon, not against Social Democracy, but against the 
working class as a whole. Although the adoption of Social Fascism has been 
accused of being a dramatic shift, in reality KPD theory had merely followed 
the course laid down for it by the previous Comintern policies and arrived at its 
natural conclusion - the theory of Social Fascism. 
Sources 
As this thesis mainly deals with the theoretical aspects of the German 
Communist movement, a traditional literary review seems out of place, 
therefore, this section will discuss the type of sources used. If the historical 
debates were relevant to the overall argument, they have been listed in the 
footnotes in the main body of the thesis. The majority of the primary sources 
used in this thesis were gathered at Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und 
Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAMPO) in Berlin and the 
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Hoover Institute for War and Peace Library and Archives at Stanford University 
in California. It was unnecessary to travel to Russia to access Soviet archives as 
the required Comintern sources were published in periodicals or available at 
SAMPO or the Hoover Institute. 
The sources used for this research were KPD and Comintern training 
material such as party school handbooks, KPD and Comintern periodicals, 
official reports such as Central Committee reports, protocol, theses and 
resolutions, statutes, speeches and programmes from the various Comintern 
conferences and Plenums. These sources were chosen because they provided 
the best insight as to how KPD theory changed in an official capacity, 
particularly during the "period of relative stabilisation" and the so called "Third 
Period. " Primary sources, such as books or periodicals in general circulation, 
have been listed according to their publishers as they can still be found in more 
than one location and do not require special clearance to access them. In cases 
where sources are no longer in circulation the name of the holder (i. e. the library 
or archive) has been listed in the footnotes. 
Many of the theoretical sources, such as the writings of Marx and Engels, 
Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, and Trotsky have been published in English and where 
possible these sources were used. In the case of original German Communist 
propaganda and training material, found in archives or libraries, the translations 
are my own unless otherwise stated. 
Many of the secondary sources were obtained at various libraries in the UK 
and from the UC Berkeley library. Certain secondary sources have been used as 
primary sources in this thesis, for example Victor Serge's Witness to the 
German Revolution, Ruth Fischer's Stalin and Gennan Communism, Franz 
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Borkenau's The Communist International, and Paul Levi's Rosa Luxembur&. 
Her Life and Work. Although these works were interpretative and attempted to 
analyse the time period, they were also witnesses to the events that they were 
trying to examine. For example, Ruth Fischer's Stalin and German 
Communism is an attempt at examining the KPD history during the entire 
Weimar period from the Left perspective. Like Herman Weber after her and 
Trotsky before her, Fischer blames Soviet interference, but more specifically 
Stalin, for the failings of the German party. As a secondary source Fischer's 
account is rather problematic. Firstly, as a historical piece of work, Ruth 
Fischer's book is flawed. She did not provide a bibliography, her sources 
throughout the work are limited, and there are several inaccuracies with dates 
and events. Secondly, Fischer's tone is largely defensive. Mainly because of 
the dubious role she played in the German Communist Party as one of its 
leaders during an extremely transitional period. 9 Fischer, famously, launched 
the attacks against Rosa Luxemburg and her supporters in the mid-1920's. The 
purging of the Right wing of the KPD had dire consequences for the theoretical 
development of the party. However, as critical as one is about Fischer's work, 
treated as a primary source, it remains an important piece of work for a student 
of KPD history. Dates and details of events can be obtained from more reliable 
sources, but first hand accounts offer the reader invaluable to anyone attempting 
to gain any understanding of the German Party during this turbulent period. 
The main secondary source I relied on for this project was Herman 
Weber's Die Waldung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der 
KPD in der Weimar Republic. In 1970, in reference to the 1969 publication of 
9 This topic certainly requires more attention and could be a project in its own right. 
Unfortunately due to the time restraints and word limitations of this thesis, I have limited my 
examination of Ruth Fischer's role in so far as her policies affected the change in KPD theory. 
11 
Weber's Die Waldung Eric Hobsbawm asked if such a large piece of work was 
necessary. The answer was yes. Hobsbawm further queried the possibility of 
performing thorough research on the topic of Gennan Communism as, at the 
time, many of the records were inaccessible in Moscow or East Berlin. "Let us 
be grateful for what we have until something better is possible. "10 Interestingly. ) 
the Berlin Wall came crashing down in 1989 and archival material is readily 
accessible and yet, Herman Weber's work is still most thorough piece of work 
on the German Communist Party (KPD) during the Weimar Republic. Weber's 
work has been criticised for focusing the blame of the KPD's political failure on 
the Soviet Union. This argument certainly has merit, however this is not the 
whole story. The KPD was internally weak. Although it claimed to uphold the 
traditions of Rosa Luxemburg and remained sceptical of Soviet interference, 
from the onset KPD leaders allowed the Bolsheviks to meddle in KPD affairs. 
Indeed it is true that Soviet interference irreversibly damaged the German 
movement but the German leaders, who allowed the Bolsheviks to dominate the 
German party in the first place, must take part of the responsibility. Even 
though I did not entirely agree with Weber's analysis, his work was extremely 
useful to my understanding of the German party. 
The English literature examining the Gennan Communist Party during the 
entire Weimar Republic is rather limited. Nothing in English resembles Weber's 
Die WaIdung. The best English source I found was from the American 
historian Eric D. Weitz. Although I did not always agree with Weitz's analysis, 
his work offered useful and thought provoking insight into the Social and 
Political History of the KPD. 
10 Eric Hobsbawm, "Confronting Defeat: The German Communist Party, " Revolutionaries: 
ContemporM Essgys (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) 43. 
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In the case of the history of the Soviet Union, the opposite is true. There is 
almost an overabundance of sources available in English from both the Right 
and Left perspective. For a general overview of the Soviet Union I relied 
mainly on E. H. Carr, in part because Carr wrote a fair amount on the topic. 
Carr's approach was mainly narrative, which suited my purposes as the thesis is 
not attempting to re-examine the Soviet Union, but rather to examine the 
changes in Marxist theory. 
13 
Chapter One: Introduction - The Origins of German Communism: A 
Historical Narrative of the German Social Democratic Party 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the theoretical origins of the 
German Communist Party (KPD) by offering a historical narrative of the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The history of German Marxism is 
inherently tied to the history of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). 
Marx and Engels eventual blessing of the party helped it rise to become the 
most important Socialist party in Europe. Although the party considered itself a 
Marxist party, a dual reformist current plagued the party from the outset. The 
party's inability to develop a strong theoretical foundation erupted in potentially 
destructive debates until the party finally split into three. 
This chapter has been split into three sections. The first section of this 
chapter - "The Gotha Unity" - will discuss the initial step towards uniting the 
two strands of the German workers' movement at a conference in Gotha. Marx 
and Engels initially opposed the Gotha Programme because they believed it 
conceded too much to the Lassalleans. But Marx and Engels' influence proved 
to be rather limited as the unity at Gotha was reached and the reformist 
tendencies of the Lassalleans flourished. 
The second section - "From the Erfurt Programme to Bureaucracy" will 
discuss the consequences of the reform versus revolution dichotomy. The 
division in the party's theoretical foundations became overtly obvious during 
the Revisionist debates and the 1905/06 Revolution. This chapter will discuss 
the consequences of those debates. 
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The third section - "From War Credits to Republic" - will discuss the 
final 
years of the Social Democratic Party as a united party, the war years, and the 
party's declaration of the Gennan Republic at the end in 1918. 
This chapter is meant as a historical overview whose purpose is to describe 
the SPD's influence on the political theory of the KPD. It is not a thorough 
history of the SPD. For this reason the use of primary sources has been strictly 
limited. It is not the intention of this thesis to blame the SPD for the failings of 
German Communism, but merely to show the origins of some of the theoretical 
and practical problems innate in the German Communist movement. 
The Gotha Unity 
The birth of the German Social Democratic Party was just as precarious 
as its life. The SPD originated out of the unity between the two strands in the 
workers' movement - the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutchlands 
(SDAP - Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany) - 
followers of Karl 
Marx and Fredrick Engels and the Allgemeiner Deutsche Arbeiterverein 
(ADAV - General German Worker's Association) - followers of Ferdinand 
Lassalle. 11 Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel were early followers of Karl 
Marx and Fredrick Engels. 12 Their personal association with Marx and Engels 
inflated their credibility. 
11 On February 14-15,1875 a conference took place in Gotha to negotiate the unity between the 
two groups. It was at this conference that the Gotha Programme was officially signed and the 
two opposing parties joined to form the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (SAP - Socialist Workers' 
Party). The party adopted the name the Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1891 following 
the Erfurt Conference. Georg Eckert, "Die Konsolidierung der sozialdemokratischen 
Arbeiterbewegung zwischen Reichsgriindung und Sozialistengesetz, " Sozialdemokratie 
zwischen Klassenbeweguniz und Volkspartei, ed. Hans Mommsen (Frankfurt am Main: 
Athenäum Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH & Co., 1974) 44-46. 
12 Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826 - 1900) participated in the revolution of 1848 and after its failure 
escaped to Switzerland and then to London. While in London he joined the Communist League 
where he came into association with Marx and Engels and eventually became a convert to their 
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Marx and Engels were very interested in the political development of the 
workers' movements in Germany and observed their development. 13 As is 
generally the case with compromising situations not everyone was pleased with 
the outcome. Marx and Engels observed the proceedings from England and 
kept in close correspondence with the Eisenach Group. Bebel had "deep 
misgivings" about the negotiations between the Eisenachers and the Lassalleans 
and expressed these to Engels. Engels, upon seeing the draft of the programme, 
wrote to Bebel a detailed letter and warned against any compromises that would 
endanger their Marxist principles. Bebel and the other Eisenachers ignored the 
warnings. Marx and Engels were infuriated at the programme adopted at Gotha 
and even threatened to "disassociate [themselves] from the programmes 
principles. " 14 Marx wrote to Bracke a critical analysis of the draft programme, 
which he hoped would be circulated amongst the leaders. Marx took points of 
programme he disagreed with and commented on them. Marx warned that the 
Gotha Programme conceded too much to the Lassalleans and although the unity 
theories. He returned to Germany in 1862 where he met August Bebel (1840 - 1913) in 
Leipzig. Under the influence of Liebknecht, Bebel also converted to Marxism. In 1866 they 
formed the Sdchsische Volkspartei (Saxon People's Party). Susanne Miller and Heinrich 
Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present (1983; 
Leamington Spa, Hamburg, and New York: Berg Publishers, Ltd., 1986) 25. 
13 Paastela described role played by Marx and Engels during this period as that of "consultant" 
to the leaders of various workers' parties. They did not actually exercise any power over the 
leaders or the parties. The leaders of the various organisations took the advice given to them by 
Marx and Engels into consideration and then decided to do what was best for their organisation. 
For example, Marx sent his criticism of the Gotha Programme to Wilhelm Bracke and other 
leaders for circulation. Marx explicitly stated, "the programme's no good. " Liebknecht, who 
felt the Gotha Congress was a victory, disagreed with Marx and did not even show the criticism 
to August Bebel. Jukka Paastela, Marx's and Engel's Concepts of the Parties and Political 
Organizations of the Working Class (Tampere: University of Tampere, 1985) 211,219; Karl 
Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme, " Collected Works, 49 vols. (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1975) 24: 78. 
14 Mehring claimed that Marx and Engels regarded the Lassalleans as a dying sect and 
eventually they would capitulate to a programme designed by the followers of Marx - the 
Eisenach group. They therefore, saw no reason to negotiate or compromise with them. The 
leaders of the Eisenach group, however, disagreed, and felt unity to be the only way to move 
forward. David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1973) 431; Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The Stoly of His Life (London: 
Butler and Tanner, 1948) 508-509; Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme, " Collected 
Works, 49 vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975) 24: 77. 
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itself was a positive move, the programme underestimated the potential 
problems involved in the unity of two opposing socialist groups. The letter and 
the critique had no effect on the proceedings, in part because it was not 
circulated as Marx had hoped. It was shown to some leaders but not others, for 
example Bebel was not shown the Critique. 15 
Needless to say the warnings of both Marx and Engels were ignored and 
a compromise in Gotha was reached. Marx and Engels were not consulted on 
the final content of the programme and learned of the final programme from the 
newspaper. They observed the proceedings of the Gotha congress and their 
warnings were largely ignored. They were angry that their warning had gone 
unheeded. Although they were unhappy with the unity, they did not 
disassociate themselves from the new organisation that later became the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD). A complete break with the movement 
would have meant cutting themselves off completely from the German workers' 
movement at a time when it appeared to be moving forward. 
Marx's inability to wield influence over the Eisenachers occurred for three 
reasons. Firstly, part of the problem had to do with Marx and Engels' attitude 
toward political parties. They did not view political parties as the decisive 
stepping-stone in the revolutionary struggle- '6 But that is not to say that 
political parties should not play a role in the development of the workers' 
movement. Marx and Engels were not strangers to political participation, as 
was demonstrated by their involvement in the Communist League and the First 
15 In fact Marx's Critique was not widely circulated until 1891 when Engels, with the help of 
Karl Kautsky, published the letter and Marx's criticism in Neue Zeit. GDH Cole, A Histo! 3ý of 
Socialist Thought: The Second International 1889-1914,7 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co. 
Ltd., 1956) 3: 255. 
16 One must note that the growth of local national political organisations did not occur until after 
the disintegration of the First International. 
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International. They clearly viewed political organisations as playing some role 
in the revolutionary struggle. 17 Yet Marx's writing on political parties remained 
scant with the exception of a few mentions scattered throughout his works. 
Marx never developed the role of political parties into a theory-' 8 Marx's 
propaganda piece, The Communist Manifesto, mentioned the role of parties, but 
in a superficial capacity and only in relation to the role of Communists. 
"The communists do not form a separate party opposed to 
other working class parties.... The immediate aim of the 
communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: 
formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the 
bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the 
proletariat. " 
19 
The role of the party was not to work against the working class but with it. The 
writings of Marx are unclear about his position on the role of parties in the 
workers' movement and as a result his actual influence in the development of a 
Marxist party in Germany was limited. 
Marx's writing on political parties may have been limited but his criticism 
of the Gotha programme offered some insight into his view of the role he 
believed parties should play in the revolutionary struggle. 
17 In his letter to Bolte Marx implies the need for some type of organisation i. e. a party. Karl 
Marx, "Marx to Freidrich Bolte 23 November 1871, " Collected Works, 49 vols. (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1989) 44: 258-259 
18 Marx and Engels did not establish a plan or a rigid structure for parties to follow. In fact if 
one is looking for a developed theory of political parties, one must look not to Marx but to the 
Marxist. Monty Johnstone accurately pointed out that there was nothing in the works of Marx 
and Engels "to justify Stalin's attempt to present as Marxist his theory that Socialism demands a 
one-party system. " Monty Johnstone, "Marx and Engels and the Concept of the Party, " Karl 
Marx's Social and Political Thought: Critical Assessments, ed. Bob Jessop, 4 vols. (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1990) 3: 183. 
19 Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto, 4hed. (New York: Pathfinder, 1995) 27. 
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"It is altogether self-evident that, to be able to fight at all, the 
working class must organise itself at home as a class and that 
its own country is the immediate arena of its struggle.... The 
internal activity of the working classes does not in any way 
depend on the existence of the 'International Working Men's 
,, 20 Association'. 
Marx did not view the existence of First International or any other party as 
necessary in the revolutionary struggle. For Marx, the most important thing was 
for the working class to evolve into a class, aware and conscious of its historical 
role. Marx did see the need for parties but only as far as they might provide 
assistance to the working class in achieving their goal. He was quite vague how 
parties and their organisers might arise. One can only assume that during the 
evolutionary period the working class would form organisations to help educate 
other members of the working class and recruit members of other classes. The 
formation of parties would occur through the energy and movement from within 
the working class and not from an outside source. Marx did not view role of the 
party with as great importance as contemporary writers. He viewed political 
parties as loosely structured organisations. He believed organisations needed to 
be flexible so that the proletariat could develop and redevelop as history itself 
developed and changed. 21 Organisations, such as the Communist League, were 
the expression of the development of the proletariat, they were the place where 
theory and practice met, but a party was not the instrument by which practice 
became realised. The purpose of these organisations and their leadership was to 
20 Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme, " Collected Works, 49 vols. (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1975) 24: 89-90. 
21 Rossanda pointed out that Marx was convinced "the proletariat does not require a specific and 
autonomous mode of organisation and expression, it creates and destroys as it goes along its 
political forms. " Rossana Rossanda, "Class and Party, " The Socialist Register eds. Ralph 
Miliband and John Saville (London: Merlin Press, 1970) 218. 
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provide education and assistance in the proletariat's evolution. The proletariat 
needed to first develop their consciousness in order to give expression to their 
frustration. They would then organise parties and organisations and use them as 
their tools for change. 22 The parties and organisations would not come first and 
use the proletariat as their tools for change. In this sense Marx had no use for 
vanguard parties. However, Marx and Engels believed that parties could 
potentially play a useful role and remained interested in the developments of 
socialist parties throughout Europe. 
Secondly, Marx and Engels were also limited by their geographical 
location. They were in England while Bebel and Liebknecht were in Germany. 
No one can deny that Marx and Engels made every attempt to remain informed 
with regard to the developments in the workers' movements but even with 
modem methods it is difficult to observe and critically assess what is going on 
abroad. Although Marx and Engels may have provided the theoretical 
foundation for the German Marxism, from their location in England they 
represented an outside force attempting to influence the internal dynamic of the 
workers' movement in Germany. To a certain extent their attempt to influence 
the German situation from the outside ran contradictory to Marx's own 
observations on the internal dynamic of the working class. While Bebel and 
Liebknecht valued the insight of Marx and Engels they ignored the criticisms of 
their mentors and did what they thought was best for the movement. Marx and 
Engels, perhaps aware of their limited influence, chose not to break with the 
newly formed party. 
22 Ralph Miliband also stressed this point. "Whatever the form of the party, it is the working 
class, its developing consciousness and its struggle for self-emancipation which really matter to 
Marx: the party is only the political expression and the instrument of the class. " Ralph 
Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) 120. 
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Finally, Marx's lack of development of his concept of the party began with 
his observations. He could only analyse what he observed. He was limited by 
his own historical surroundings. Marx lived during a time when most European 
countries did not have universal suffrage, freedom of speech or press. Most 
countries were still under the authoritarian powers of monarchs. Marx, himself, 
was forced to flee his native Germany on account of his political writings. 
Therefore, if universal suffrage did not exist then neither did political parities in 
the modem sense. 23 Contemporary parties by their nature strive for political 
power. They campaign in various ways to convince others to join them. If the 
extreme possibility of political power did not exist then the party was 
superfluous. These were the extreme conditions of the 19 th century Europe and 
this was what Marx observed. Even when universal suffrage was introduced in 
Wilhelmian Germany, the possibility for obtaining power did not exist. 24 
Groups of people wishing to organise and discuss political issues, instigate 
change, or even promote education were forced to do so in secret for fear of 
arrest. They had no hope of election by legal means. 25 Therefore, the only 
23 McLellan pointed out that mass political parties began to grow towards the end of Marx's life, 
and this was mainly due to the extension of suffrage in Western Europe. David McLellan, 
"Politics, " Marx: The First Hundred Years, ed. David McLellan (London: Frances Pinter 
(Vublishers), 1983) 15 1. 
2 JP Nettl accurately pointed out that political parties during this period were extremely limited. 
They could, of course, play a limited negative role. Parties could obstruct legislation, but the 
possibility for obtaining or sharing power was never available to them. Ultimate power rested 
with the Kaiser. Peter Nettl, "The German Social Democratic Party 1890-1914 as a Political 
Model, " Past and Present 30 (1965): 65. 
25 Robert Dahl asserted "the hypothesis that political parties are indispensable to democracy was 
not widely accepted during the lifetime of Marx and Engel even by those who set democracy, 
agrarian or capitalist, as their polity. " Regardless of one's politics, during the 19'h century, 
political parties were never regarded as a means to power. Dahl claimed that Marx was too set 
in his "dogma" and too preoccupied with finishing Capital that when dramatic political changes 
occurred (universal suffrage was introduced in Germany in 1866, the electoral reforms in 
England in 1867 and 1884, and the growth of socialist parties) Marx and Engels made no 
attempt to revise their ideas. Dahl then drew the conclusion that Marx did not develop adequate 
political theory. The point is senseless to argue, as it seems obvious that Marx never had any 
intention of developing political theory. Seeking political theory in Marx's writing implies that 
Marx accepted the State and hoped to change it from within. His intention was, however, not to 
change the system from within, but to completely destroy the system and create a new 
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possible method of changing the political situation was through the violent 
overthrow of the government - revolution. In Marx's view the only possibility 
of a successful revolution rested on the shoulders of a politically conscious 
working class. 
Marx and Engels may have given the name to the Marxist movement but it 
was Bebel and Liebknecht who wielded the real influence inside the German 
workers' movement. Much to Marx and Engels' frustration, they attempted to 
utilise Marx and Engels theories to build a mass party in Germany. It is clear 
from Marx and Engels writing that they had a view on the type of party they 
hoped would develop in Germany, however they did not develop these views 
into a theory. Their notion of the party remained scattered throughout their 
writing and their followers were forced to create their own version of the 
Marxist party. 
None the less, Marx's warnings were not without merit. In reality, the 
Eisenachers were frustrated Lassalleans and Marx provided a substantial 
alternative as well as a theoretical platform which explained their predicament. 
Wilhelm Liebknecht had a free hand in the design of the Programme and it was 
more Lassallean than Marxist. 26 Marx and Engels felt that the Gotha 
Programme conceded too much to the Lassalleans. Although Liebknecht was 
fully aware of Marx's hostility towards the programme, he believed that the 
egalitarian society. Robert Dahl, "Marxism and Free Parties, " The Journal of Politics 10.4 
(1948): 805,809,812. 
26 Although Lassalle's writings were sporadic, he had enduring appeal in the pre-SPD labour 
movement and his influence persisted long after the adoption of the Erfurt programme. 
Lassalle's version of Socialism did not require the overthrow of the state and could be realised 
within the confines of the state. Lassalle's ideas were passionate, however, much to Marx's 
frustration, they lacked substance and depth. Lassalle was a legend in the working class 
movement, more for his personality rather than his theories. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
Gotha Programme should have been so heavily influenced by Lassalle. For example the 
programme insisted on the "abolition of the iron law of wages. " In reply to "Lassalle's dogmas" 
Marx insisted, "Lassalle did not know what wages were. " Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha 
programme, " Collected Works, 49 vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1989) 24: 92. 
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unity was more important. Liebknecht's determination to see the unity through 
came at a price. His refusal to demand that the Lassalleans adopt a non- 
reformist Marxist programme allowed a contradictory tendency to flourish 
within the movement. The existence of such a contradictory programme not 
only enabled the SPD to expand, but also had a detrimental effect on the 
Marxist movement as a whole. On the one hand the SPD was at the epicentre of 
Marxist revolutionary theory and officially promoted a Marxist programme, on 
the other it allowed an undercurrent of reform to flourish. 
Marx and Engels' eventual blessing of the party allowed the SPD to 
dominate the Second International both practically and theoretically. As the 
chief interpreters of Marx's theories, the SPD played a remarkable role in the 
advancement of Marxism in the European Socialist movement. However, the 
situation was not as straight forward as it might seem. Although revolutionary 
Marxism was the official doctrine of the SPD, a reformist stream persisted as an 
undercurrent. This conflicting dichotomy existed since the compromise at the 
Gotha Conference in 1875 and continued to resurface until the party's voting for 
war credits in 1914 finely broke the SPD into three. From the onset Social 
Democracy was torn between its Marxist theory and reformism. 
From the Erfurt Programme to Bureaucracy 
Shortly after the unity at Gotha Bismarck unleashed the Anti-Socialist 
Laws (1878-1890). The differences between the Marxist and the Lassalleans 
became irrelevant as they were all under assault for being Socialists. The party 
provided a giant umbrella and drew its strength from its numbers. All those 
involved with socialist movements could have potentially been sent to prison. 
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Many SPD members and leaders were jailed for their Socialist affiliation, but 
not all. Those leaders who had suffered under Bismarck's repression, those 
whose professional lives suffered, etc tended towards a more revolutionary form 
of Marxism. Those who suffered less leaned more towards a reformist 
approach. While this divide may help explain the course that the party pursued 
in the run up to the voting for war credits, at the time this divide was not that 
significant. The loose structure of German Social Democracy allowed various 
currents to exist and they were openly debated. Gennan Social Democracy 
emerged from Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Laws as the leading Marxist party in 
Europe. 
The Anti-Socialist Laws were overturned in 1890 and by 1891 the Social 
Democratic Workers' Party of Germany had become known as the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Years of repression and underground 
organization helped drive out the utopianism of the Lassalleans, but not the 
reformism. In 1891 Ignaz Auer, August Bebel, and Wilhelm Liebknecht 
formed a committee to rewrite the Gotha Programme along more Marxist lines. 
The SPD adopted its official Marxist programme at the Erfurt conference in 
1891. The draft was prepared by Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein and 
became known as the Erfurt Programme. 27 The Programme was largely 
inspired by the Communist Manifesto and emphasized the class struggle through 
its clear demarcation between the aspirations of the working class and the 
27 The Erfuri Programme, largely written by Karl Kautsky, insured that the SPD was a Marxist 
party. However, there was not one overr iding theory that governed the SPD. The SPD did not 
possess a theory of taking power or a theory of the role of the party. Such concepts were openly 
debated between the Right, Left and Centre, but there was not one single SPD theory that 
dominated the SPD- Yet, something held the three currents together. In the early years all three 
currents were Marxist and sought a socialist outcome. They merely could not agree on the 
details. As time went on this lack of theoretical cohesion became problematic and eventually 
the Right wing of SPD drifted away from Marxist theory altogether. 
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repressive role of the State. However, a problem existed that neither Marx nor 
Engels recognised. Even from the beginning the theoretical understanding of 
Marx's writing amongst the leadership in the Eisenacher group was in fact very 
poor. The leaders that joined the Eisenachers were disillusioned Lassalleans 
who had turned to Marxism as different path to revolution and perhaps this 
explains their reluctance to place strict demands on the Lassalleans, as the 
Marxist leaders themselves were significantly influenced by the ideas of 
Lassalle. 28 
As the chief interpreters of Marxism, the SPD played a key role in the 
advancement of Marxism in the European Socialist movement. While the early 
years of the SPD are generally regarded as the "golden years" for the 
development of Marxist theory, this period was plagued with a remarkable lack 
of theoretical cohesion. However, as the political and economic situation 
changed in Germany the dichotomy between its Marxist revolutionary theory 
and its behaviour as a mainstream party seeking reform within the parliamentary 
system grew. As the party made parliamentary gains the divisions within the 
party became increasingly polarised as the Executive's focus moved away from 
the revolutionary rhetoric of the Erfurt Programme, which had gained them 
support. The party's inability to develop a strong theoretical foundation meant 
that it was unable to develop the internal dynamic of the working class in the 
revolutionary struggle. 
The consequences of this dichotomy between reform and revolution 
manifested itself in potentially destructive open debate. This division in the 
SPD's theoretical foundations became overtly obvious first during the 
28 The interpretation of Marx's writing was taken up by younger Social Democrats, such as 
Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg under the banner of Orthodoxy. 
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revisionist controversy and then during the 1905/06 uprisings. The Erfurt 
Programme demonstrated the official victory of the Marxist over the 
Lassalleans, but this is not to say that it represented the victory over reformism. 
The strained relationship between the revolutionary Marxists and the refonn 
minded Lassalleans quickly became apparent. Within less than a decade of the 
Erfurt conference the revisionist debates led by one of the programme's 
architects, Eduard Bernstein, nearly destroyed the party. Eduard Bernstein 
published a series of articles in Die Neue Zeit on "The Problems of Socialism" 
from 1896-1898. Bernstein insisted that the nature of the party had changed. 
He claimed that the SPD was no longer a revolutionary party but a "democratic 
socialist" party of reform. While Bernstein had ruffled numerous feathers, for 
the most part the SPD executive were willing to allow the whole thing to blow 
over. However, Bernstein had taken things too far when he allegedly announced 
that "the final aim is nothing, the movement is everything. " The SPD Executive 
was no longer able to ignore him. Karl Kautsky and the SPD's new arrival, 
Rosa Luxemburg, took up the task of dealing with Bernstein . 
29 The SPD 
officially sided with Luxemburg and rejected Bernstein's concept of 
66 evolutionary socialism" at the International Congress, which met in 
Amsterdam in August 1904. Bernstein certainly made some valid points, albeit 
his execution was flawed and Rosa Luxemburg had no problem in destroying 
his arguments. The German Social Democratic Party was changing and 
Bernstein certainly had support within the SPD Executive. However, the party 
was not in a position to officially make these changes as it owed much of its 
popularity to the Erfurt Programme. The official defeat of the Revisionists did 
29 For a more detailed description of Luxemburg's role in the Revisionist Controversy see 
chapter 2. 
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not kill the reformism in the party, quite the contrary, it continued to flourish 
and once again resurfaced during the mass strikes debates, which followed the 
1905 uprisings. 
The Russian Revolution of 1905 sparked strikes and protests all over 
Central Europe. The situation was no different in Gennany as strikes and 
protests spontaneously erupted. For Rosa Luxemburg the 1905/06 revolution 
signified the revolutionary potential of the German working class. Much to the 
frustration of Rosa Luxemburg, the Party Executive and the Trade Unions not 
only offered little support to the strikes, but they also actively tried to prevent 
them. Luxemburg was aware that the political and economic climate had 
changed, but she had not yet realised that by 1905 the Party's dynamic had also 
changed. The Social Democratic Party had begun to change and was shifting 
away from revolution toward a more reformist path. With their new found 
allies, the Trade Unions, the German Social Democratic Party had made 
significant parliamentary gains. The SPD Executive was antagonistic toward 
anyone or anything that might jeopardise their newly secured relationship with 
the Trade Unions. The Trade Unions were sceptical of revolutionary rhetoric 
that drew the rank and file away from the day to day struggle. 
The 1905/06 Revolutions marked a tremendous watershed in the history of 
the German Socialist movement. At the Jena Congress held in September 1905 
Bebel put forward the motion in support of the use of the general strike. The 
party passed the resolution with a large majority. In principle the SPD 
supported the use of the general strike as a political weapon under certain 
circumstances. However, this was not the reality of the situation. When 
unofficial strikes had broken out in 1905 the party and the Trade Unions 
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attempted to prevent them. In refusing to support the strikes the SPD Executive 
demonstrated that they were no longer restrained by the revolutionary rhetoric 
of the Erfurt Programme. The party and the Trade Unions not only refused to 
support the strikes, in 1906 when Luxemburg returned from Poland eager to 
theorise and utilise the lessons learned from the 1905/06 revolution, her efforts 
were met with intense opposition from both the SPD Executive and the Trade 
Unions. 30 They were hostile at Luxemburg's attempts to discuss the issue of 
general strikes as political weapons. The defeat of the Russian Revolution 
allotted the Trade Unions enough leverage to convince Bebel and the SPD 
Executive of the dangers of misusing the mass strike. By the Mannheim 
Congress, Bebel changed his position on the use of mass strike as a political 
weapon. 
The Mannheim Congress marked a crucial turning point in the course that 
the SPD pursued after 1905. The issue was not merely the Trade Unions' 
attitude toward the use of mass strike for political purposes. The Trade Unions 
had demonstrated that they had also emerged from the Anti-Socialist Laws a 
powerful and influential force. While the Trade Unions and the party had 
always been separate entities, the Trade Unions had been in a subordinate 
position to the SPD Executive and tended to remain neutral in politics. 
Neutrality was necessary for recruitment purposes and cooperation with non- 
socialist unions. However the mass strike debates brought the Trade Unions out 
of their neutrality. The Mannheim Congress in 1906 not only placed the Trade 
Unions on equal footing with the SPD Executive, but also demonstrated the 
party's dependence on the Trade Unions. As a result of the Mannheim 
" For a more detailed discussion of Luxemburg's role in the Mass Strike debates see chapter 2. 
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Congress the Trade Unions won increasing influence over the SPD and its 
policies. 
31 The Trade Unions clearly were not revolutionary nor did their 
interest in the day to day struggle require the destruction of capitalism. As a 
result of the Trade Unions suspicion of Marxist theory, their influence changed 
the theoretical and practical course of the party. 
As a consequence of the SPD's dependence on the Trade Unions, a new 
type of revisionism became the official position of the party - one that was 
devoid of theory - and the divisions within the party grew. 
32 The internal party 
dynamic began to change during this period. The debates that took place in the 
party's Congresses and in the various party journals no longer reflected the 
debates taking place in the inner circles of the party. The party shifted away 
from its revolutionary Marxism toward what Robert Michels termed as 
oligarchy. 33 The party expanded and increased its paid ftill time members of 
staff in order to deal with the increase in the number of members, the intake of 
dues, the party press, etc thus paving the way for the career SPD politician. The 
SPD Executive appointed local and regional secretaries, who were on the party 
payroll. The party became increasingly centralised and maintained tight control 
over elected members and representatives of mass organisations. Of course this 
increasing bureaucratisation had to do with more than the mere fact that the 
31 In effect, the Mannheim Congress of 1906 negated the 1905 Jena Congress, while at the same 
time claiming to uphold it. Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard 
Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952) 238. 
32 Peter Gay made a very important point. He asserted that while the Trade Unions were the ally 
of Revisionism and gave the movement strength, they did not create the movement. The 
leading Revisionists were intellectuals not trade union leaders. "If there had been no Revisionist 
movement, trade unions would have celebrated their 1906 Mannheim triumph without it. " 
Essentially the Trade Unions were intent on pursuing a specific path and it had nothing to do 
with theory. Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge 
to _Marx 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1952) 130. 
33 Michels claimed that part of the self-preservation mechanism of large organisations, that 
democracy was impossible. "Democracy has an inherent preference for the authoritarian 
solution of important questions. " Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the 
olig Lrchical Tendencies of Modem Democracy., trans. Edan and Cedar Paul (New York: The 
Free Press, 1962) 342. 
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party had paid members of staff. 
34 The political and economic conditions in 
Germany had changed in such a way that allowed these changes to take place 
within the party. Revolutionary rhetoric was no longer necessary to bind the 
party together. 
From War Credits to a Republic 
Having fallen out of favour with the SPD Executive as a result of the mass 
strike debates and frustrated by the course the party was taking Left and Centre 
became more and more marginalised until the party was divided into three 
mutually hostile camps. 35 The Right wing of the party found their champion in 
the form of Friedrich Ebert. 36 Ebert became General Secretary in 1906 and 
34 Essentially this hierarchically structured, highly disciplined, and centralised party became a 
model for Lenin and the other members the Second International. From 1904 - 1914 the central 
executive was enlarged, regional organisations strengthened, and new ones were created. The 
SPD created party schools in Berlin in 1907 and organised social and cultural events such as 
excursions and singing groups. These activities increased the party's reputation as a state within 
a state and made it the envy of the Second International. However unlike Lenin's conception of 
the "career" revolutionary, Friedrich Ebert's purpose was not revolution, but to build a party 
that could compete with other mainstream political parties. Pierre Brou6, The German 
Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 21; JP Nettl, "The German 
Social Democratic Party 1890-1914 as a Political Model, " Past and Present 30 (1965): 76-77; 
Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The Development of the Great 
Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 127. 
35 While the divisions within the adult movement increased in the period of 1904 - 1906 youth 
groups developed spontaneously. Unlike the Communist youth movements, the SPD's youth 
groups were not officially created by the party as the party executive saw no need to have a 
separate organisation for the young. Clara Zetkin was the first to recognise the potential of the 
youth movement. Zetkin developed a theory of youth training and believed that the youth 
organisations had something to add to German Social Democracy as a whole. Having been 
marginalised and pushed out of key party positions many on the Left focused their energies in 
the SPD's party school. Therefore, it is not surprising that the youth of the SPD became the 
leaders of the German Communist Party, for example Wilhelm Piek and Heinrich Brandler were 
former students of Rosa Luxemburg. Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: 
The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 97-108. 
36 Friedrich Ebert (1871-1925) was a saddler by trade. Ebert joined the party quite young and 
had made a name for himself as a talented organiser and administrator. In 1900 he became 
Bremen's first paid labour secretary. Schorske described Ebert as, "Colorless, cool, determined, 
industrious, and intensely practical, Ebert had all those characteristics which were to make him, 
mutatis mutandis, the Stalin of Social Democracy. " That is to say, Stalin in bureaucratic form. 
Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The Development of the Great 
Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 124; also see H. Schurer, "The Russian 
Revolution of 1905 and the Origins of German Communism, " Slavonic and East European 
Review 39 (1961): 469; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer 
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Chairman of the SPD in 1913 after Bebel died. It was under Ebert's leadership 
that the party became an efficient bureaucratic machine. The new party 
Executive was not theoretical and eventually the party bureaucracy became 
more interested in maintaining itself than it was in politics. 37 The main 
function of the party became to increase its electoral winnings and to avoid 
tactics that would alienate the non-socialist voter, rather than seeking 
revolution. Indeed in during the 1906-1914 period the SPD dramatically 
increased its voter capacity and became the largest single party in the Reichstag. 
The party bureaucracy would demonstrate how mainstream it had become when 
it backed the Kaiser's bid for war in 1914. Although not all the SPD 
representatives in the Reichstag agreed with the party's decision to vote in 
favour of war credits, those that were in opposition agreed not to break party 
discipline. On the 4th of August 1914 the SPD Reichstag delegation 
unanimously voted for war credits, including Karl Liebknecht. 38 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005) 24; David McLellan, Marxism After Marx: An Introduction (London: 
MacMillan Press, LTD, 1979) 53. 
37 The Marxism of the SPD was carried on by the marginalised Left and Centre. Although Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were the most famous of the Left wing of the SPD, the Left 
was actually composed of a small group, which included Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian 
Karski (Marchlewski), and Parvus (Helphand). Unlike the Right and the Left, the Centre had no 
political line of its own and often acted as a buffer between the Right and the Left. None the 
less, the Centre found its voice in the form of Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein. Ironically 
Bernstein, who was nearly expelled from the party for his revisionism did not align himself with 
the revisionist on Right of the party. Unlike the Right, Bernstein defended his views as Marxist 
and his version of revisionism, flawed though it was, had a Socialist outcome. Evelyn 
Anderson, Hammer or Anvil: The Story of the German Working-Class Movement (1945; New 
York: Oriole Editions, 1973) 16. 
38 Although there were anti-war demonstrations (26-30 July 1914) through out Germany, 
Schorske explained that the primary motivation for the SPD's decision to support the war was 
fear. Social Democrats feared that if they were to oppose the war effort that the party could 
regress to the time of Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Laws. In Germany the law of siege insisted that 
during times of war commanders of military districts were granted unlimited power in dealing 
with any opposition to state. With this threat in mind, Friedrich Ebert and Otto Braun were sent 
to Zurich with the party's treasury so that if the party was dissolved and its leaders arrested there 
would be something left to continue the party. There was also the fear of opposing the war, 
losing to the Russians, and that such a defeat would lose the party the support of the working 
class who identified itself with the nation. Schorske pointed out that German patriotism is 
perhaps over emphasised as the key reason why the SPD voted for war credits. For example, 
Anderson claimed that the SPD was merely acting as the "faithful mouthpiece of the masses" as 
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However, this show of party unity was soon to be tested. By mid- 
September 1914 open opposition began to re-emerge in the party press, most 
notably in Vorwdrts. By the end of 1914 the military censors had suspended the 
paper twice. Karl Liebknecht had resigned himself to vote alone against the 
second war credits bill on 3 December 1914. As opposition mounted on the 
of February 1915 the party changed its policy, which granted the Reichstag 
deputies "whose conviction would not permit him to participate in the 
unanimous vote of the deputation ... the right to absent himself from the session 
in which the vote was taken; but this abstention might not have demonstrative 
character. , 39 Effectively this new policy allowed oppositionist the opportunity 
to protest without breaking party unity. Too a certain extent it worked. On the 
next two votes (20 March and 20 August 1915) the Centrists abstained, with the 
exception of Otto RUhle who joined Liebknecht in voting against war credits in 
March but abstained in August. When the vote was taken again in December 
1915, twenty Centrists voted against war credits. 
Those who descended from the Executive's decision to support the war 
were openly condemned - as a warning to the moderate oppositionists - 
Liebknecht was formally expelled from the Reichstag in January 1916.40 In 
the working class was nationalistic. While Schorske's "fear" argument can explain the SPD's 
initial support for the war, it does not explain the SPD's motivation for their continued support 
for the war and the State. Although the SPD's support of the war warrants further discussion, it 
remains outside of the scope of this thesis. Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905- 
1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 
283-291; Evelyn Anderson, Hammer or Anvil: The StoEy of the German Working-Class 
Movement (1945; New York: Oriole Editions, 1973) 19-20,22-26; Helga Grebing, The History 
of the German Labour Movement: A Survey, trans. Edith K6rner (Leamington Spa: Berg 
Publishers, Ltd., 1985) 92-93. 
39 As quoted from Prager in Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The 
Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 301. 
40 Karl Liebknecht was "called up" on 7 February 1915. In May 1915 he produced the leaflet 
which advanced the "enemy is at home. " Liebknecht had not been taken seriously amongst his 
colleagues in the SPD Executive. He was regarded as a nuisance and not quite fit to fill his 
father's great shoes. However, his anti-war campaigning gained him support and notoriety 
within the working class. 
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March 1916 when the Left and the Centre delegates voted against war credits 
for the second time, the majority expelled them from the Reichstag delegation 
and purged the party press. 41 The group around Rosa Luxemburg attempted to 
42 
gather oppositional support against the party's policies . From its birth 
German Social Democracy housed many different currents. At times these 
currents were completely opposed to the decisions of the SPD Executive. 
Before the war, this type of opposition was merely seen as a nuisance. 
However, after the declaration of war, this type of opposition was seen as a 
clear threat. 
By 1916 support for war had declined as the food situation became critical 
in what became known as the "turnip winter" of 1916 - 1917.43 With the 
increase in opposition to the war the goverment tightened its repression. A 
pre-censorship of socialist press was introduced, at times closed membership 
SPD meetings were banned, and opposition leaders were arrested. Rosa 
Luxemburg, Franz Mehring (who was over seventy), Kdthe Duncker, and many 
others were placed under "military protective custody. " Essentially this meant 
that they were jailed without the hope of a trial. Karl Liebknecht was arrested 
and sentenced to two years in prison for "treasonable utterances on May Day" in 
June 1916. The government's clear violation of civil liberties only strengthened 
41 Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The Development of the Great 
Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 308-311. 
42 By the beginning of 1916 the group around Rosa Luxemburg had become known as the 
"Spartacists. " The official name of the group was Spartakusbund (Spartacus League) named 
after Spartacus, leader of the largest slave rebellion during the Roman Empire. Herman Weber, 
Die Waldung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die 
-Stalinisierung 
der KPD in der Weimarer 
Republik, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 24; Eric D. Weitz, 
Creating German Communism, 1890- 1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) 79. 
43 Schorske placed the "turnip winter" during the winter of 1916-1917, while Brou6 placed it 
during the winter of 1915-1916. Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The 
Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 308; Pierre 
Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 59. 
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the oppositions resolve and gained them sympathy. Liebknecht's arrest aroused 
demonstrations and strikes all over Germany. In Berlin alone 55,000 workers 
from a munitions factory struck on June 28 - the day that Liebknecht appeared 
in court. The government attempted to increase its control over society by 
arresting the Left leaders - Karski was arrested on June 28 and Ernst Meyer was 
arrested on August 3. The SPD's continued support for the war and the state 
merely exposed the contradictions within the party. 
As opposition within the party mounted, the Centrists called a conference 
in January 1917, which included the Spartacists and the Left Centrists. At this 
point neither the Spartacists nor the Left Centre were advocating a split with the 
party. The purpose of the conference was to discuss methods of protecting the 
oppositional minority against the repressive policies of the majority. However, 
they were unable to come to a consensus on what action to actually take. The 
Spartacists purposed the withholding of dues, which was rejected by the Left 
Centrists. Unable to control the opposition and impose party discipline, the 
majority Socialists seized the opportunity to rid itself of the opposition. On 
January 16,1917 the party council declared that by holding a separate 
conference the opposition had separated itself from the party and SPD 
Executive expelled the opposition. As a result of the expulsion the 
oppositionists held a conference in Gotha and established the Independent 
Social Democratic Party (USPD) in April 1917.44 
' The new party included old rivals - Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Hugo Hasse, Georg 
Ledebour, Karl Kautsky, Rudolf Hilferding, and Eduard Bernstein. The negotiations between 
the pacifist Centre and the revolutionary Left resulted in the re-adoption of the Erfurt 
Programme. This left the Spartacists, dissatisfied as they believed the Erfurt Programme to be 
outdated by the current events. While the new party emerged against the State and the war, the 
unity was fragmented from the start. There were many on the left (including the radical groups 
in Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover, and Riistringen) who advocated a split with the Centre. In 
reality the Spartacists group was too small and many of its supporters were in jail. They 
reluctantly joined the USPD out of fear of degenerating into a sect. Carl E. Schorske, German 
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1917 marked an incredible turning point as support for the war waned. 
Revolution erupted in Russia in February 1917 and Lenin, with the support of 
the Germans, embarked on his journey back to Russia in April. In the months 
that followed the February Revolution strikes and demonstrations began to take 
place in Gennany and once again like their Russian counterparts, the 
demonstrations were about food shortages. Revolutionary delegates decided to 
take advantage of the Russian events and planned to purpose a motion in favour 
of a strike for better food at the metal workers' union meeting in Berlin on April 
15,1917. However, the plot was discovered by union officials and Richard 
Mfiller - the secret organiser of the revolutionary metal workers - was secretly 
arrested on April 13,1917. By April 12 strikes for better food had begun in 
Leipzig. On April 15,1917 the government announced a reduction in bread 
rations from 1,350g to 450g and the delegates at the metal workers' union 
meeting decided to take action. Strikes took place in Berlin and Leipzig. By 
April 17,1917 the strikes were called off and Miller's release had been 
negotiated. The reputation of the USPD had been inflated for the role they 
played during the strikes. 
While the April demonstrations passed they were not the last. In January 
1918 USPD deputies called for a three day strike. A strike Action Committee 
was elected and the Spartacists suggested extending an invitation to the SPD. 
On January 28,1918 workers once again took to the streets, which resulted in 
clashes with police. By January 30 Vorwdrts had been banned. By February 1 
the military High Command threatened to impose martial law if strikers did not 
Social Democracy 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1955) 312-313; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. 
John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 78-79; Julius Braunthal, History of the International: 1864 - 
1914,2 vols. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons LTD, 1966) 2: 59-60. 
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return to work. The SPD insisted that workers comply. At this point the 
strikers remained isolated and there were no signs of the soldiers defecting to 
the side of the workers as they had done in Russia. The Action Committee 
called for an end to the strikes and by February 3,1918 the workers resumed 
work. While the SPD took great pains to quell the hopes inspired by the 
Bolshevik victory, the workers paid no attention popularising the Russian 
, 45 slogan of "Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. 
By the August 1918 the Gennan leaders' hope for victory began to fade 
and in mid-August the Kaiser decided to sue for peace. Defeats on both the 
Western and Eastern Fronts reawakened the possibility of revolution in 
Germany. By October 1918 sailors on the High Sea Fleet refused to sail against 
the British Fleet. They claimed the war was lost and they saw no point in dying 
for a lost cause. In an effort to quell the growth of radicalism the govenunent 
freed hundreds of activists, including Karl Liebknecht whose imprisonment had 
granted him martyr status. 46 On October 26,1918 demonstrations took place in 
Hamburg. While the USPD and Spartacists attempted to organise a date for the 
insurrection, rioting sailors captured Kiel and along with the dock workers 
fonned Workers' and Soldiers' Councils on November 4,1918. The Kiel 
mutiny set off a revolutionary wave all over Germany and Workers' and 
Soldiers' Councils were established. Since October 23,1918 SPD ministers in 
45 In retaliation for the strikes the government cancelled the "special exemptions" of many 
workers who had participated in the strikes. 50,000 Berlin workers - approximately 10 per cent 
of the strikers - were called up in the armed forces. MWler, who was regarded as one of the 
ring leaders, was one of the first to be sent. The police also set out to arrest revolutionaries such 
as Jogiches. As a result the government felt free to launch its assault on the Eastern Front. 
Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 
110. 
46According to Frblich the German government granted amnesty for political prisoners on 
October 20. This did not apply to Rosa Luxemburg because she was serving a prison sentence. 
Luxemburg was released from prison on November 9,1918. Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: 
Her ife and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 286. 
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the govenunent had called for the Kaiser to abdicate. However, this insistence 
on the Kaiser's abdication had nothing to do with their support for the 
revolution, but rather they hoped to circumvent the revolution. They sought to 
"sacrifice the Kaiser to save the country" from going down the same road as the 
Russians. 47 The Kaiser finally surrendered to the SPD leaders demands and 
nt% abdicated on November 9,1918. By then it was too late to stop the revolution, 
but not too late to change its course. 
In the previous years the SPD leaders had done their utmost to prevent the 
revolution from developing. Once it became clear that they could not stop it 
they made sure that they did not appear to be standing in its way and even began 
signing their leaflets with the words "workers' councils, " "soldiers' councils, " 
and "people's committees. " While Liebknecht, from the roof of a car at the 
Imperial Palace, declared a German Socialist Republic, Philip Scheidmann, 
from the balcony of the Reichstag, declared a German Republic, much to 
'01, 
huert's resentment. Although the USPD leaders and the Spartacists had been 
the instrumental driving force in the revolution, they were disorganised and too 
fragmented to really control its direction. The SPD leaders were trained 
bureaucrats. They had little trouble in regaining their footing and coming out of 
the German Revolution - something which they had spent years trying to 
prevent - as its champion. In the end the USPD and the majority SPD formed a 
government and Ebert was declared Chancellor of the Reich. The Spartacists 
refused to take part in what they perceived to be a non-democratic government. 
in any event the dual government was short lived and by the end of December 
1918 the USPD ministers resigned from the government. Essentially the end of 
47 As quoted by Kolb in Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005) 144. 
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Imperial Germany and the beginning of the German Republic is where the story 
of the German Communist Party begins. 
38 
Chapter Two: The Theoretical Foundations of German Communism - The 
Theories of Rosa Luxemburg 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the theoretical contribution that 
Rosa Luxemburg made to the German Socialist movement. During her short 
life Luxemburg was a key figure in key theoretical debates in German Social 
Democracy. Rosa Luxemburg's political views were deeply entrenched in 
Marxist orthodoxy. After her death in 1919 her ideas lived on through her 
followers and she remained the most influential figure in the German 
Communist movement. As a result of her resilience in the Communist 
movement the Stalinised Comintern made many attempts to distort her 
theories. 48 This chapter will argue that Luxemburg was consistent in her 
political thought and it was her consistent devotion to the revolutionary 
movement that posed a threat to the changing SPD and later to the Comintern. 
The first section of this chapter - Rosa Luxemburg as a Theorist - will 
discuss the academic debates surrounding Luxemburg as a theorist. Her writing 
48 Herman Weber is probably still the foremost expert on German Communism. In his two 
volume book, Weber recounted Rosa Luxemburg's democratic nature. Weber was obviously 
sympathetic to Luxemburg and her constant desire to maintain democracy and a mass base 
party. Eric Weitz has written extensively (in English) on the German Communist Party. 
Although he correctly criticised others for their "uncritical [and] at times hagio graphical" 
writing he spent little time actually delving deeply into her theories and even claimed that her 
writings were not theoretical. Weitz's post- structural i st argument is interesting - he attacked 
Luxemburg's language and essentially held her writings responsible for the post-war Stalinised 
Germany. He focused on her word usage and what he claimed to be inconsistencies in her 
writing rather than her theories. Weitz alleged that Luxemburg's powerful and passionate 
language paved the foundation for the repressive regimes of the GDR. JP Nettl and Paul 
Frolich's insightful biographies gave brilliant accounts of her life. Frolich's book still remains 
an important starting point for anyone interested in Rosa Luxemburg. However, it can be 
frustrating at times, as he did not always reference his quotes. Those that make references to her 
writing generally focus on "The Accumulation of Capital" or "Critique of the Russian 
Revolution. " Herman Weber, Die WaIdung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung 
der KPD in der Weimarer Republik, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 
1969); Eric D. Weitz, " 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German Communism and the 
Luxemburg Legacy, " Central European History 27.1 (1994): 30; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 
vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Paul Frolich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and 
Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New York: Howard Fertig, 1969); Georg Lukdcs, 
History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (London: Merlin Press, 197 1). 
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has been criticised for not being theoretical enough. Since Luxemburg's 
theories were extremely influential in the German Communist movement it 
seems important to include these discussions in this thesis. 
The second section of this chapter - Rosa Luxemburg's Contribution to 
Gen-nan Socialism - will discuss the role that Luxemburg played in the SPD. 
The Revisionist debates offered Luxemburg her first real chance to participate 
in a major debate in the SPD. The debate afforded Luxemburg the opportunity 
to make a name for herself and she was instrumental in the temporary defeat of 
the revisionists. Equally important was her role in the Mass Strike debate 
following the Russian Revolution of 1905. Luxemburg was adamant that the 
Russian Revolution of 1905 had lessons to teach the German movement. This 
was the first time that the world had witnessed a general strike used to bring a 
govenunent to its knees and establish workers' councils in factories. 
Luxemburg believed this powerful weapon could be utilised in Germany, but 
the bureaucratised SPD leadership was no longer interested in revolutionary 
tactics. Although the mass strike debate was a sobering wake up call for Rosa 
Luxemburg, it is clear from her later writing that she remained devoted to the 
notion of mass action as the means to a successful revolution. 
The third section - Polemics with Lenin - will discuss Luxemburg's role in 
international debates such as the National Question, Imperialism, and Political 
Organisation. Although, it was fashionable at the time for Social Democrats to 
be in favour of an independent Poland, Rosa Luxemburg sternly disagreed with 
this position. She believed that giving into nationalism would incur alliances 
with the bourgeois parties, who, once their desires for an independent Poland 
were fulfilled, would not only abandon the working class but also seek to 
40 
oppress them. Luxemburg firmly rejected national self-determination with the 
exception of cases where the oppressor country was keeping the locals 
backward as method of control. As the economic and political situation in 
Germany changed the debates over the National Question were quickly 
superseded by the discussion over Imperialism. 
The end of the First World War and the Bolshevik victory in Russia 
changed the nature of the debates. Upon being released from prison Luxemburg 
set forth to create a revolutionary party in Germany. Although Luxemburg 
never articulated a clear blue print of party organisation, it is quite clear that she 
had an idea of what type a party she thought Spartakusbund should become. 
Luxemburg hoped to build a mass base party similar to the SPD but more 
democratic and less bureaucratic. Her untimely death at the hands of the 
Freikorps prevented this from becoming a reality. 
1. Luxemburg as a Theorist 
As an Orthodox Marxist Rosa Luxemburg adhered to Marx's materialist 
dialectical methods and like the Marxist of her time she did not blindly worship 
or hold his writings as sacred. She, as other Marxists such as Lenin, sought to 
unite theory and practice for the purpose of revolution. According to Robert 
Looker she exemplified the "unity of revolutionary theory and practice which 
lies at the heart of Marxist materialism. , 49 But others were not so generous 
about her theoretical writing. JP Nettl, in his two volume biography of Rosa 
Luxemburg, accused her of being no more than a political critic. Whereas, Eric 
Weitz, saw her flaws entrenched in the "insufficiencies of Marxian socialist 
49 Rosa Luxemburg, Selected Political WrjýM, ed. Robert Looker (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1972) 13. 
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tradition" and her devotion to mass activism. This, according to Weitz, resulted 
in her devoting little attention to "the institutional grounding of a democratic- 
socialist polity. 9ý50 The flaw does not lie with these "insufficiencies of 
Marxism" that Weitz referred to, but rather with the reading of the subject. 
Weitz and Nettl both have read Luxemburg's writing with the eyes of a mid-20 th 
century academics in a world where democratic institutions in the Western 
world are commonplace. 51 In doing so they failed to truly grasp the context of 
her works. As a consequence of their search for modem democratic institutions 
Weitz and Nettl have failed to understand the purpose of Marxist revolutionary 
theory. This is not an effort to absolve Luxemburg of any criticism, her 
writings do possess flaws and as Weitz accurately pointed out, many are 
reluctant to criticise her work, but rather this is an attempt to understand the 
source of the KPD's birth. 
Nettl claimed that Rosa Luxemburg was "a critic, albeit profound and acute, 
rather than a political theorist.... Luxemburg was neither nor [did she] pretend 
to be a profound political thinker. , 52 He also claimed that her writings were 
tactical rather than analytical. Nettl was correct in that Luxemburg had no time 
for intellectuals and she did not aspire to be categorised as one. But his 
50 Eric D. Weitz, " 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German Communism and the Luxemburg 
Legacy, " Central European History 27.1 (1994): 29. 
" interestingly, Geoff Eley, in his book review of Norman Geras' The Legacy of Rosa 
Luxemburg, pointed out that one of Geras' main flaws in his appraisal of Luxemburg's works 
was that "he fails to consider the material setting - the dynamics of Wilhelmine capitalism, the 
developing structure of the German working class, the larger field of class relations, the 
character of the Imperial state, the political formation of the SPD - in which Luxemburg's ideas 
were formed, and which helps explain both the strengths and weaknesses of her thought. " This 
appears to be a common trait in the case of criticism of Luxemburg's works. The historical 
setting can not be detached from any analysis of her writing. Groups or individuals may attempt 
to adapt her writing for modem for modem political purposes, as in the case of the use of 
Luxemburg as a symbol in East Germany, but such use leans more towards propaganda rather 
than theoretical analysis, in which case the context of the analysis is different. Geoff Eley, "The 
Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg, " Critique 12 (1979-1980): 148; Norman Geras, The Legacy of 
Rosa Luxemburg, (London: NLB, 1976). 
52 JP Netti, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 2: 493,546. 
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criticism of Luxemburg's writing revolved mainly around the lack of "systems" 
in Luxemburg's writings. As a journalist she commented on the political 
questions of the day rather than systematically examining the various aspects of 
politics that she found interesting. 53 Much of Luxemburg's work was 
commissioned, therefore, some lacked the impassioned ferocity that others 
possessed. This also serves to explain why some were more analytical than 
others. 
As a Marxist Luxemburg did not see her role in the party as someone who 
built a framework for others to try to fit into. The party needed to be flexible 
enough to deal with a change in the revolutionary tide. There is no evidence to 
suggest that she had any desire to develop systems or methods outside of those 
that already existed within Marxism. She analysed the societal setting of the 
world around her and used Marx's methods to try inspire change in the world. 
She criticised others who became too comfortable in their enviroment and no 
longer fought for change. But this did not make her any less theoretical. 
Central to Luxemburg's writing was a desire to fuse analysis with revolutionary 
commitment. 54 Nettl's claim that Luxemburg's works were more tactical than 
analytical demonstrated his desires for "systems. " His search for "systems" 
prevented him from seeing that the opposite was actually true. One of 
Luxemburg's greatest flaws was her lack of revolutionary tactics. Her writing 
analysed and criticised the heated political questions of the day but offered no 
53 Looker's response to this lack of systemisation was contextual. "Like all genuine Marxists, 
Luxemburg's work is rooted in the determinate conditions of her arena of struggle, and unlike 
many of them, her responses to that struggle possess a sense of immediacy and grasp of detail 
which place very considerable demands on the historical knowledge of the reader. Indeed the 
unwary reader might be excused for assuming that this very detail must limit their relevance to 
their specific subject matter, and for seeing them as examples of the art of journalism ... rather 
than contributions to Marxist theory. " Rosa Luxemburg, Selected Political Writings, ed. Robert 
Looker (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) 12-13. 
54 Rosa Luxemburg, Selected Political WrifiM, ed. Robert Looker (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1972) 13. 
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systematic method of change. But this problem was not limited to the writings 
of Rosa Luxemburg. This problem has plagued the Left since the time of Marx. 
Let us examine Weitz's argument further. His argument followed two basic 
points of attack - her language and her lack of political theory, which he refered 
to as "the politics of everyday life. , 55 He accused her of failing to describe 
what kind of relationship would exist between Civil Society and the State once 
the Socialist revolution took place. He claimed her democratic ideals were 
undermined by her blind faith in Socialism. I would like to argue that Weitz 
failed to understand Luxemburg as a Marxist. 
Firstly, Weitz was correct to point out that Rosa Luxemburg's writings 
lacked any discussion or even any acknowledgement of the relationship 
between Civil Society and the State before or after the revolution. 56 She never 
used the tenn Civil Society to discuss the repressive nature of the State. She 
inevitably used Marxist tenns such as proletariat, workers, working class, 
bourgeoisie, etc to describe the participants in society. Although she had a clear 
understanding of Social Science categorisations (she possessed a Doctorate in 
55 Eric D. Weitz, " 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German Communism and the Luxemburg 
Legacy, " Central European Higgry 27.1 (1994): 44. 
56 One must point out that Weitz's desire for a discussion of Civil Society is historically out of 
context in Wilhelmine Germany. Aristotle originally developed Civil Society as a democratic 
concept. It was later taken up by Rousseau but later fell out of use. Hegel and Marx did use the 
term, but they used it interchangeably with "bourgeois society. " It meant something entirely 
different than it does today. We must remember that dialogue between public and private was 
obsolete. European Empires were ruled by sovereigns, who believed they were chosen by God, 
and had no desire or intention of sharing power. Julius Braunthal produced a fantastic quote by 
Wilhelm II at Kbnisberg in August 1910 where he referred to his Grandfather's coronation, "my 
grandfather placed the crown of Prussia on his head by his own right ... it had been given [to] 
him solely by the grace of God, and not by parliaments, popular assemblies or decrees of the 
people ... he considered 
himself to be the chosen instrument of heaven.... Considering myself to 
be the instrument of Him, without regard to any opinions or ideas, I proceed on my way.... " 
Therefore the relationship between Civil Society and the state was not a topic of discussion 
particularly amongst socialists. Oppositionalists generally favoured the overthrow of the 
monarchy and the formation of liberal democracies. Discussions of Civil Society did not re- 
emerge until the 1970s and 1980s as anti-State politics in Eastern Europe. Julius Braunthal, 
History of the International: 1864 - 19149 2 vols. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons LTD, 
1966)1: 267. 
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Political Science from the University of Zurich), she made no reference to such 
terminology in her writing. The use of the term Civil Society inherently implies 
that one acknowledges a relationship between the participants in society (the 
public sphere) and the State (the private sphere). 57 This acknowledgement also 
implies that cooperation is possible. Such an assumption is contrary to the 
writings of Marx and the Marxist of this period. It is here that Weitz failed in 
his understanding of Luxemburg's writing as a Marxist. Marx and the Marxist 
did not divide social and political relationships into the categories of society and 
the state but rather the social division was derived from the productive system 
(which inevitably affected social relationships). Marx divided society into the 
owners of the means of production (bourgeoisie) - those who influenced and 
ruled the State and workers (proletariat) - those who were subject and repressed 
by those who ruled. This relationship was contradictory and hostile henceforth, 
any relationship was impossible. Attempts at cooperation would inevitably end 
in greater repression of the proletariat. Therefore, it would be contradictory for 
Luxemburg as a Marxist to "anchor [herselfl in democratic institutions, " as 
Weitz suggested, as well as impossible. 58 Yet, Luxemburg, indeed, anchored 
herself in democracy. But her democracy had nothing to do with "institutions. " 
She was not fighting for the establishment of a modem liberal democracy, but 
rather she fought for the overthrow of the State in its entirety. For Luxemburg, 
a democratic society was one in which all members of society participate in the 
57 Most writers of Civil Society accept the role of the State as a legitimate part democratic 
society. Even the radicals such as Havel, who believe that State power is inherently corrupt, 
have reluctantly conceded to its role. The Sociological view is probably most widely accepted. 
it is very clearly defined by Frentel-Zagorska as "a structure of self-organisation of society, 
located outside, though not disconnected from, the institutional framework of the state. " Jania 
Frentzel-Zagorska, "Civil Society in Poland and Hungary, " Soviet Studies 42.1 (1990): 759. 
58 Eric D. Weitz, " 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German Communism and the Luxemburg 
Legacy, " Central European HiqtM 27.1 (1994): 44. 
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decision making process. The desire for the establishment of "democratic 
institutions" automatically contradicted Luxemburg's views. 
Secondly, Weitz attacked Luxemburg')s language. Weitz's argument 
stemmed from a post-structuralist point of view. He claimed that the "very 
complexity and instability of her ideas and language made their meanings 
,, 59 extremely mobile and open to a wide range of interpretations. Weitz's 
argument did not leave any room for misreading and misinterpretation on the 
readers' part. In the case of Rosa Luxemburg, her word usage was 
overpoweringly strong. Her speeches and articles generally took the form of 
debates. Taken out of this context and carefully manipulated, her position may 
have appeared polarised and exclusive. But Rosa Luxemburg was not against 
open debate or opposing voices. Most of her political career had been spent as 
an oppositional voice from her time in the revolutionary socialist party 
"Proletariat" in Poland, to her formation of the Social Democratic Party of the 
Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) in opposition to the Polish 
Socialist Party (PPS) in Zurich, to her organisation of Spartacus in opposition of 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany. The nature of debates is the 
development of a concrete argument. Essentially the strongest argument wins. 
Taken out of context Rosa Luxemburg's, or anyone 1) s writing, can be 
manipulated and used for purposes contrary to the desires of the author. 
Weitz's post- structuralist argument was a moral time bomb. We can not hold 
Luxemburg responsible for the Stalinist's distortion of her writing no more than 
we can hold Nietzsche responsible for the crimes of Hitler. 
'9 Eric D. Weitz, " 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German Communism and the Luxemburg 
Legacy, " Central European Higgry 27.1 (1994): 31,35. 
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II. Rosa Luxemburg's Contribution to the Debates within the SPD 
Rosa Luxemburg arrived in Germany in 1898 in order to actively 
participate in the German Social Democratic Party. 60 She very quickly became 
a leading figure inside the party and the Second International. Throughout her 
life she remained dedicated to the revolutionary role that Marxist theory played 
in the overthrow of the capitalist system. Rosa Luxemburg was committed to 
Marxism as a tool in the revolutionary struggle. Paul Fr6lich described 
Luxemburg's theoretical and political method as non-dogmatic and used 
empirical evidence to support her arguments. 
"Like Marx, she regarded history as a process in which class- 
forces struggled with each other for their interests as they 
developed out of objectively given economic conditions. For 
her Marxism was not a theoretical system solving all questions 
once and for all, but a method of examining the process of 
economic change at each new stage of its development, with 
all its effects on the interests, ideas, aims, and political 
activities of each group in society. , 61 
This was clearly demonstrated throughout her writings. Luxemburg's role in 
the Revisionist and Mass Strike debates demonstrated, more than in her other 
writings, the importance of the ftmction of theory and practice within the party. 
60 Rosa Luxemburg was smuggled out of Poland and joined the Polish 6migr6 group in 
Switzerland. Upon completion of her university studies in Zurich in the spring of 1897, Rosa 
Luxemburg decided to move to Germany to work with the SPD. In order to solve her 
citizenship problem she married a family friend, Gustav Lubeck, which granted her German 
citizenship for life, and thereby saving her from deportation. (The two separated outside the 
registry office. ) She arrived in Berlin in the spring of 1898, in time to join the Revisionist 
debate. Incidentally, this period was the only time that Rosa Luxemburg was in good graces of 
August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht. 
61 Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New 
York: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1969) 64-65. 
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This section will discuss Rosa Luxemburg's role in defending Marxism 
against the Revisionist and how she believed revolution could be spread through 
the use of the Mass Strike. 
Revisionism 
"Piefurther development and elaboration of Marxist doctrine must begin with 
criticism of it., ý62 
The non-revolutionary character of German Social Democracy had always 
been a feature in the party in one form or another. Initially these tendencies 
within the party did not appear threatening. It was not until Eduard Bernstein, 
albeit not his intention, offered a theory for the changes that were occurring in 
the party. Eduard Bernstein had written a series of articles from 1896 - 1898 
63 
in Neue Zeit on the "Problems of Socialism. "64 Eduard Bernstein had been 
close to Engels until his death in 1895 and became one of the literary executors 
of Engels' estate. In reality Bernstein was surprised that that his writing erupted 
into controversy. Until his death Bernstein defended himself against 
62 Eduard Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) 28. 
63 Colletti and Tudor place the first date of publication as 1896 (a year after Engels' death). 
Braunthal and Oell3ner placed the first year of publication as 1897. Lucio Colletti, From 
Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society (London: NLB, 1972) 48; Eduard 
Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) xxi; Julius Braunthal, History of the International: 1864 - 1914,2 vols. (London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons LTD, 1966) 1: 264; Fred Oell3ner, Rosa Luxemburg: Eine Kritische 
Biographische Skizze (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1952) 24. 
64 The series of articles originally appeared as "Probleme des Sozialismus" which were reprinted 
almost in full as "Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Sozialismus. " The first edition of the book 
appeared in March 1899, as Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der 
Sozialdemokratie - The Presuppositions of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy. 
(Depending on the translator Voraussetzung may appear as precondition, premise, or 
presupposition. ) According to Tudor the English translation was published in 1909 under the 
title Evolutionary Socialism. Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard 
Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952) 61,65; Eduard 
Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) xi. 
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accusations that he ceased to be a Marxist. 65 Bernstein believed that he was 
adding to the Marxist debates within the party and that what he was writing 
merely reflected the reality of the party. 66 The task of defending the party's 
position fell on the SPD's new arrival - Rosa Luxemburg. Although her name 
was all ready known in the SPD for her publications in Western Europe on the 
Polish situation, it was the Revisionist controversy that made her famous as a 
Marxist theoretician. It was the springboard that launched Rosa Luxemburg's 
career within the SPD. This in itself gives us insight to how she viewed and 
developed her Marxist theory. We can see the consistency in her thought. 
First, Bernstein's theory of Evolutionary Socialism, albeit poorly executed, 
brought into the open a growing current within German Social Democracy. 67 
Bernstein was correct to point out that certain trends had developed within 
German Social Democracy, which did not reflect its rhetoric. Bernstein 
claimed. ) 
"The position nowadays is that one can probe everything out 
of Marx and Engels.... The duty of their disciples consists in 
65 According to Gay the transition to Revisionism was a difficult one for Bernstein and perhaps 
this was the reason why he clung to the unrealistic insistence that Revisionism was still 
Marxism. The struggle affected him deeply. In 1898 Eleanor Marx wrote to Kautsky 
complaining that Bernstein had become irritable. She expressed concern that he was allowing 
himself to be used by the Fabians as a tool in their anti-Marxist campaign. Peter Gay, The 
Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1952) 60. 
66 According to Nettl, Bernstein's articles were "good natured construction" that used the tools, 
materials, and acknowledged skills of Marx. Nettl suggested that Bernstein's intentions were 
not to abandon Marx but to adapt Marx's writings to suite what he perceived as changes in 
modem society. JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 1: 
204,205. 
67 According to Mary Alice Waters Karl Kautsky - who was the editor of Neue Zeit - thought 
highly of the articles and accepted them for publication. Mary Alice Waters, ed. Rosa 
Luxemburg Speaks (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 33. 
49 
this [the removal of contradictions from their works], and not 
,, 68 in the perpetually repeating the words of the masters. 
Indeed dogmatic elements had begun to appear in the Marxist movement and 
that it was the duty of Marx and Engels' followers to develop and pursue 
debates within the movement. 
Second, Bernstein directed his criticism at Marx and German Social 
Democracy, in particular, the Erfurt Programme in which he ironically helped to 
write. Bernstein argued that capitalism was more enduring than Marx had 
expected and he denied the notion that the collapse of the bourgeois economy 
was expected shortly. In fact the capitalist class had increased and did not 
appear in decline as Marx had predicted in the Communist Manifesto. The 
working class were better off than they had ever been and were increasing in 
strength. 
"The intensification of social relations has not in fact occurred 
as the Manifesto depicts it. It is not only useless but extremely 
foolish to conceal this fact from ourselves. The number of 
property owners has grown, not diminished. The enormous 
increase in social wealth has been accompanied not by a fall in 
the number of capitalist magnates but by an increase in the 
number of capitalists of all grades. The middle classes are 
changing in character, but they are not disappearing from the 
social spectrum. "69 
68 Eduard Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. 
University Press, 1993) 28. 
69 Eduard Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. 
University Press, 1993) 2,77. 
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Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Bernstein's basis for this attack was the Marxist "materialist conception of 
history. " He accused the materialists of being "Calvinists without God"" for 
their belief in a predestined collapse of the capitalist system. 70 Bernstein 
rejected Marx's notion of the crisis in the capitalist system as an abstraction 
reminiscent of Hegelian philosophy. 71 The revolution, whose rhetoric was 
'7.1% 
abundant in SPD propaganda, was not only unnecessary but impossible. 
Third, Bernstein concluded that tactics must be adapted to suite this new 
assumption. He accused the Social Democratic Party of no longer being a 
revolutionary party but rather a "democratic socialist party of reform. , 
72 He 
insisted that rhetoric of the German Social Democratic party was outdated. 
"Is there any sense ... in maintaining the phrase 'dictatorship of 
the proletariat' at a time when representatives of Social 
Democracy have in practice placed themselves ... in the arena 
of parliamentary work ... which [is] inconsistent with 
dictatorship. The phrase is nowadays out of date.... All the 
practical activity of Social Democracy is aimed at creating the 
circumstances and conditions which will enable and ensure 
the transition of the modem social order to a higher one - 
without convulsive upheavals. [D]ictatorship belongs to a 
70 Eduard Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) 13. 
71 Bernstein denied actually coming up with the catchphrase - "The final goal of socialism is 
nothing to me, the movement is everything. " He later insisted that his point about the final goal 
was, "[P]reconceived theories about the outcome of the movement which go beyond a generally 
conceived goal, and which determine the fundamental direction and character of the movement, 
will always be forced into utopianism and will ... stand in the way of the real theoretical and 
practical progress of the movement, obstructing and constricting it. " Bernstein was convinced 
that reformism would rescue the party from plunging into utopianism. Something that Marx 
himself was adamantly against. Eduard Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. Henry Tudor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 190,192; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 1: 152. 
72 Eduard Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) 186. 
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lower civilisation ... it can only 
be regarded as a retrograde 
,, 73 step, as political atavism. ... 
The SPD's parliamentary success terminated their commitment as solely 
participating in the government for the purposes of agitation. 74 Bernstein 
insisted that the party should admit this and focus on gaining power through 
parliamentary means as the time for armed insurrection had passed, the party 
should concentrate on the development of Trade Unions and cooperatives. 
Bernstein drew on Engels as proof and based this presumption on Marx's 
The Class Struggle in France for which Engels wrote the introduction for the 
reprint in March 1895. Engels reflected on the revolutions of 1848 in which 
both Engels and Marx (as well as other socialist) believed would erupt into a 
Socialist Revolution. He admitted that they had miscalculated the economic 
development of the continent and its ripeness to overthrow capitalism. 
Hindsight had shown them that the " 'social' revolution of 1848 had 
concentrated the real power in the hands of the big bourgeoisie. " Engels also 
pointed out that the nature of the standing army had changed. The methods 
used in 1848 to bring the continents monarchies to their knees were no longer 
viable as demonstrated by the bloodbath of 1871 in Paris. Engels mentioned the 
73 Eduard Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, ed. Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) 145-146. 
74 To a certain extent Gay was correct to point out that Bernstein "merely told an obvious truth. " 
However, Bernstein's argument was grossly incorrect. It is ironic that the SPD voted 
overwhelmingly against Bernstein at the 1904 Amsterdam Conference. By 1903 the SPD had 
won eighty-one seats in the Reichstag. By 1914 the Revisionist controversy ceased to have any 
importance as Marxist orthodoxy seemed to vanish overnight when the SPD voted for war 
credits at the onset of WWI. But even prior to the 1914 Luxemburg had become fi-ustrated with 
the SPD's lack of action during the 1905 uprisings. The leadership's revolutionary incapacity 
was further exasperated during the Revolution of 1918 and Friedrich Ebert's reluctance to not 
only to establish a "bourgeois" republic but to take the revolution further - to socialism. Peter 
Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1952) 228-230; Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 
1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1955)23. 
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irony that success was being won by legal means - through parliamentary 
participation, which he appeared to encourage. But nowhere did Engels state 
that parliamentary means should be the sole means of revolutionary conduct. 
Engels was fully aware that universal suffrage did not exist and that the 
monarchical governments of the continent would never surrender power threw 
legal methods. 
75 
August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, the "Fathers of Social Democracy" 
vehemently disagreed with Bernstein and strongly insisted that the role of the 
SPD within the parliament was limited to agitation. 76 But when the articles first 
began appearing the party leadership did not take the controversy seriously. 
Eduard Bernstein, after all, was a friend of the entire SPD leadership - August 
Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, and Ignaz Auer, to name but a few. 77 He had been 
persecuted under Bismarck's anti-socialist laws and was forced to live in 
75 Fr6lich suggested that there was something wrong with the introduction. He mentioned 
Engels' protests and submission. He alluded to the notion that the SPD executive tampered with 
original manuscript. Schurer suggested that the SPD Executive "bowdlerised" Engels' text and 
made him appear an advocate of peaceful progress by parliamentary means alone. This 
"bowdlerised text" became the "political testament" of Engels and remained unchallenged for 
many years at least until the Russian Revolution of 1905. Schurer also insisted that in 1909 
Karl Kautsky published documents in Neue Zeit which proved that Engels' 1895 preface had 
been tampered with and that a few months before his death Engels had protested against this. 
David McLellan, ed. Marxism: Essential Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) 
72-73; Paul Fr6lich, Rosa LuxemburR: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; 
New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 61-62; Helga Grebing The Histoly of the German Labour 
Movement: A SurM, trans. Edith K6rner (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1985) 76; H. 
Schurer, "The Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Origins of German Communism, " Slavonic 
and East European Review, 39 (1961): 460,467. 
76 Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1952) 101. 
77 One must bear in mind that the Anti-Socialist Laws (1878 - 1890) remained fresh in the 
memories of many SPD leaders. The lifting of the law did not guarantee democratic freedom 
and the government quite often interfered with the SPD's meetings. The law had been lifted for 
five years but this did not prevent Wilhelm Liebknecht from being imprisoned after a speech 
following a party congress in 1895. In 1900 the International Socialist Congress was not held in 
Germany due to the lack of freedom of speech. Although the SPD was the largest party in the 
Second International, the German party was still very weak and could not afford to expel or 
allow rival dissenting groups to form. At most the SPD could make party life difficult for 
dissenters i. e. make it difficult for them to hold key positions of influence party organisation. 
James Joll, The Second International 1889 - 1914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968) 
90-91; also see GDH Cole, Socialist Thoujzht, 4 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co LTD, 1958). 
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78 England, as an exile as there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest . In fact, 
the SPD leadership, although most disagreed with Bernstein, were hopeful that 
the whole controversy would disappear. 
However the German Social Democratic Party, as the leading party in the 
Second International, was forced to react to Bernstein. While the SPD 
leadership had chosen to deal with Bernstein's articles in a quiet manner, 
foreign Socialists such as Plekhanov were not prepared to ignore them. 79 For 
the non-German Socialists Bernstein's attempts to "update" Marxism attacked 
the fundamental basis of the theory and practice of the Marxist movement. To 
insist that cooperation with the State was the only way forward in countries 
where basic suffrage rights did not exist was ludicrous. Plekhanov wrote to 
Kautsky, "You say your readers have no interest in philosophy ... then you must 
force them to take an interest.... If you want me to write against Bernstein you 
must give me full freedom of speech. Bernstein must be destroyed ... and I will 
78 Bernstein was allowed to return to Germany in January 1901 after his friends in Germany 
managed to convince Chancellor Biflow to not renew the warrant. Gay pointed out that the 
Chancellor's motives were unclear, but that it is quite plausible that he believed that Bernstein's 
presence would split the SPD. Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard 
Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952) 66. 
79 Let us not forget that Bernstein did have support within the party leadership, even though 
August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, and Karl Kautsky were adamantly against 
him. Gay pointed out that Viktor Adler, while he disagreed with Bernstein, he applauded him 
for bringing "socialist doubts" out into the open. On March 17,1898 Alder wrote to Bernstein, 
"I will tell you and everybody else frankly: in my opinion you have not put yourself anywhere 
outside Social Democracy, no matter how much I may dissent in some things. You represent, in 
brilliant fashion, a direction within the party. " At first Bebel was determined to have Bernstein 
expelled, but changed his mind because of the "grave disturbance" he thought it would cause the 
party. Bebel wrote to Adler on April 8,1899, "The whole matter would be of little significance 
if there were only one Bernstein ... 
but we have a whole lot of them, and most in distinguished 
positions within the party. " Following the Dresden Congress in 1903 Ignaz Auer wrote to 
Bernstein, "My dear Ede, you don't pass such resolutions. You don't talk about it, you just do 
it. " Essentially this is what the SPD eventually did. Nettl made the interesting point that the 
supporters of revisionism tended to be people who had managed to remain "socially acceptable 
socialists" - Trade Union leaders and others who had not suffered for their open dedication to 
the SPD. Members against revisionism tended to be those who had suffered i. e. lawyers who 
had been disbarred or had become isolated because they were socialists. Peter Gay, The 
Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1952) 66-69,267; James Joll, The Second International 1889 - 
1914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968) 94; JP Nettl, "The German Social Democratic 
Party 1890 - 1914 as a Political Model, " Past and Present 30 (1965): 68-69. 
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gladly undertake this task if you let me. , 
80 Bernstein's Revisionism became a 
source of embarrassment for them and the SPD leaders were forced to openly 
act. 
Parvus, editor of the Sdchsiche Arbeiterzeitung, had been running criticism 
of Bernstein from January to March 1898.81 It was during this period that 
Luxemburg arrived in Berlin in 1898 and joined forces with Parvus against 
revisionism. The main assault against revisionism was led by Parvus, Mehring, 
and Luxemburg and eventually others joined. Luxemburg and Parvus' 
criticisms forced the SPD leadership to take a stand on the issue. Bebel and 
Kautsky openly denounced Bernstein at the Stuttgart Conference in October 
1898. 
By far Bernstein's intellectual superior Rosa Luxemburg launched a serious 
of attacks in the Leipziger Volkszeitung in September 1898 in which she focused 
on reformist tactics and the party's revolutionary goal. The articles were 
reissued as a book in 1899 under the title Social Reform or Revolution. 82 
Luxemburg pointed out that the potential shift toward reformism threatened the 
very essence of the Social Democratic movement. 
"[Bernstein's] theory tends to counsel us to renounce the 
social transformation, the final goal of the social democracy 
and inversely, to make social reforms the means of the class 
struggle, its aim. [T]he final goal of socialism constitutes the 
80 Plekhanov's to Kautsky dated 16 September 1898 as quoted in J. P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 
abridged edition, (New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1969) 130. 
81 According to Schurer, Parvus was extremely influencial in the thought of Luxemuburg, 
Kautsky, and Trotsky. It was Parvus, after all, who gave Luxemburg her first chance to prove 
herself as a writer in the German Social Democratic movement. H. Schurer, "The Russian 
Revolution of 1905 and the Origins of German Communism, " Slavonic and East European 
Review 39 (1961): 460-46 1. 
82 David McLellan, Marxism After Marx: An Introduction (London: MacMillan Press, LTD, 
1979)43. 
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only decisive factor distinguishing the social democratic 
movement from bourgeois democracy and bourgeois 
radicalism.... The question of reform or revolution, of the 
final goal and the movement, is basically ... the question of the 
petty bourgeois or proletarian character of the labour 
movement. , 83 
Bernstein's abandonment of the final goal also brought into question the nature 
of the class struggle of the movement. In placing greater emphasis on the 
movement rather than the goal Bernstein shifted the focus of socialist activity 
away from revolutionary change. This in turn removed the proletarian 
consciousness as a class as the centre of revolutionary activity and replaced it 
with institutions. Institutions have the capacity and indeed the tendency, become 
bureaucratised. 84 
In abandoning the revolutionary goal Bernstein placed great importance on 
the role of Trade Unions in transforming the political system from within. 
Luxemburg conceded that the Trade Union struggle and parliamentary 
participation were a means to an end - that of guiding, educating, and preparing 
the proletariat for their revolutionary task of taking power. Trade Unions 
helped assist in developing the consciousness of the proletarian and organising 
them as a class. But Luxemburg disagreed that the Trade Unions and 
83 Rosa Luxemburg, "Social Reform or Revolution, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. Mary Alice 
Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 36,37. 
84 Robert Michels was a disillusioned member of the SPD. His book described the evolution of 
the SPD from a political underground movement to bureaucracy to oligarchy. For Michels this 
was the nature of political participation - that is of modem democracy and the institutions that 
function within it. Highly organised political parties seeking power are not democratic within 
their own internal structure; therefore, they were incapable of fighting for a democratic society. 
They would not suddenly become more democratic but rather become more controlling as they 
gained more power. Once they had gained "collective power" it was probable that they would 
do all that was possible to maintain control. They would eventual evolve into oligarchy. Robert 
Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem 
Democraa, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: The Free Press, 1962) 188-202,349. 
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parliamentary participation could produce a "socialising influence" on political 
economy. 
"[Once trade unions] are considered as instruments of direct 
socialisation of capitalist economy, they lose not only their 
usual effectiveness but cease being means of preparing the 
working class for the conquest of power. "85 
Luxemburg insisted that although Trade Unions may at times support 
Social Democracy in their revolutionary struggle, they were reformist rather 
than revolutionary. Trade Unions fought to alleviate the symptoms of 
capitalism. They struggled for shorter working hours, unemployment insurance, 
job security, etc. According to Luxemburg the dual function of Trade Unions, 
that of influencing the situation in the labour market and improving the 
conditions of the workers, resembled a sort of "labour of Sisyphus. 46 
Luxemburg had not meant to offend the Trade Unions with this comment. She 
believed their work to be "indispensable" but like Sisyphus never ending. In 
their tireless struggle to increase wages the aims of Trade Unions would always 
stop short of revolution. 
The short term impact of Eduard Bernstein's Evolutionary Socialism was 
limited. The debates over Reform or Revolution involving Bernstein, 
Luxemburg, Kautsky, Merhring, and Parvus were mostly played out at the 
intellectual level of the party. By the time the SPD voted against revisionism in 
85 Rosa Luxemburg, "Social Reform or Revolution, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaksl ed. Mary Alice 
Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 5 8. 
86 According to Greek mythology, Sisyphus was the King of Corinth who, as a punishment for 
disrespecting Zeus, was condemned to eternally roll a heavy rock up a steep hill. Once he 
neared the top of the hill the rock would always escape him and roll back down again. Although 
this comment was not intended maliciously, it deeply antagonised the Trade Unions. Rosa 
Luxemburg, "Social Reform or Revolution, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. Mary Alice Waters 
(New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 7 1. 
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favour of a revolutionary programme at the Amsterdam Congress in August 
1904, the debate in this specific form had faded into insignificance. But this is 
not to say that the drive toward reformism faded. The rejection of Bernstein's 
theory did not destroy the refonnism within the party, nor did it lead to the 
expulsion of the revisionists. 87 The SPD had quietly begun to transform (evolve 
as Bernstein put it) as Bernstein pointed out in 1896. As time moved on and old 
SPD leaders died this shift became more and more openly apparent. For 
Luxemburg this shift away from revolutionary methods became all too clear 
after the Russian Revolution of 1905. 
Mass Strike and the Russian Revolution of 1905,88 
The defeat of the Russian army at Port Arthur during the Russo - Japanese 
War demonstrated the initial signs of weakness of the Russian autocracy. On 
the Whof January 1905 the Tsar Nicholas 11's soldiers opened fire on peaceftil 
demonstrators outside the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. The reaction to this 
dreadfully violent act (which became known as Bloody Sunday) was outrage in 
the already discontented Russian society. By the 22 nd of January, fury had 
manifested itself into the "dramatic eruption" into revolution with mutinies 
occurring in the army and navy and the establishment of Soviets. 89 This wave 
87 Gay insisted that if there had been no Bernstein it would have been necessary to invent him. 
For Gay Revisionism represented "the rational recognition of an already existing state of 
affairs. " Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenize to 
Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952) 99; also see Carl Schorske, German Social 
Democracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1955) 16-24. 
88 Parts of this section have been published in an article. For further details see Lea Haro, 
"Luxemburg, the Mass Strike, and the 1905/06 Revolution, " Against the Current 118 (2005) 23- 
25. 
89 JP Nettl described the outbreak of the 1905 Russian Revolution as a complete surprise. It was 
only later, in the "search for perspective, " that the warning signs were pieced together. The 
revolution was a surprise not only to the Tsar but also to professional revolutionaries such as 
Lenin, Martov, and Luxemburg. JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, abridged edition, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969) 202. 
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of revolutionary fervour spread throughout the Tsarist Empire into Poland and 
even spilled into Germany. 
As news of the Russian Revolution reached Germany the Ruhr basin was 
already embroiled in its greatest labour struggle. Workers all over Germany had 
taken an active interest in Russian affairs and demanded the presence of the 
SPD's inspiring speaker - Rosa Luxemburg. Leaders of the four mine workers' 
unions attempted to prevent the spread of strikes but failed. By February the 
strikes had been called off. May Day was normally a day for protest in Russia 
and Poland, but in 1905 Germany also experienced outbreaks of strikes and 
protest. Trade Unions renounced the revolutionary spirit in Germany and 
refused to take part. Luxemburg became increasingly frustrated and 
disillusioned with the inaction of the SPD and the growing power of the Trade 
Unions. The Unions blamed Luxemburg for the "strike fever. " 90 
Poland responded to the revolution in Russia by declaring a state of 
emergency. By the 27 th of January connections between Russian and Polish 
workers had been established and according to JP Nettl, they behaved as Marx 
predicted, without borders. 91 A state of emergency was declared in Poland. 
Mass strikes and opposition from most sections of Russian society forced the 
Tsarist government to agree to convene an elected but purely consultative 
National Assembly known as the Duma. By October the government was near 
collapse. But this victory was short lived. On the P of December 1905, the 
90 Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great 
Lchism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 37; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 1: 300-304; Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburiz: Her Life 
ý! nd Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 117. 
in The Communist Manifesto Marx insisted that the "The working men have no country. " 
th Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, intro. Leon Trotsky, 4 ed. (New 
York: Pathfinder Press, 1995) 32; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966) 1: 319. 
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government arrested 260 members of the St. Petersburg Soviet including Leon 
Trotsky. 
By 1906 the Tsarist government had regained complete control of Russia 
and began trying and executing members of the opposition. The events in 
Poland continued until 1906. Ignoring the persuasive efforts of August Bebel, 
Franz Mehring, Karl and Louis Kautsky, and Leo Jogiches, Luxemburg began 
preparations to travel to Poland in mid-December 1905. By the time she arrived 
the revolutionary struggle was dying. By March Polish authorities had arrested 
her; a German conservative newspaper had exposed her presence in Warsaw. 
She was allowed to leave Poland through Finland where she spent time with 
Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other exiles of the 1905 Russian Revolution 
who had managed to escape. 92 When Luxemburg returned to Germany, she 
arrived refreshed and ready to analyse the 1905 - 1906 events and apply them to 
the German situation. For Luxemburg, the upsurge in strikes symbolised the 
revolutionary spirit of the working class. 
The Revolution of 1905 - 1906 symbolised a turning point in Rosa 
Luxemburg's practical and theoretical thought for two reasons. First, 
Luxemburg's return from Poland provided her with the opportunity to blatantly 
see the changing nature of the SPD Executive. By the time Luxemburg returned 
92 Luxemburg wrote the pamphlet "Mass Strike, the Party, and Trade Unions, " while in 
Kuokkala, Finland during the second half of 1906. Schurer argued that from 1905-1914 German 
Social Democracy never stopped discussing whether the Russian Revolution of 1905 had 
anything to teach German Socialism. For Schurer a deep polarisation developed that 
foreshadowed the divide between the Social Democratic and Communist movements. Schurer, 
quoting from Radek, claimed that Luxemburg's pamphlet sparked the beginning of a new trend 
in Social Democracy. It "[began] the separation of the communist movement from social 
democracy. " This view is also held by JP Nettl and Pierre Brou6. H. Schurer, "The Russian 
Revolution of 1905 and the Origins of German Communism, " Slavonic and East European 
Review 39 (1961): 459,463; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University 
jý-ess, 1966) 1: 298; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005) 18-19; Eric D. Weitz, - 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German 
Communism and the Luxemburg Legacy, " Central European History 27.1 (1994): 34. 
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to Germany, the revolutionary situation had returned to "normal. " She was 
shocked to find that the nature of the party had changed in her absence. The 
party had become "official" and tame in its opposition. It behaved 
diplomatically and behind the scenes. Indeed, it behaved like a political party 
whose goal is power within a parliamentary system while at the same time still 
paying lip service to its Marxist revolutionary rhetoric. 
Luxemburg was further shocked to discover the increasing influence of the 
Trade Unions in party matters. While she was in Warsaw the Trade Unions 
had regained their autonomy under a secret agreement. 93 The SPD Executive's 
increasing reliance on Trade Union support made them reluctant of anything 
that might cause confrontation with them and Rosa Luxemburg's newfound 
revolutionary enthusiasm certainly appeared dangerous to their relationship with 
the Trade Unions. The party's capitulation to the Unions was so complete that 
in her attempt to have the pamphlet, "Mass Strike, Party, and Trade Unions" 
printed, the party executive put a last minute stop on the printing. The 
Executive had the original printing blocs destroyed and printed a mildly altered 
93 The secret agreement took place on February 16,1906 and was an incredible victory for the 
Trade Unions. The Executive renounced any intentions of propagating the mass strike and 
pledged to take preventative measures. If a mass strike were to break out the party would bear 
sole responsibility for leadership and costs of the strike. Although Trade Unions would not 
participate, they would not betray the strike either. Should lockouts and strikes occur after the 
mass strike was called off, then the Unions would step in and offer support. The content of the 
secret agreement eventually leaked out. It betrayed the Jena Congress resolution (held in 
September 1905) in which the party supported and indeed advocated mass strike under certain 
conditions. In fact Bebel put forward the motion to support the political general strike. 
Essentially the SPD Executive granted the Unions autonomy in all Trade Union questions and 
the party (unofficially but in practice) gave up its right to enforce party policy on the Unions 
without their full consent. Brou6 insisted that it was at this point - the signing of the secret 
agreement - that German Social Democracy "categorically turned its back on the Party's 
identification with revolution. " The secret agreement became the official party policy at the 
Mannheim Congress held on September 23,1906. Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 
1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1955) 48-49; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: 
Brill, 2005) 18-19. 
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version of the pamphlet, having first removed any phrases that might antagonise 
the Unions. 94 
Trade Unions, on the other hand, were mostly concerned with the practical 
consequences of using mass strikes for political purposes. Aside from the 
potential financial devastation that mass strikes posed, refocusing the workers' 
attention on the revolutionary struggle, as opposed to the day to day struggle, 
threatened the Unions authoritative position. They feared political discussions 
and hope for political change would lure the rank and file away from the 
practical work of the Trade Union struggle. 95 Therefore, in an effort to draw the 
rank and file back to the Trade Union struggle and away from the "abstractness" 
of the revolution the SPD Executive and the Trade Unions distorted the 
meaning of Rosa Luxemburg's pamphlet. 
Second, the revolutions of 1905/06 provided Rosa Luxemburg with the 
basis for her future thought on political organisation. From 1906 onwards the 
role of mass action in the revolutionary struggle remained dominant in her 
writing. For Luxemburg it formed the link between theory and practice that is 
more crucially, the link between the party and the masses. The notion of the 
mass strike or general strike was quite old but the Russian Revolution of 1905 
94 The Hamburg provincial organisation was furious at the interference by the SPD Executive. 
Not only had the most forceful strikes in 1905 taken place in Hamburg but the Hamburg 
organisation had also commissioned Luxemburg's stay in Finland for the purpose of writing on 
the Russian Revolution and its use of the mass strike. They had hoped that the pamphlet would 
influence the delegates at the Mannheim congress. Unfortunately they had not realised that the 
SPD Executive had changed in such a way that the propagation of the revolution was no longer 
necessary to gain popular support. JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966) 357,365; Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The 
Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 54-55. 
95 The SPD did not possess the financial resources to keep striking workers from going hungry. 
Hostile employers could potentially retaliate with lockouts. Carl Schorske, German Social 
Dem: )cracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1955) 39-40; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966) 1: 299-300. 
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was the first time that mass strikes were used to bring an empire to its knees. 96 
Luxemburg believed that the 1905 Russian Revolution demonstrated the 
debilitating potential of spontaneous mass action and she believed that it could 
be utilised as a special weapon in times of revolutionary upheaval. Although 
Luxemburg intended mass strike to be a tool used by the SPD in the overthrow 
of Capitalism, her theory posed a great danger to the new bureaucracy 
developing within the SPD. 
Luxemburg's critics attacked "Mass Strike, the Party, and Trade Unions, "' 
for creating a link between mass strike and revolution. They felt she confused 
two separate issues - the economic and the political strike. They accused her of 
advocating a "theory of spontaneity, 19 which: diminished the role of the party as 
the leader of the class struggle; over-estimated the role of the masses; denied the 
importance of conscious and organised action; and the "complete abandonment 
,, 97 to the mechanical fatalism of the historical process. Indeed, if the workers 
were to play the leading role in their own struggle then the role of the Party and 
the Trade Unions would be superfluous. 
96 Julius Braunthal asserted that it was always discussed as a last resort and had been discussed 
as early as 1839 at the Chartist Convention. Paul FrOlich pointed out that it was mainly 
discussed as a weapon against the bourgeois for political purposes. It was a means of exerting 
pressure on capitalism to force the system into reforms and a means by which the workers could 
fight for political rights. However in capitalist countries the idea of general strike as a weapon 
of the working class movement seemed to have gone out of fashion, particularly in Germany 
and Great Britain. It remained firmly placed on the shelf of academic discussion and strictly for 
defensive purposes, although Parvus advocated that it could lead the masses from the defensive 
to the offensive struggle. Most SPD leaders were of the opinion that "General strike is general 
nonsense. " Julius Braunthal, History of the International, trans. Henry Collins and Kenneth 
Mitchell, 2 vols. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1966) 1: 285,295; Paul Fr6lich, Rosa 
Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New York: Howard Fertig, 
1969) 150-15 1; H. Schurer, "The Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Origins of German 
Communism, " Slavonic and East European Review 39 (1961): 462; Peter Gay, The Dilemma 
of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1952) 232,237. 
97 Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 168. 
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Not surprisingly her critics' accounts of Luxemburg's use of mass strike 
were exaggerated and inaccurate. 98 Rosa Luxemburg did not advocate chaotic, 
leaderless, undisciplined, and unconscious uprisings, although fear inspired her 
enemies to argue that these were indeed her intentions. Luxemburg did not 
believe that the mass strike should be limited to a purely defensive measure, nor 
was it an isolated incident. In fact, the mass strike was "the sign" of the class 
struggle, which had developed over years. 99 For Luxemburg, the mass strike 
did not lead to revolution but rather the revolutionary period created the 
economic and political conditions for mass strikes to occur. This spontaneous 
action by the party could not be contained by discipline, planned, or tampered 
with by the party. 100 
Luxemburg fully intended the party leadership to play an active role at the 
head of strikes. She did not believe that the leadership could plan the hour of 
the mass strike; the masses would have to decide for themselves the critical 
moment of the mass strike. She did, however, believe that the trend and 
character of the party would play a crucial role in determining the nature and the 
course the strikes took during the revolutionary period. 
"To fix beforehand the cause and the moment from and in 
which the mass strikes in Germany will break out is not in the 
power of social democracy, because it is not in its power to 
98 With the discussion over the mass strike debates once again placed on the party's agenda, the 
party leadership once again drew on Engels' introduction to the Class War in France and 
continued to claim that he warned against confrontations with the military. Julius Braunthal, 
History of the International, trans. Henry Collins and Kenneth Mitchell, 2 vols. (London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1966) 1: 302 
99 Rosa Luxemburg, "Mass Strike, Party, and Trade Unions, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. 
Mary Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 182. 
100 Geras suggested that Luxemburg' repeated emphasis that the mass strike was not something 
that could be conjured up by the leadership was the reason why she was accused of being a 
64spontaneist. " Norman Geras, "Mass Strike, " The Legacv of Rosa Luxemburg (London: NLB, 
1976) 118. 
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bring about historical situations by resolutions at party 
congresses. But what it can and must do is to make clear the 
political tendencies, when they once appear, and to formulate 
as resolute and consistent tactics. Man cannot keep historical 
events in check while making recipes for them, but he can see 
in advance their apparent calculable consequences and arrange 
his mode of action appropriately. "' 01 
The conditions for spontaneous action did not fall from the sky, nor did workers 
arbitrarily decide to "have" a mass strike. 102 The economic and political 
conditions would need to already exist. It was not only necessary for the party 
to play an active role in educating and preparing the proletariat for their 
historical role of the overthrow of capitalism, but the party was in fact a pre- 
condition of a successful revolution. Luxemburg believed that this type of 
spontaneous mass action would play a vital role during the revolutionary period. 
However she maintained that without the necessary preparation and fulfilment 
of the necessary pre-conditions the most carefully planned and disciplined 
general strike would be no different than an ordinary struggle for wages and it 
could, potentially, end in disaster. In order for a mass strike to be an effective 
revolutionary weapon against Capitalism it was imperative that the desire and 
drive for mass action came from the masses - who had been guided and 
influenced by the party. 
Essentially Rosa Luxemburg's theory of mass action - placed the workers 
at the centre of the revolutionary struggle. In empowering the workers 
Luxemburg posed a threat to the Trade Unions and the SPD Executive. Indeed 
101 Rosa Luxemburg, "Mass Strike, Party, and Trade Unions, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. 
Mary Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 205. 
102 Rosa Luxemburg, "Mass Strike, Party, and Trade Unions, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. 
Mary Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 187-188,198. 
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German Social Democracy had changed. Social conditions in Germany meant 
that it was no longer tied to the revolutionary rhetoric of the Erfurt Programme. 
From 1906 onward Rosa Luxemburg and her supporters became increasingly 
marginalised. Many focused their attention on the party school. 
M. Polemics with Lenin 
Although the Left wing of the party played a dominant role during the 
Revisionist controversy by 1906 their influence had diminished. By 1906 
bureaucrats enjoyed the majority in the SPD Executive and Trade Unions had 
become increasingly influential force within the SPD. The party had become 
more involved in parliamentary politics and as a result dependant on Trade 
Unionists votes, who tended to be anti-revolutionary. The Trade Unions" 
alliance allowed the SPD Executive to become the parliamentary representative 
of the workers through their alliance. In exchange the SPD Executive hung the 
Left out to dry. 103 Schorske pointed out that this alliance would prove fatal for a 
revolutionary party such as the SPD. For although, the Executive were 
swinging Right and attempting to reinvent themselves as a legitimate legal 
political party, it still paid lip service to its Marxist origins. The move towards 
parliamentary participation proved a practical victory for the Revisionists who 
maintained their belief that the road to Socialism lies in parliamentary 
participation. But the Trade Unions were anti-revolutionary and had no interest 
in the Marxist rhetoric of overthrowing Capitalism and the Socialist revolution. 
103 Despite the Left's diminishing influence, they remained in control of the women's 
organisation, the youth organisation, and the party school. (The SPD Executive founded the 
party school in Berlin in 1905 to train party and Trade Union functionaries. ) The Unions did 
not openly object, they merely demonstrated their distaste by not sending students. Carl 
Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great Schism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 111. 
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Their social interests were finnly grounded in practical everyday struggles and 
their material interests in retaining the existing system. Schorske concluded that 
the SPD's alliance with the Trade Unions helped sow the seeds for its own 
destruction. "By capitulating before the trade unions ... the party surrendered its 
political flexibility, 
dissolution. " 104 
and thus prepared the ground for its subsequent 
During the period 1905 - 1909 the party restructured itself, creating a rigid 
hierarchy. The partys inflexibility and orientation towards parliamentary 
participation demonstrated its tendency towards bureaucracy. 105 By 1911 
Friedrich Ebert had become the most influential man in the SPD and became a 
symbol of the party's new bureaucracy. 106 The Left radicals became 
increasingly marginalized. Luxemburg found it more and more difficult to get 
her articles published particularly any articles that promoted the use of mass 
strike and the reorientation of the party's influence back into the hands of the 
masses. 107 The SPD had existed on the fringe of German politics - as agitators 
of the parliamentary system. But by the 1912 election campaign the SPD had 
104 Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great 
Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 110. 
105 Schorske claimed that the SPD were the first to devise bureaucratic institutions as a means of 
control and these were adapted by Communists, Fascists, and Nazis to suite their own purposes. 
The statement is interesting because it is adapted directly from Michels. Carl Schorske, German 
Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1955) 116; Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the 
Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: The 
Free Press, 1962). 
106 David McLellan, Marxism After Marx (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1979) 53; Carl 
Schorske, 'German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great Schism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 124; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 
- 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 24. 107 Kautsky refused to publish Luxemburg's article "What Further? " in Die Neue Zeit. The 
article had been previously rejected by Vorwdrts. McLellan claimed the article's title was 
"What Now? " while Schorske claimed the article title was "What further? " however, Kautsky 
wrote a series of articles entitled "What Now? " David McLellan, Marxism After Marx 
(London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1979) 53; Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 
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thrown itself into the arena of power hungry politics and begun cooperation 
with bourgeois parties into order to maximise votes and thereby further 
marginalizing the Left and Centre wings within the SPD. By early 1917 both 
the Left and the Centre had been expelled from the party. 108 The SPD had 
shown its support for the State through its support for the war and consolidated 
its power by expelling its opposition. 
Despite being marginalised and expelled from the SPD Luxemburg 
remained committed to the active role of the masses until the end of her life. It 
is clear through her writing and her activity in the SDKPiL and Spartakusbund 
that Luxemburg viewed the SPD as a model by which to build a movement on. 
The Social Democratic Party of Germany was famous, intellectually and 
organisationally. During the period of the Second International it was the 
strongest socialist movement in Europe and was the party in which others based 
themselves on. But as the SPD moved out of the shackles of illegality under the 
Anti-Socialist Laws and into the realm of a socially acceptable political party, it 
became considerably less democratic and increasingly bureaucratic. 
Luxemburg's articles called for more democracy within the party, the use of 
mass action as a weapon, and the education of the masses so that they could 
become conscious and would be able to transform themselves from a "class in 
itself' to a "class for itself. " 
108 The Left wing of the party (the group around Rosa Luxemburg which became known as the 
Spartacists) and the Centrists formed the Unabhdngige Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands 
(USPD - Independent German Socialist Party. ) The USPD included Spartacists, Kautsky, and 
even Bernstein. At the time Luxemburg was keen to cooperate with the Centrists in an effort to 
"steal" away its members. Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John 
Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 79-85; Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: 
The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 312-321; 
JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 2: 655-659; Julius 
Braunthal, History of the International: 1914 - 1943,2 vols. (London: Thomas Nelson and 
Sons LTD, 1967) 59-60; Herman Weber, Die Waldung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die 
in der Weimarer ReDublik, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europ5ische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 36-37. 
68 
Rosa Luxemburg remained consistent and dedicated to her opposition of 
centralism and bureaucracy and this was certainly highlighted by her debates 
with Lenin. Therefore, this section will discuss Rosa Luxemburg's polemics 
with Lenin. Although Lenin and Luxemburg debated on most topics this section 
will highlight their debates surrounding the national question, Imperialism, and 
political organisation. 
The National Ouestion 
The "national question" was and still remains a great point of division in 
the Socialist movement. This question has never been successfully resolved and 
still remains a point of contention amongst some groups. ' 09 Rosa Luxemburg's 
experience in German Social Democracy was no exception. Luxemburg first 
became involved in the debate over the national question in Switzerland during 
her time with the PPS. 110 During this period it was fashionable for Western 
European Social Democrats to dogmatically support Polish independence. They 
claimed that Marx and Engels had supported this position. Paul Frblich pointed 
out that Marx and Engels had pursued a policy of independence for Poland since 
109 For Schorske the most significant event in the fluctuation of the SPD's attitude toward the 
national question was the Mannheim Congress in 1906. The congress not only brought about a 
reversal of the party's position toward the use of mass strike, but it also showed the first signs of 
the acute division developing between the Left and the party leadership. Carl Schorske, German 
Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1955) 75. 
110 The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was formed in 1892 as an attempt to unite the underground 
Polish Socialist movement. The unity was extremely short lived. The nationalists could not 
agree amongst themselves. Some advocated the use of the slogan of Polish independence as a 
means of realising a Socialist revolution. Many bore hostility toward Russians and the other 
oppressed nationalities within the Tsarist Empire and refused to entertain the notion of an 
alliance with Russian Social Democracy. The divisions over the national question became one 
of the central issues for the PPS split. The issue of national self-determination of nations also 
contributed to the split in the Russian Social Democratic Party. Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: 
Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 50; 
Leonard Sharpiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
1960) 148; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 2: 845. 
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the 1840's but their policy did not have nationalist undertones. ' 11 They viewed 
Tsarist Russia as a powerful threat that intervened in Western European affairs 
and actively hindered progress. Their attitude toward Polish independence was 
largely governed by their aim of defeating Russia. The idea was that an 
independent Poland would sufficiently weaken Russia's grasp and potentially 
allow the wheels of progress to move forward. Indeed the creation of a 
democratic Poland was a pre-condition to the creation of a democratic 
Germany. 112 While Marx and Engel supported the notion of an independent 
Poland, they were extremely sceptical about the right of self-determination of 
nations. They finnly believed that it was not possible for a nation to be truly 
free as long as the Capitalist system remained in place. 113 
Luxemburg maintained that the means by which Marx had hoped to gain 
independence for Poland no longer existed. The Tsar's Empire had begun to 
show signs of weakness. The introduction of Capitalism had begun to 
disintegrate Russian society. As a result the Tsar was forced to emancipate the 
serfs in 1861. The Tsar received a further blow when Russia was hit with a 
series of famines in 1891 - 1893. Capitalism and famine forced peasants to 
leave their villages in search of work in the towns, thus, creating a new class - 
the proletariat. The development of the working class in Russia would be the 
means by which the Tsar's empire would come to an end. Luxemburg believed 
that even in the unlikely event that the Polish proletariat were to successfully 
break away from the three strongest empires in Europe (the Russian, the Austro- 
111 Paul Frolich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 37-39. 
112 JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 2: 842. 
113 Paul Frblich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 37-39; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966) 2: 842-844. 
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Hungarian, and the Prussian) it would then be forced to take the position of the 
ruling class, resulting in the creation of a new class within the State. It would 
then be forced to propagate further oppression in order to maintain its power. 
Luxemburg insisted that "National States and Nationalism are empty vessels 
into which each epoch and the class relations in each particular country pour 
their particular material content. "' 14 Although she realised that there was no set 
formula for each country, Luxemburg concluded that an independent Poland 
should not be followed as an immediate aim of the Polish proletariat. 
Rosa Luxemburg agreed that the aim of Socialism was indeed, the 
destruction of all forms of oppression including Imperialism - the oppression of 
one nation over another. 115 Luxemburg's acknowledgement that each national 
case was different was not a contradiction in her position. In some cases 
Imperialist nations kept oppressed countries backward as a means of 
maintaining control. 1 16 Luxemburg cited the example of Turkey, in which 
Turkish domination in Southern Europe retarded cultural and economic 
development. Independence for the Balkan countries would allow the 
development of bourgeois democracies and potentially create a united force 
against Russia. " 7 But marrying Socialist aims to nationalist aims by 
114 As quoted from Fr6lich. Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward 
Fitzgerald (1940; New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 45. 
115 For Luxemburg the "concern about guaranteeing an internal market for the industrialists of 
the 'fatherland', and of acquiring new markets by means of conquest" were the concerns of the 
bourgeoisie and their purpose of creating a Nation-State. According to Luxemburg these aims 
were the opposite of the aims of a "conscious proletariat. " Rosa Luxemburg, "rhe National 
Question and Autonomy, " The National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, ed. 
Horace B. Davis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976) 167. 
116 Luxemburg was adamant that the " 'nation' -state as an apparatus of the domination and 
conquest of foreign nationalities ... has no meaning for the proletariat. " Rosa Luxemburg, "The 
National Question and Autonomy, " The National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa 
Lux ý, mburg, ed. Horace B. Davis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976) 168-169. 
117 Rosa Luxemburg, "The National Question and Autonomy, " The National Question: Selected 
Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, ed. Horace B. Davis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976) 
113-114; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 2: 846- 
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unconditionally advocating the right to self-determination was dangerous to the 
final aim of Socialism. Self-determination required an alliance based on 
national boundaries, i. e. the unity of the Polish proletariat with the Polish 
bourgeoisie rather than alliances based on class. Promoting the right of self- 
detennination of nations threatened the international working class struggle. 
In her article, "Der Sozialpatriotismus in Polen, " Luxemburg argued that 
the Polish bourgeoisie had proven that their true alliance lay with the Russian 
bourgeoisie and not with their countrymen- the Polish proletariat. " 8 Not only 
did big business rely on the Russian market but petty bourgeoisie and hand 
working businesses attempted to follow the lead of big business and gain access 
to the Russian market. In reality the entire Polish economy was heavily 
dependent on Russia as it main market. Luxemburg concluded that as no class 
had an economic interest in Polish independence, the Polish proletariat must 
openly build alliances with the Russian proletariat. 119 When Luxemburg 
introduced these ideas to the Polish Socialist movement she met with resistance 
and hostility from both nationalist and those who had dogmatically followed the 
Social Democratic line of Polish independence. 
Despite severe opposition Rosa Luxemburg maintained her anti-nationalist 
stance until her death in 1919. She readdressed the issue of Polish 
847; Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 44-46. 
118 The article was originally published in Neue Zeit in 1895/96. Rosa Luxemburg, "Der 
Sozialpatriotismus in Polen, " Gesammelte Werke: 1893 - 1905,5 vols. (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 
1972). 
"9 Luxemburg pointed out that this was not only an issue of economic interests. Some Poles 
enjoyed more "freedom" than others. Poles in the Austrian sphere of influence enjoyed relative 
autonomy. They did not have much to gain but rather they potentially had much to lose in a 
unified Poland. Rosa Luxemburg, "Der Sozialpatriotismus in Polen, " Gesammelte Werke: 
1893 - 1905,5 vols. (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1972) 1/1: 43-51; Horace B. Davis, Toward a 
Marxist Theory of Nationalism (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1978) 61. 
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independence in a series of articles "The National Question and Autonomy. 99120 
Although several Marxist attempted to contribute to the "National Question" 
including Kautsky, the most notable, in the eyes of contemporary scholars, 
came from Lenin. 121 Lenin answered Luxemburg with his article "The 
Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Detennination, " 
published in 1914. Lenin firmly held that Marx shared the concept of the right 
of self-detennination of nations to the point of separation. 
"Never in favour of petty states, or the splitting of states in 
general, or the principle of federation, Marx considered the 
separation of an oppressed nation to be a step towards 
federation, and consequently, not towards a split, but towards 
concentration, both political and economic, but concentration 
on the basis of democracy. " 122 
Lenin claimed that such a programme was an internationalist programme. He 
argued that an oppressed nation was not able to flourish democratically while its 
oppressor was stifling its "freedom. " Therefore, it would be hypocritical for the 
proletariat of the oppressor nation to not demand separation. Separation did not 
close the door to a potential federation, which might come later. Lenin 
advocated that this was consistent with a revolutionary programme and in 
120 The articles were originally published in 1908-1909 in the Polish journal Przejzlad 
Sozialdemokratyczgy. Rosa Luxemburg, "The National Question and Autonomy, " The 
National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, ed. Horace B. Davis (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1976). 
121 Kautsky disagreed with Luxemburg on the issue of Polish independence. Kautsky claimed 
that Polish dependence on Russian markets was a "passing phase. " He put forth the old Social 
Democratic notion that an independent Poland would weaken Russia and hence increase the 
possibility for revolution. However, he did not advocate the unconditional right to self- 
determination of nations. Horace B. Davis, Nationalism & Socialism: Marxist and Labor 
Theories of Nationalism to 1917 (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1967) 138- 
139. 
122 V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, " 
Collected Works, 45 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964) 21: 410. 
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keeping with internationalism. In fact, it was imperative to "link the 
revolutionary struggle for Socialism with a revolutionary programme on the 
national question. " 123 Lenin insisted that demands for self-determination and 
the right to succession could not be separated from democracy or the 
international Socialist struggle. 
Luxemburg, however, continued to disagree. While writing from her 
prison cell during the war she remained sceptical about linking the revolutionary 
struggle to nationalism. 124 In her critique of the Russian Revolution, 
Luxemburg warned of the potential disaster awaiting the Bolsheviks. She 
warned that the working class alliance with the bourgeoisie for the struggle of 
self-determination could potentially become a tool of the counter-revolution and 
this would potentially ruin the revolutionary struggle. 
"[I]t was really not the 'people' who engaged in these 
reactionary policies, but only the bourgeois and petty 
bourgeois classes. ) who - in sharpest opposition to their own 
proletarian masses - perverted the 'national right of self- 
determination' into an instrument of their counter 
revolutionary policies. "' 25 
123 V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, " 
Collected Works, 45 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964) 21: 408. 
124 Waters criticised Luxemburg's position on the national question. She claimed that 
Luxemburg's refusal to accept the self-determination as a strategy was a "major error. " Waters 
was correct to assume that Luxemburg under-estimated the full potential of the nationalism. 
History has proven time and time again that nationalism is a powerfully destructive force that 
Socialist movements have been unable to control. Nonetheless Luxemburg's argument 
remained sound. Socialist support for national self-determination subordinated the working 
class struggle to that of a national struggle. Mary Alice Waters, ed. Rosa Luxemburg Speaks 
(New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 12-15. 
121 Rosa Luxemburg, 'The Russian Revolution, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. Mary Alice 
Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc. 1970) 380. 
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She further argued that under Capitalism self-deten-nination was not possible 
because each class would end up working to enhance their own situations rather 
than striving for the overthrow of Capitalism. Eventually the bourgeoisie would 
subordinate the drive for national freedom in favour of the maintenance of class 
rule. This is essentially what happened in Russia. But the Bolsheviks' slogan of 
national self-determination during the Russian Revolution must not judged too 
harshly. Luxemburg was in prison and her access to information was limited. 
Her argument was not based on information but rather she merely presented the 
same argument she had been advocating since 1895. She remained fully 
unaware that the Bolsheviks, whether they were for or against national self- 
determination, were forced to promote the slogan. They had no other choice as 
Republics had begun to break away and they did not have the means to stop 
them. The success of the Russian Revolution forced the Bolsheviks to rethink 
their position on the national question. 
Imperialism 
The SPD's position on the national question fluctuated. Before 1907 many 
chose to ignore the issue as irrelevant and, as stated above, they merely 
followed the dogmatic line of the First International. As the social and political 
situation changed in Germany the national question became inherently tied to 
the development of Imperialism and militarism in Germany. 126 At the 
beginning of the 2Whcentury the party abandoned its position on the abolition of 
standing armies and the creation of militias in favour of advocating support for 
126 Schorske pointed out that after the 1905 Russian Revolution "world politics" or Imperialism 
began to occupy centre stage. It was not until after 1907 that Marxists began serious attempts at 
analysing the problems of Imperialism. Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: 
The )evelopment of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 67-68. 
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national defence. The concept of national defence helped pave the way for the 
SPD's support of the State in the event of war. At the Bremen congress in 1904 
Karl Liebknecht proposed the development of anti-militarist propaganda 
amongst potential recruits. The proposal was rejected with a certain amount of 
laughter. When Liebknecht tried again at the Mannheim congress in 1906 this 
time the reaction was not laughter, but fury from August Bebel. 127 It appeared 
that Bebel had resigned himself to the might of the German military. If war 
were to break out the military would assume control in order to maintain law 
and order and resistance would be foolish. 128 Acknowledging the strength of 
the German military machine and support for national defence slowly shifted 
the SPD leaders' position away from a Marxist anti-State position and toward a 
nationalist position. 
129 
For Luxemburg this shift toward militarism and its intemational 
counterpart - Imperialism - played a very specific role in the history of 
Capitalist development. "Imperialism is the political expression of the 
accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what remains still open of 
the non-Capitalist environment. " 130 Luxemburg's attempt to explain why 
127 Schorske asserted that Bebel's annoyance with Liebknecht was partially motivated by his 
own "innate nationalism. " Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The 
Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 69-70,72. 
128 Joll asserted that the SPD leaders were fully aware of the strength of the Prussian army and 
as a result they were much less revolutionary than they claimed. Even before they gave up on 
their anti-military propaganda they had resigned themselves to their subordinate position. For 
Schorske, it was this fear of the German military machine that drove the SPD to support the 
State's war agenda. James Joll, The Second International 1889 - 1914 (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1968) 110; Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The 
Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 71-73,283- 
291. 
129For Anderson and Grebing it was the SPD's growing nationalism that dictated their decision 
to vote for war credits. Evelyn Anderson, Hammer or Anvil: The Story of the German 
Working-Class Movement (1945; New York: Oriole Editions, 1973) 19-20,22-26; Helga 
Grebing The History of the German Labour Movement: A Survey, trans. Edith K6mer 
(Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1985) 92-93. 
130 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951) 446. 
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capital had expanded beyond itself began from an underconsumption point of 
view. 131 First, Luxemburg argued that Imperialism began with onset of 
Capitalism. During the period of "primitive accumulation" militarism played a 
role in conquering the New World and other countries such as India. It was 
later used as a means of proletarianisation of the local population and also as a 
means of control. 
Second, she pointed out that in order to perpetuate its own existence it 
needed to find new markets to exploit. 
"From the very beginning, the forms and laws of capitalist 
production aim to comprise the entire globe as a store of 
productive forces. Capital, impelled to appropriate productive 
forces for purposes of exploitation, ransacks the whole world, 
it procures its means of production from all comers of 
civilisation and from all forms of society. It becomes 
necessary for capital progressively to dispose ever more fully 
of the whole globe.... " 132 
Militarism was used to create new markets for European countries for the 
purpose of Capitalist expansion in non-European regions. ' 33 Indeed the concept 
of Capitalist expansion was not new. However Luxemburg's point was that 
capitalism needed to expand in order to exist. 134 If it did not expand or if it ran 
131 The most convincing underconsumption argument probably came from J. A. Hobson. 
Hobson was a liberal economist whose book was critical of Imperialism and overseas 
expansion. For more details see J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, 3rd ed. (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1938). 
132 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951) 357-358. 
133 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951) 454. 
134 Brewer stressed that although Luxemburg was wrong to claim that Capitalism needed a non- 
Capitalist environment to exist, she was certainly correct to point out that it did appear to grow 
in these environments. Sweezy on the other hand was entirely dismissive of Luxemburg's 
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out possibilities for expansion then the system would fall into a crisis. 
Luxemburg concluded that Capitalism would be overthrown before it exhausted 
its markets. 1 35 Essentially history has proven her wrong on this point as 
Capitalism has not fallen into an irrevocable crisis. 
While Luxemburg's theory of Capitalist accumulation has been 
systematically disregarded as being wrong, she did make some very valid 
points. 136 Luxemburg was incorrect to suggest an inevitable mechanical 
breakdown of the Capitalist system. However she was correct to point out that 
economic polarisation was occurring on a world wide scale that is, the rich 
nations were getting richer and the poor nations were getting poorer. 137 
Luxemburg was the first to highlight that the arms race provided Capitalism 
with a special, artificial market. 138 Luxemburg insisted that the increase in 
competition for new markets would eventually become lawless and violent and 
would eventually lead to war. 
Rosa Luxemburg wrote The Accumulation of Capital prior to the outbreak 
of the war. Her purpose was an attempt to fill in the gaps left by Marx - gaps 
argument. He attributed her mistakes to her "logical inflexibility. " Anthony Brewer, Marxist 
Theories of IlLiperialism: A Critical Surva, 2 nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1989) 
66; Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political 
EconoMy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968) 202-207. 
135 Luxemburg concluded that "Though Imperialism is the historical method for prolonging the 
career of capitalism, it is also a sure means of bringing it to a swift conclusion. " Rosa 
Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951) 446. 
136 Fr6lich insisted that only Franz Mehring and Julian Marchlevski were the only prominent 
Marxist that saw the value of her work. He claimed that there were hordes of criticisms from 
competent and incompetent critics, which degenerated into mere abuse. Essentially they refused 
to recognize that there was a problem with Marx's formula most probably because they did not 
understand his economics. Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward 
Fitzgerald (1940; New York: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1969) 186-187. 
137 Michael Barratt Brown, "A Critique of Marxist Theories of Imperialism, " Studies in the 
Theory of Imperialism, eds. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe alondon: Longman Group Limited, 
1972)50. 
138 V. G. Kieran, Marxism and Imperialism (London: Edward Arnold (publishers), 1974) 21; 
Michael Barratt Brown, "A Critique of Marxist Theories of Imperialism, " Studies in the Theo[y 
of Imperialism, eds. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman Group Limited, 1972) 
51. 
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that others refused to recognise their existence in the first place. Luxemburg 
was heavily criticised for the flaws in her work particularly by Lenin, who had a 
political score to settle. Lenin began from a disproportionality position. Unlike 
Luxemburg, Lenin's pamphlet was written in Zurich in 1916 in the middle of 
the First World War. He made no attempt to offer anything new to the already 
existing theories of Imperialism. Lenin's main purpose for writing his work on 
Imperialism seemed to be to criticise other Marxist such as Kautsky and 
Hilferding, whom he viewed as taking the Second International in the wrong 
direction. 
Lenin's theory of Imperialism was derived from Hilferding, Bucharin, and 
Hobson. 139 Unlike Hilferding who argued that Capitalism could organise itself 
out of a crisis and Luxemburg who argued that Imperialism had always been a 
part of Capitalism, Lenin not only argued that Imperialism was a stage of 
Capitalist development but that it was the final stage. 
"Imperialism emerged as the development and direct 
continuation of the fundamental attributes of capitalism.... 
But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite 
and high stage of its development.... Monopoly is the 
transition from capitalism to a higher system. Imperialism is 
the monopoly stage of capitalism. , 140 
139 Rudolf Hilferding's book Finance Capital attempted to explain the growth of Monopoly and 
Finance Capital. Brewer pointed out that Hilferding's work contained almost all the major 
points made by Bucharin and Lenin and in some ways he deserves the real credit for developing 
the Marxist theory of Imperialism. Brewer insisted that Bucharin's originality was not that he 
developed new ideas, but that he put together the existing ideas into a coherent and novel whole. 
Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey, 2 nd ed. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1989) 88-116. 
140 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism -A Popular Outline, revised trans. 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1948) 107-108. 
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Lenin argued that Capitalism was in decline and this explained why it turned to 
Imperialism. Underdeveloped countries served as a place where the Capitalist 
could get the most return for their investment. The monopolisation of important 
sources of raw materials increased the power of the Capitalist and increased 
antagonism between industries. 141 From these monopolies banks were formed, 
which Lenin referred to as a "financial oligarchy. " As the colonial world 
quickly became usurped a period of intense struggle for the division and re- 
division of the world followed. 
142 
What becomes rather interesting is that in the Stalinised Comintern Rosa 
Luxemburg's contribution to the debates on Imperialism and Marxist Political 
Economy were entirely disregarded. Lenin's analysis became the reigning 
theory of the Third International. In 1928 Bucharin insisted, "Imperialism 
is ... moribund and 
decaying capitalism. It is the final stage of development of 
the capitalist system. "' 
43 
Political Organisation 
On November 9,1918 Rosa Luxemburg was freed from her prison in 
Brelau. She arrived in Berlin on November 10,1918 eager to become involved 
in the revolutionary movement growing around her. Luxemburg had a clear 
idea of the type of political party she hoped Spartakusbund (Spartacus League) 
would become. Luxemburg outlined Spartacus' position in the pamphlet, Was 
141 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Hijzhest Stage of Capitalism -A Popular Outline, revised trans. 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1948) 148-149. 
142 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism -A Popular Outline, revised trans. 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1948) 149. 
143 Bucharin, "The Programme of the Communist International (Adopted by the VI World 
Congress on I" September 1928, Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 (1928): 
1753. 
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will der Spartakusbund? 144 The pamphlet was consistent with Luxemburg's 
democratic position on the central role of the working class in carrying out the 
revolution. In the spirit of Marx's Communist Manifesto the eight paged 
pamphlet took the form of a propaganda piece making its demands clear but 
with no set programme as to how to accomplish them. She insisted, "The 
liberation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself. " 145 
In order for a proletarian revolution to be successful the work and the desire for 
revolution must come from the masses themselves and not from a minority who 
manipulated the masses' desires for change to suite their own needs as 
bourgeois revolutions had done in the past. She also insisted that unity 
amongst all strata of the proletariat was imperative for building the basis of a 
future socialist society. 
"Only a solid front of the entire German proletariat: the south 
Germans with the north Germans, the city dwellers with the 
country dwellers, the workers with the soldiers ... can create 
the granite foundations on which the edifice of the future can 
be constructed. " 146 
The pamphlet discussed Spartacus' refusal to share power with bourgeois 
parties or even to take power without the direct participation and consent of the 
majority of the proletariat. Luxemburg also outlined Spartacus' demands to 
secure revolution, which were incredibly similar to the SPD's pre- 1906 
position, particularly with its advocacy of a voluntary workers' militia and the 
144The pamphlet is not dated but one must assume that it was written in late 1918 as they 
changed their name to Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in 1919. 
145 Rosa Luxemburg, Was will der Spartacusbund? (Berlin: Spartacusbund, n. d. ) 4. Hoover 
Library: S. P. Germany - Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands [Spartacus]. 
146 Rosa Luxemburg, Was will der Spartacusbund? (Berlin: Spartacusbund, n. d. ) 5. Hoover 
Library: S. P. Germany - Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands [Spartacus]. 
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abolition of military hierarchy in favour of soldiers' councils. Economically au 
and politically Luxemburg's demands coincided with her position on mass 
action. She advocated the abolition of the State and parliament replacing them 
with a German Socialist republic run by workers' and soldiers' councils. The 
pamphlet's economic demands were similar to the demands cited in Marx's 
Communist Manifesto - the abolition of private property, repossession factories, 
and other large-scale trade organisations. As a piece of propaganda the 
pamphlet idealistically laid out the demands of the Spartacus League. 
It is clear that Luxemburg hoped to build a party similar to the SPD, but 
one that was committed to the revolutionary struggle and one without the SPD's 
bureaucracy. As early as 1904 she expressed her concerns over centralism and 
bureaucracy. Luxemburg's article "Organisational Questions of Russian Social 
Democracy" was originally published in 1904 in Neue Zeit. The German 
version appeared in the SPD party press before it appeared in Iskra. Although 
the article was presented as a reply to Lenin's "One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back, " it was in fact written with a German audience in mind. 
147 She addressed 
the political organisational problems of Russian Social Democracy but the same 
problems existed within German Social Democracy. Her warnings were 
addressed to the Russian Social Democratic party but they were intended for 
German ears. Luxemburg was concerned with the use of centralism as a means 
of organising the movement. At first she was sympathetic to the organisational 
difficulties that Russian party has experienced, particularly with its lack of 
bourgeois democracy. However, she warned that centralising party organisation 
147 Although Lenin was in fact impressed that the German Social Democrats had bothered to 
"acquaint" themselves with the literature of the Russian party, he did point out that 
Luxemburg's criticism was addressing something other than his book. V. I. Lenin, "One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back: Reply by N. Lenin to Rosa Luxemburg, " Collected Works, 45 vols. 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964) 7: 474. 
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- creating a hierarchical centre that dictates to its lower branches and 
functionaries - was not the answer. 
To Luxemburg, the installation of a Central Committee would give the 
impression that the Committee is the only active section of the party and the 
other sections merely behaved as its minions carrying out the Committee's 
orders. She was concerned that strict organisation was not what Marx had in 
mind. Luxemburg asserted, "it becomes clear that the Marxist conception of 
socialism cannot be fixed in rigid formulas in any area, including that of the 
question of organization. " 
148 
It is interesting that Luxemburg had concerned herself with rigid party 
structures as early as 1904. Perhaps she had begun to see the subtle changes 
taking place in the SPD structure, its leanings toward bureaucracy. She warned 
Russian Social Democracy, "nothing will deliver a still young labor movement 
to the intellectual's thirst for power more easily than confining it in the 
straitjacket of a bureaucratic centralism which degrades the worker to a pliant 
tool of a 'committee 9. , 149 Again, this warning could very easily have been 
transferred to the SPD Executive who did, in fact, become a bureaucratic 
machine concerned with maintaining power. 
While maintaining a commitment to mass action and a democratic structure 
in political parties, Luxemburg's articles never addressed how a party was 
supposed become a decentralised non-bureaucratic party. She viewed rigid 
organisations as means to subordinate the movement. But Socialist 
148 Rosa Luxemburg, "Organizational Questions of Russian Social Democracy, " Selected 
Political Writings, ed. Dick Howard (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1971) 
286-287. 
149 Rosa Luxemburg, "Organizational Questions of Russian Social Democracy, " Selected 
Political Writings, ed. Dick Howard (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1971) 
302. 
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organisations have been grappling with the issue of how to effectively organise 
a movement and none have managed to come up with a solution. Those that are 
loosely organised generally fall apart because no one can agree on anything, 
while those that are strictly organised fail because their dictatorial methods 
scare off members. Luxemburg's writings on political organisation are 
profoundly democratic but, like Marx, they did not provide the formula as to 
how to build a political mass movement. 
Summary 
Rosa Luxemburg was a political commentator, a critic, and a theorist. She 
criticised others' writings and commented on the world around her. As a theorist 
she attempted to interpret the nature of the world around using Marxist methods. 
As the leader of Spartakusbund she did her utmost to push the movement 
forward. She has been criticised for remaining in the USPD too long. But 
Luxemburg, who was reckless when it came to her own safety, was not willing 
to prematurely break with the UPSD. She feared a premature break would 
cause Spartakusbund to disintegrate. She has also been criticised for the lack of 
systems in her writings. But this comment is unfair. Luxemburg was against 
rigid organisation because she worried that a strictly disciplined party would 
lose its democratic character. As an orthodox Marxist this was something she 
was not willing to risk. 
Luxemburg's contribution to German Socialism was enormous. She 
relentlessly battled against Revisionism because it strayed from Marxism. She 
argued against national self-determination because she was fully aware of the 
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devastating strength of nationalism and its potential to destroy the working 
class. When the Russian Revolution of 1905 broke out she advocated the mass 
strike as a weapon hoping that it would be utilised in the revolutionary struggle. 
But the nature of the SPD had changed and they were no longer interested in 
revolution. Rather, the new leadership's interests were in maintaining their 
positions in the Reich parliament and promoting their careers. It is true that 
Luxemburg never developed a "plan" for a Marxist party, but such a thing ran 
counter to her beliefs. She felt that a party should be run by the masses and 
flexible enough to change during a revolutionary period. 
In January 1919 Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were murdered by 
Freikorps during the so called "Spartacus uprisings. -, -, 
150 The untimely deaths of 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht led to a crisis of leadership in the newly 
formed KPD. Following the subsequent murder of Leo Jogiches, Paul Levi - 
who did not have majority support within the party - succeeded them. It was 
during this period that the fledgling KPD began to look toward the Bolshevik 
party for guidance, something that Rosa Luxemburg was extremely cautious of. 
151 She feared Russian dominance of the Communist International and even 
instructed the Gennan representative, Hugo Eberlein, to vote against joining in 
150 On January 6,1919 strikes took place all over Berlin in support of Emil Eichorn - Berlin's 
radical Police President. Eichorn had been charged with appropriating public money and 
preparing to launch a civil war. The USPD, the Shop Stewards Committee, and the 
Communists decided to support Eichorn. On January 11,1919 Noske led 3,000 troops through 
Berlin. By January 13 the fighting was over and the General Strike was called off. Luxemburg 
and Liebknecht refused to leave Berlin and hid in Neukblln. On the evening of January 15, 
1919 they were arrested and brutally murdered during the night. Pierre Brou6, The German 
, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 
239-258. 
15 1 The founding congress of the German Communist Party took place on December 30,1918- 
January 1,1919. Rosa Luxemburg was reluctant of the party being called the German 
Communist Party. She preferred the name Sozialistische Partei (Socialist Party) but she and the 
Zentrale were outvoted 62 to 23 votes. Herman Weber, Die WaIdung des deutschen 
Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republik, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am 
Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 37-38. 
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1919.152 Her worst fears quickly came to surface as the German Communist 
Party did not merely look toward the Soviet Union for guidance but became 
completely subordinated to its will. The party no longer functioned as a 
revolutionary struggle directly linked to Marxist theory and eventually became a 
party devoted to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the link between Marxist 
theory and the party was severed as soon as the party became focused on the 
needs of the Soviet State rather than the needs of the Gennan Socialist 
movement. Efforts to develop workers' consciousness were quickly replaced by 
training material filled with dogmatic slogans. 
152 The First Congress of the Communist International was held on the 2 nd of March 1919. 
Invitations were sent to 39 Communist Parties and revolutionary groups who had broken with 
the Second International thus qualifying them for membership to the Third International. In the 
end only 9 out of the 51 delegates managed to pass though the boarders, the rest were Soviet 
based. Hugo Eberlein was the only German representative to arrive in Moscow. (Levin6 was 
also chosen to attend but he never made it out of Germany. ) Both were given strict instructions 
by Luxemburg to oppose the formation of a new International as premature. Eberlein, after 
private persuasion by the Bolsheviks, defied Luxemburg's instructions and abstained rather than 
vote against the International. On the 4thof March 1919 the Third Communist International was 
bom. Eberlein's refutation of the Third International can be found (under the pseudonym Max 
Albert) in John Riddell, ed. Foundiniz the Communist International: Proceedings and Documents 
of the First Congress, March 1919 (New York: Anchor Foundation, 1987) 113-120,169-170; 
also see Hugo Eberlein, "The Foundation of the Comintern and the Spartakusbund, " The 
Communist International 6.9-10 (1929): 436-442; Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The 
Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin (London: MacMillan 
Press Ltd., 1996) 12-13; Isaac Deutscher, "Record of a Discussion with Heinrich Brandler, " 
New Left Review 105 (1977): 49. 
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Chapter Three: Crisis of Theory in the Comintern 
But there exists yet another danger. The leadership of the Socialist Party may 
fall into the hands ofpersons whose practical tendencies are in opposition with 
the programme of the working class, so that the labor movement will be utilized 
for the service of interests diametrically opposed to those o the proletariat. 153 f 
The death of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht not only marked the 
end of an old tradition in German Marxism - the development of Marxist theory 
- it also signified an end to the pioneering role played by the Germans in 
leading the European socialist movement both practically and theoretically. The 
successful revolution in Russia knocked the Germans into second position as the 
most important Marxist revolutionary party. Lacking strong leadership from 
within the German Communist Party the rank and file looked toward the Soviet 
Union for theoretical and practical guidance. However, the Soviet Union's 
theoretical development had also suffered a severe blow. Lenin's death resulted 
in a power struggle, which consumed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
and changed the Marxist revolutionary movement all over Europe, most notably 
in Germany. The Soviet Union's desire to maintain itself as a nation-state 
meant that, although, the Soviet State and its revolutionary organ - the 
Comintern - paid lip service and spread revolutionary propaganda neither were 
interested in promoting or developing theory that might displace the Soviet 
Union's hegemony over other parties or threaten its nation-state status. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the role of revolutionary theory in 
the Comintern, how it changed, and the way in which those changes affected the 
153 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
trans. Edan and Cedar Paul (New York: The Free Press, 1962) 352. 
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German Communist Party. This chapter will argue that although not a single 
Comintem policy can be held fully responsible for destruction of the KPD's 
theoretical and practical development, each played a role in the KPD's 
subordination to the Soviet Union - each policy was a stepping stone to the 
KPD's adoption of Social Fascism, which will be discussed in chapter four. I 
have broken this chapter into three sections. 
The first section, Creating Unifon-nity in the Comintern, describes Lenin's 
desire to utilise his version of correct theory and centralism and strict discipline 
to drive the revolutionary movement forward. Prior to his death Lenin 
implemented a Policy of Uniformity in the Comintern's parties, including the 
KPD. Its purpose was to reorganise member States' parties and tum them into 
vanguard parties based on the Bolshevik model. 154 Lenin clearly viewed this 
154 The process of creating uniform parties in 1919 - 1923 was a long complex process and did 
have the support of the rank and file within the national parties. We must recall the historical 
events during this period. The First World War had just come to an end and many believed that 
a proletarian revolution was imminent. Members of the Spartacus League were young and there 
was a strong sense of radicalism. In 1918 the rank and file had voted against parliamentary 
participation against the position of their leaders - Luxemburg, Levi, and Jogiches. 
Participation in the parliamentary elections was something the Rosa Luxemburg actually 
supported. The newly formed Communist Party did not participate in the elections because their 
leaders were outvoted (62 to 23 votes) which Luxemburg and the others accepted as the wishes 
of the majority. This was also something that Lenin mentioned in his pamphlet, 'Left - WipL 
Communism - An Infantile Disorder. However, he mistakenly included Liebknecht amongst 
those who supported participation in the parliament. According to Fr6lich, Liebknecht on 
principle was against parliamentary participation but his position often fluctuated. 
Drachkovitch and Latich pointed out that Liebknecht, in particular, struggled to make up his 
mind on the issue of parliamentary participation in 1918. Drachkovitch and Latich identified 
the rejection of parliamentary participation as "an unmistakable symptom of the 'leftist 
disorder'. " Following the murders of Luxemburg, Liebknecht, and Jogiches the party never 
really recovered nor did it manage to find strong replacements. According to Radek, whilst in 
prison he became concerned regarding the fate of the revolutionary struggle in Germany. "From 
my correspondence with them I saw that the Party had no leadership; on the basic question of 
relations with trade unions, there was complete chaos. " According to Carr, Radek developed his 
cynical pessimism during this period and it "coloured all his later thought and action. " Milorad 
M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1972) 242; Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald 
(1940; New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 313; V. I. Lenin, " 'Left - Wing' Communism - An 
Infantile Disorder, " Selected Works, 3 vols. (1964; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) 3: 321; 
E. H. Carr, Karl Radek, and M. Philips Price, "From Soviet Publications - Radek's 'Political 
Salon' in Berlin 1919, " Soviet Studies 3.4 (1952) 422; E. H. Carr, A Histoly of Soviet Russia: 
The 
_Bolshevik 
Revolution, 3 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1953) 3: 134; Eric D. 
Weitz, - 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German Communism and the Luxemburg Legacy, " 
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policy of creating uniformity in the Comintern's individual national parties as a 
step forward. Lenin's version of the vanguard party required obedience and 
loyalty, which suited the conditions of Tsarist and wartime Russia. Although 
Lenin's Policy of Uniformity attempted to force the revolution forward, in 
Germany it served to hinder the practical and theoretical development of the 
German movement. Rather than assist in the recovery of the German 
movement, Lenin's Policy of Uniformity attempted to replace German 
theoretical traditions with Russian traditions. Russian interference served to 
undermine the Gen-nan leaders' attempts to rebuild their party and in the end left 
the newly formed German Communist Party subordinated to the Soviet Union. 
The second section, Comintern's Policy of Bolshevisation, describes the 
impact that the power struggle in the Soviet Union had both inside the Soviet 
Union and the Comintern. 155 Inside the Soviet Union the power struggle 
severely damaged the reputations of the mostly likely candidates to succeed 
Lenin, allowing Stalin and Bucharin to take the reigns. The Bolshevisation of 
the Comintern was the means of purging the opposition. The Fifth Plenum in 
1925 (in Lenin's name) began to undo what Lenin spent his life attempting to 
achieve. It changed the role of the party and Lenin's desire for strict discipline 
within the party. Lenin had always intended strict discipline as a means of 
pushing the revolution forward. Bolshevisation changed this. Strict discipline 
became a method in which to control the Comintern's parties. The Stalinists 
launched attacks against all theoretical opposition. Lenin's dedication to the 
Central European History 27.1 (1994): 36; Herman Weber, Die Wandung Des Deutschen 
Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankftirt am 
Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 38. 
155 Agnew and McDermott accurately pointed out that the term "Bolshevisation" was not used 
as a slogan until after 1924. Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A HigM 
of Communism From Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 26-27. 
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role of theory and political practice as his theories were replaced by the dogma 
of Leninism. 
In Germany, Bolshevisation was used to divide and rule the movement. The 
power struggle and economic stabilisation created the perfect environment for 
the rise of the Left, led by Ruth Fischer and Arkadij Maslow. The Left 
possessed no theoretical training and were extremely hostile to the old 
theoretical traditions of the KPD, which they considered "remnants of Social 
Democracy. " Bolshevisation was used to defeat the old Spartacists who 
remained loyal to the theories of Rosa Luxemburg. The Stalinised Comintern 
pitted the Left and Right against one another and purged the party of all dissent. 
The party no longer resembled the mass base party that Luxemburg had 
attempted to build. Luxemburgism was invented as a means of ridding the party 
of the memory of Rosa Luxemburg. The attacks were partially successful. 
Luxemburg, the woman and martyr of the Spartakusbund, was rehabilitated. 
Her theories, however, were not. Crimes and errors were invented in an effort to 
destroy and possibility of dissent in the various Communist Parties. The Fifth 
Plenum and Bolshevisation were the first signs of the dramatic and repressive 
changes occurring in the Comintern. Once the Left had defeated opposition and 
its theoretical remnants within the KPD, the Comintern turned against Maslow 
and Fischer. 
The third section, the Consequences of a New Doctrine, discusses the role 
that Socialism in One Country played in reshaping the world's Communist 
movement from a theory based revolutionary movement to an instrument of the 
Soviet Union. Socialism in Once Country had a tremendous impact on the 
Comintem transforming it from a revolutionary organisation to an instrument of 
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propaganda. Socialism in One Country was designed to counteract Trotsky's 
Theory of Permanent Revolution by claiming that Socialism did not require a 
world revolution to survive. The result of Socialism in One Country was the 
Comintern Programme of 1928 and announcement of the emergence of the 
Third Period. The Statutes of the Sixth Congress placed further repressive 
restrictions on the Comintern's member parties and insisted on blind obedience. 
Although the Third Period was supposed to herald the beginning of a new 
revolutionary era, it in fact served to destroy the revolutionary movement. Each 
policy imposed on the Comintern by the Soviet Union - Lenin 9S Policy of 
Uniformity, Stalin's policy of Bolshevisation, and the Programme of Sixth 
Congress, regardless of their original intent, reshaped the Comintern by placing 
restriction on open debates and criticism of Soviet policy. This in turn had an 
effect on the Comintern's parties, such as the KPD. In the end theory was no 
longer being developed and the Comintern's member parties bent to the will of 
the Soviet State. 
1. Creating Uniformity in the Comintern 
In Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of the Russian revolution she praised the 
Bolsheviks for doing what European socialist organisations had failed to do - 
conduct a victorious revolution. However, her praise was followed by severe 
criticism and words of caution. She warned against the subordination of theory 
in favour of duplicity and tactics that would ensure victory at whatever costs. 
Luxemburg feared that such a policy would only provide short-term gains and 
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corrupt the ultimate goal of socialism-' 56 Indeed the Bolsheviks had substituted 
theory for tactics in an effort to remain flexible during the revolutionary 
upheaval. Unlike the German or other European socialist uprisings post-WWI,, 
the Bolshevik revolution survived both revolution and civil war. However, by 
1920 the masses were exhausted from war and the revolutionary tide seemed to 
have turned. Communist parties began the laborious process of rebuilding their 
mass base. 
The Bolsheviks were desperate for a European revolution that would save 
their Russian Revolution. Lenin believed that the success of the Bolshevik 
party was attributed to their possession of the correct revolutionary theory and 
through their development of a centralised and strictly disciplined party. Lenin 
was deeply committed to building Communist parties that would produce 
156 Luxemburg chastised the Bolshevik policies on land, the national question, suffrage, the 
Constituent Assembly, and democracy and dictatorship. From these criticisms arose 
Luxemburg's most famous quote and weapon against Soviet hegemony, "Freedom only for the 
supporters of the government, only for the members of one party - however numerous they may 
be - is no freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks 
differently. " According to Herman Weber, from this work Luxemburg arose as a symbol of 
Soviet opposition, although, her intention was never to undermine the Russian Revolution. 
Luxemburg remained consistent in her argument and presented the same case that she had on 
these topics, against Lenin, since the early 1900's. Luxemburg had always been critical of 
Lenin's concept of a vanguard party. It seems fair to assume that whilst in prison Luxemburg 
was not able to keep up to date with occurrences in Russia. She remained unaware that the 
Bolshevik slogan of "go and take the land for yourselves" occurred after the peasants had begun 
confiscating land. To go against the peasants' actions during the revolutionary upheaval would 
have been political suicide for the Bolsheviks. Georg Lukdcs made the very important point 
that Rosa Luxemburg's article on the Russian Revolution had been used for propaganda against 
the Soviet State since it was published in 1922. Levi's publication of the pamphlet took place 
during a struggle between the KPD and the Comintern. Worshippers and opponents of 
Luxemburg have manipulated this work, in particular, to suite their own propaganda needs. 
Lukdcs surmised that the aim of its publications was not to "undermine the standing of the 
German C. P. or to weaken confidence in the policy of the Third International; it [was] to strike a 
blow at the theoretical basis of Bolshevik organisation and tactics. " Rosa Luxemburg, "The 
Russian Revolution, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. Mary Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder 
Press, 1970) 389; Herman Weber, Die Wanduniz Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die 
Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 13-14; Georg Lukdcs, "Critical Observations on Rosa Luxemburg's 
'Critique of the Russian Revolution', " History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist 
p, ialectics (London: Merlin Press, 1968) 272; Eric D. Weitz, " 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to 
Us! ' German Communism and the Luxemburg Legacy, " Central Euroj)ean Higm 27.1 (1994): 
27-3 1; Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 
1921 - 1923 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 42; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 
vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 2: 794-796. 
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successful revolutions. He, therefore, attempted to force the Bolshevik model 
on the Comintern parties through the implementation of his Policy of 
Uniformity in the early 1920's. Uniformity was endorsed through his pamphlet 
"Left-Wing" Communism - An Infantile Disorder and the resolutions ratified at 
the Second Congress of the Connnunist International. Although Lenin's Policy 
of Uniformity in the Comintern was meant as a means to promote world 
revolution, it helped to lay the foundations for Stalin's retardation of the 
revolutionary movement. 
This section will examine Lenin's Policy of Uniformity by exploring his 
propagation of the f 'correct theory" as well as centralism and strict discipline 
and the consequences that these policies had on the fledgling German 
Communist Party. 
The Role of Correct Theorv 
Lenin, like Luxemburg, was interested in the role that theory played in the 
revolutionary movement. In 1902, in his article What is to be Done? Lenin 
declared, "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary 
movement. )3,157 For Lenin the party played an important role in the 
revolutionary struggle and theory played a central role in guiding the 
revolutionary party to victory. Workers might show their dissatisfaction 
through the spontaneous destruction of machinery and these actions were 
157 Lenin remained committed to this notion until his death. Interestingly, this quote was used by 
the Comintern in its propagation of false theories. In the late 1920's and early 1930's what 
Lenin meant by theory ceased to have any meaning in the Comintern. In 1902 Lenin strove for 
a theory that defined and guided the movement. By the late 1920's the term theory ceased to 
represent anything with depth or meaning. It became euphemism for propaganda. For example 
see "Reorganisation unseres Literaturvertriebes, " Rundschreiben 1930 SANWO RY 
1/12/707/146 FBS 248/11612 40-48; V. I. Lenin, "What is to be Done? " Collected Works, 48 
vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1961) 5: 369. 
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consciousness in embryonic form. 158 Such destructive action demonstrated the 
awaking of consciousness, and herein rested the role of the party. Lenin viewed 
the party as a highly centralised and disciplined organisation, led by a small 
group of committed revolutionaries - career revolutionaries who acted as a 
vanguard and who were willing to commit their lives to working under the 
extremely dangerous and illegal conditions of Tsarist Russia. Their role was to 
develop theory in order to lead the revolutionary struggle and to educate the 
working class in the correct theory. Amed with the correct theory the working 
class would become conscious of their place within the confines of the 
economic system. Rather than fight for higher wages or civil rights, they would 
realise themselves as a united class and realise that their enemy was not their 
employer or even the State but the entire capitalist system. Only with their 
victorious destruction of the system could they become free and able to change 
their situations. Although Lenin's intentions were later manipulated by Stalin 
and his cohorts to suite their own political purposes, during his lifetime Lenin 
remained committed to the important role that the correct theory played in the 
revolutionary movement. 
First, Lenin believed that the Bolsheviks' victory proved they possessed the 
correct theory. His pamphlet, "Left Wing" Communism - An Infantile 
Disorder demonstrated his earnest dedication to the propagation the Bolshevik 
version of the correct theory. 159 Lenin believed that even under favourable 
158 Lenin pointed out "there is spontaneity and spontaneity, " meaning that there were different 
forms of spontaneous action. Lenin was against spontaneous action, in the random sense, 
because it inevitably led to a backlash. However, Lenin agreed that spontaneity played a role in 
the revolutionary movement. V. I. Lenin, "What is to be Done? " Collected Works, 48 vols. 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1961) 5: 374. 
159 The pamphlet was written in April 1920 and was distributed prior to the Second Congress, 
which took place during the summer of 1920, for the purpose of discussion. According to Carr, 
this article was the last of his major writings and one of the most influential. It was written 
shortly after the civil war and in the spirit of "legitimate self-congratulations. " Borkenau 
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revolutionary conditions, all their efforts would have failed without the correct 
46 political strategy and tactics. " The creation of the correct conditions for 
victory could only occur under the guidance of the vanguard party who 
possessed the correct theory. For Lenin, the issue of correct theory was crucial 
in building a revolutionary movement and this correct theory guided the 
Bolsheviks to success. 
"[Flacilitated by a correct revolutionary theory, which, in its 
turn, is not dogma, but assumes final shape only in close 
connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly 
revolutionary movement. [ ... ] Bolshevism arose in 1903 on a 
very firm foundation of Marxist theory. The correctness of 
this revolutionary theory ... 
has been proved, not only by the 
world experience throughout the nineteenth century but 
especially by the experience of the seekings and vacillations, 
the errors and disappointments of revolutionary thought in 
Russia. "' 60 
Lenin rationalised the victory of his party, not as luck, but as fate. If the 
Bolsheviks had not possessed the correct theory then victory would not have 
been possible, therefore the Bolsheviks must be in possession of the correct 
theory. 
insisted that the pamphlet was the Comintern's first attempt to interfere with Communist parties 
abroad. Angress asserted that the pamphlet was written with a dual purpose - to criticise Left 
wing elements within Communist parties and to win new supporters to Communism. E. H. Carr, 
A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, 3 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co. 
Ltd., 1953) 3: 177; Franz Borkenau, The Communist International (London: Faber and Faber 
Limited, 1938)190-191; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005) 402; Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid For 
Power in Germany, 1921 - 1923, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 63. 160 V. I. Lenin, " 'Left - Wing' Communism - An Infantile Disorder, " Selected Works, 3 vols. 
(1964; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) 3: 294. 
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Lenin's desire to create uniformity amongst the Comintern's parties in no 
way meant the divorce of political practice from theory. Indeed, Lenin believed 
that the Bolsheviks had formulated the "correct" theory that could be applied all 
over Europe. 161 "We now possess quite considerable international experience, 
which shows very definitely that certain fundamental features of our revolution 
have a significance that is not local, or a peculiarly national, or Russian alone, 
but international. 1,062 This attitude of "correctness" resonated in the Comintern 
and their insistence that the other parties follow their model and, for the most 
part, the rank and file of the Comintern's national parties agreed. Their proof 
was the fact that the Russian party was the only party to base themselves on 
Marxist theory who had completed a successful revolution. 163 The idea was that 
the Bolsheviks had armed themselves with the correct theory, the correct 
revolutionary practice followed, and their reward was victory. 164 
161 Carr made the point that "the arguments and recommendations of the pamphlet were 
designed for the brief interval necessary to bring about this consummation [revolution in 
Western Europe]. " That is to say Lenin intended the instructions in the pamphlet to be 
temporary measures. It was clear, based on the pamphlet itself, Lenin believed that West 
European parties, particularly the German Communist Party would shortly conduct their own 
revolutions. E. H. Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, 3 vols. 
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1953) 3: 177. 
162 V. I. Lenin, " 'Left - Wing' Communism - An Infantile Disorder, " Selected Works, 3 vols. 
(1964; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) 3: 29 1. 
163 Fernando Claudin made the interesting point that other parties were inclined to agree with 
Lenin. "On a more general theoretical plane, the October victory was seen as irrefutable proof 
of the absolutely scientific character of Marxism. " Incidentally this was part of Luxemburg's 
point. Victory did not mean that the road to Socialism was sustainable. Socialism built on 
strong foundations with faulty materials would crumble i. e. the steps in between were just as 
important as the outcome. Although the October victory proved to many that Marxism was 
correct, the steps taken to gain that victory would be the true test. However, the rank and file of 
individual parties were not inclined to take into account theoretical or practical foundations and 
did not look beyond the victory. As a result they sided with Lenin whom they believed could 
show them the path to socialism. They demonstrated their confidence in the Bolsheviks through 
their ratification of Statutes and Conditions of Admission at the Second Congress, which 
consolidated Soviet control. Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern 
to Cominform. (1970; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) 94; Rosa Luxemburg, "The 
Russian Revolution, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. Mary Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder 
Press, 1970). 
164 This may seem an overly simplistic attitude, but one must bear in mind that then as now, 
there would have been a percentage of party members who were interested in neither 
revolutionary theory nor Marx's dialectical methods. Some may have joined Marxist 
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Second, Lenin remained firmly committed to his version of correct theon,, 
but he needed to convince the Comintern parties to adopt the Bolshevik model. 
Lenin emphasised the role that history played in their attainment of the correct 
theory. His pamphlet attempted to demonstrate the applicability of the Russian 
model to other countries through a discussion of the history of Bolshevism. 
Lenin described Russia's political struggle amongst the three main classes - the 
"liberal bourgeoisie, " the "petty-bourgeois-democratic" (this included the social 
democrats as well as other revolutionary groups) and the revolutionary 
proletariat. These trends were able to mature and develop into revolutionary 
organisations and parties. All three groups sought change through revolution, 
however they differed on their methods and practical outcomes. The time to 
test these organisations quickly came in the 1905 - 1907 uprisings, which Lenin 
referred to as the "1905 dress rehearsal. " The formation of Soviets 
demonstrated the powerful weapon of spontaneous mass action. Although the 
Tsar was victorious and a backlash followed, Lenin claimed that if it had not 
been for the lessons learned during the 1905 revolution then victory in 1917 
would not have been possible. The spontaneous formation of Soviets was 
similar to the spontaneous destruction of machinery. It demonstrated working 
class' desire for change and the possibility for working class consciousness, 
however, as an unguided force their actions were followed by a backlash. 
Utilising the lessons learned in Russia in 1905 and 1917 Lenin hoped to 
transplant Russian style revolutions all over Europe. 
Unfortunately, Lenin's historical assessment was flawed. Firstly, his 
argument neglected the simple fact that the historical conditions existing in 
revolutionary parties, not because they agreed with Marx but because Communist parties 
appeared radical and seemed to give a voice to their misery with promises of a better world. 
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Western Europe were different than those existing in Russia. Unlike Russia, 
political parties and Trade Unions were allowed to exist and had limited rights 
within the parliamentary system. The uprisings that took place in 1905/06 in 
Central Europe were not of the same magnitude as those that took place in 
Russia in 1905. It is true that mass strikes occurred but not on the same 
revolutionary scale as in Russia. In Germany, for example, the strikes were 
quickly subdued. Although the workers, particularly in the Ruhr Basin, were 
eager for the strikes to develop into a revolution, they did not have the support 
of the Trade Unions and as a result the Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(SPD) was reluctant to encourage the strikers. ' 65 Unlike the Tsar, who was 
forced to make concessions, the Kaiser in Germany remained firmly in control 
and the situation returned to normal fairly quickly. Lenin's Russo-centric 
analysis did not highlight important lessons learned from other countries and the 
role played by others in the historical development of the Russian movement. 
Secondly, Lenin's desire to transplant the Bolshevik's version of the 
"correct theory" to other countries neglected the unique theoretical traditions of 
each country. For example, the German party possessed a rich theoretical 
tradition whose origins traced back to Marx and Engels. It had developed under 
conditions that were different to those that existed in Russia. The SPD had 
emerged as an underground movement during Bismarck's Anti-Socialist laws to 
become a fully legal parliamentary party, from which the KPD split in 1914 
after the majority voted for war credits in 1914. This contrasted to the 
Bolsheviks who had never experienced legality. Therefore, the assumption that 
165 Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905 - 1917: The Development of the Great 
Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 37; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 1: 300-304; Paul Fr6lich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life 
And Work, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (1940; New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) 117. 
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only the Bolshevik experience allowed them to possess the correct theory 
invalidated the theoretical development of other countries such as Germany, 
who in the realm of theory had always been superior to Russians. Naturally the 
inability of the Germans to produce a successful revolution and the murder of its 
leaders Luxemburg and Liebknecht won the Bolsheviks support for their belief 
in their own theoretical superiority. 
Lenin, in his propagation of the Bolshevik's version of correct theory, truly 
believed that he was doing what was best to push the revolution forward. 
However, in using force to drive the revolution the Comintern's parties were no 
longer in a position to develop on their own. Although Bolshevik propaganda 
was aware that revolutionary movements needed to develop, Lenin's Policy of 
Uniformity attempted to speed up the process. The assumption that the 
Bolsheviks were the only ones to possess the "correct theory" opened the door 
for Stalin's exploitation. In his drive to push the revolution forward Lenin was 
unable to see the devastation instilled in the Policy of Uniformity. 
Centralism and Strict Discipline 
In addition to correct theory Lenin believed centralism and strict party 
discipline were crucial to the procurement of a successful revolution. Lenin 
believed that the Bolsheviks would have been unable to obtain power if "iron 
discipline" and "strict discipline" did not reign within the party. However, 
Lenin continued to neglect the unique circumstances existing in each country. 
Lenin's insistence on "centralism" and "strict discipline" may have suited the 
conditions of Tsarist Russia but such a dramatic change in party practice was 
met with resistance in some of the Comintern's parties. Although Lenin's 
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discussions of a strict and disciplined party were consistent with the views that 
he had held since the early 1900's, the rigidity of his policies opened the door 
for Stalinist exploitation. 
First, Lenin believed that a highly disciplined and centralised organisation 
were absolutely essential qualities of a revolutionary party. Lenin reiterated this 
notion throughout his pamphlet, 'Left-Wing' Communism - An Infantile 
Disorder and the Theses and Resolutions adopted at the Second Congress. 
"The strictest centralisation and discipline are required within 
the political party of the proletariat in order to counteract 
[petty-bourgeois atmosphere] (and that is its principal role) 
may be exercised correctly, successfully and victoriously. 
f 
... 
] Whoever brings about even the slightest weakening of the 
iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during 
its dictatorship), is actually aiding the bourgeoisie against the 
proletariat. 9. )166 
Lenin made it abundantly clear that anyone who disagreed with his notion of the 
party was, in fact, assisting the bourgeoisie. However, the German Left 
disagreed and they expressed their views in an oppositional pamphlet. 167 They 
166 V. I. Lenin, " 'Left - Wing' Communism - An Infantile Disorder, " Selected Works, 3 vols. 
(1964; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) 3: 310-311. 
167 Broue insisted that the ultra-left current had erupted throughout Europe. It revealed itself 
46vigorously" in Germany and resulted in the founding of the German Communist Workers' 
Party - Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (KAPD) in April 1920. The principle 
theoreticians for the current were found in the Dutch Communist Party - Henriette Rolland- 
Holst, Hermann Gorter, and Anton Pannekoek. Lenin addressed the local German group in 
Frankfurt am Main who had published a pamphlet expressing the ideas of the opposition 
entitled, "The Split in the Communist Party of Germany (The Spartacus League). " The Left, in 
adopting the name the "Spartacus League, " attempted to align themselves with Rosa Luxemburg 
and the tradition of "opposition" she was perceived to have established. The Left were opposed 
to the Bolshevik's method of organisation. They also expressed opposition to participation in 
the parliamentary elections and trade unions. In 1919 the issue of parliamentary participation 
and trade unions took second tier in the Comintern next to more pressing issues, but by 1920 
these topics re-emerged as central issues. V. I. Lenin, " 'Left - Wing' Communism - An 
Infantile Disorder, " Collected Works, 48 vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1966) 31: 39; 
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argued that Bolsheviks drive for top down discipline appeared more important 
than the needs of the local party, thereby, alienating the leadership from the 
masses. The German Left were also hostile towards the Bolshevik' s form of 
organisation. Under Luxemburg, the majority ruled the party. The Left 
criticised the Bolshevik's version of the party for creating a division between 
the party leadership and the masses. The Left claimed that they fought for the 
"dictatorship of the masses" while the Party Executive represented the 
"dictatorship of the leadership. " This view was held, particularly amongst the 
young radical elements in the party. For Lenin their antagonism toward the 
Bolsheviks was a lack of situational understanding and a matter of principle 
versus compromise. Lenin pursued his attack on the Left but particularly the 
"Left-Wing" of the German Communist Party who he accused of possessing the 
"infantile disease of Leftism. " Lenin dismissed these accusations as "Left-Wing 
childishness" but he could not deny that at times the Left were more popular 
than the sections that complied with the Bolsheviks. 168 In viewing the Left as 
disruptive children and not as outright enemies Lenin allowed room for the 
possibility of change. The discrepancy was a matter of tactics not a matter of 
politics. Both Lenin and the Left desired the same goal, they did not agree on 
how to make that goal a reality. Lenin hoped that in time he could convince the 
Left to join the side of the Bolsheviks. 
Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 
2005) 
398; Herman Weber, Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD 
in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europ, dische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 
39. 
168 For this very reason Lenin believed that the Left posed a greater danger to the revolutionary 
struggle than the Right because the Left divided the revolutionary movement through their 
attacks on the Bolsheviks. Lenin was severe and uncompromising with the Right - the enemy 
of the proletariat. Although he saw the dangers posed by the Left to Bolshevism as more 
harmful, he viewed their actions as childish and did not instigate a complete break with them. 
V. I. Lenin, " 'Left - Wing' Communism - An Infantile Disorder, " Collected Works, 48 vols. 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1966) 
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Second, Lenin and the Bolshevik's refusal to acknowledge the possibility of 
other revolutionary methods was demonstrated by the authoritarian terminology 
used in polices adopted at the Second Congress. 169 Lenin continued to 
propagate his notions of centralism and strict discipline as the only means by 
which to secure a successful revolution. The Second Congress provided a 
platform to create structural changes in the Comintern and where the true shift 
towards uniformity began. 170 The Comintern believed that it carried forth the 
tradition of the First International and their ultimate goal was the overthrow of 
the international bourgeoisie, the creation of international soviets, and the 
destruction of the State. The only possible means by which to accomplish these 
goals was through a strictly centralised organisation. However, the Statutes 
appeared repressive and removed any autonomy from the individual parties and 
placed the Comintern in control of the revolutionary movements. Although 
Lenin hoped to utilise the Statutes adopted at the Second Congress as a means 
169 The Second World Congress of the Communist International took place in Leningrad and 
Moscow between July 19 and August 7,1920 against the backdrop of the Polish-Soviet War, 
which appeared to be going well. The First Congress merely served as the founding Congress 
and no major decisions were made other than the founding of the Congress itself. Indeed any 
such decisions may have been subject to the claim of ill representation as many delegates had 
difficulty travelling to Russia because of the civil war. In 1919 of the 51 delegates only 9 had 
travelled from abroad. Unlike the First Congress, many of the delegates of the Second Congress 
represented parties from outside the Soviet Union - 37 countries were represented (Angress 
claimed that 41 countries were represented, while Agnew and McDermott and Weber placed the 
number at 37. ) Germany was represented by three different parties - the KPD, KAPD, and the 
USPD, although the KAPD and the USPD were only guests they had consultative power but no 
voting rights. John Riddell, ed., The Communist International in Lenin's Time - Workers of the 
World and Oppressed Pewles, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress, 
1920,2 vols. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991) 1: 1-5; Werner T. Angress, Stillborn 
Revolution: The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 1921 - 1923 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963) 64-66; Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A 
History of Communism From Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 17; 
Herman Weber, Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in 
der Weimarer Rgpublic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 3 1. 
170 The Statutes, in the spirit of Lenin's pamphlet "Left-Wing" Communism - An Infantile 
Disorder demanded uniformity and centralisation. The move toward uniformity was explicitly 
demonstrated in the Statutes and the Twenty-one Conditions of membership. The Statues of the 
Second Congress were adopted unanimously at Session 14 on August 4,1920 with a vote of 237 
to 156 delegates. Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890- 1990: From Popular 
Protests to Socialist State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) 98. 
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by which to push the revolution forward, it in fact, created an oppressive 
environment and opened the door for Stalinist exploitation. The Communist 
International elevated itself and the CPSU over and above all parties. Any 
parties who did not agree with the Comintern. would be expelled. For example, 
"Point 4. The highest authority of the Communist 
International is the world congress of all parties and 
organizations belonging to it. [ ... ] Only the world congress is 
empowered to change the program of the Communist 
International. The number of decisive votes allotted to each 
party or organization is determined by a special congress 
decision. 
Point 5. The world congress elects the Executive 
Committee of the Communist International.... The Executive 
Committee is responsible only to the world congress. 
Point 8. The party of the country where, by decision of the 
world congress, the Executive Committee is located bears the 
main burden of the Executive Committee's work [the Soviet 
Union]. 
Point 9. The Executive Committee of the Communist 
International has the authority to demand of its member 
parties the expulsion of groups or individuals that breach 
international discipline, as well as the authority to expel from 
the Communist International any party that contravenes the 
resolutions of the world congress. " 171 
The theme of expulsion carried over to the "Theses on the Conditions for 
Admission" also known as the 21 Points or the 21 Conditions of 
171 John Riddell, ed., The Communist International in Lenin's Time - Workers of the World and 
Oppressed Peoples, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Conuess, 1920,2 vols. 
(New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991) 2: 697-698. 
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Membership. 172 The "Theses on the Conditions of Admission" elaborated on 
the role of the individual member parties. 
"Point 2. Every organization wishing to join the 
Communist International must consistently and systematically 
remove reformists and centrists from all positions of any 
responsibility in the workers' movement ... and replace them 
with reliable Communists.... 
Point 6. Every party that wishes to belong to the 
Communist International is duty-bound to expose not only 
overt social patriotism but also the duplicity and hypocrisy of 
social pacifism [i. e. social democracy].... 
Point 7. Parties wishing to belong to the Communist 
International are duty-bound to recognize the need for a 
complete break with reformism and the policies of the 
Center.... The Communist International demands 
unconditionally and as an ultimatum that this break be carried 
out at the earliest possible date. 
Point 12. Parties belonging to the Communist 
International must be organised on the basis of the principle of 
democratic centralism. In the present epoch of intensified 
civil war, the Communist Party will be able to fulfil its duty 
only if it is organized in the most centralized way possible and 
governed by iron discipline, and if its central leadership, 
sustained by the confidence of the party membership, is 
strong, authoritative, and endowed with the fullest powers. 
172 According to Deutscher the purpose for the 21 Conditions was to create a constitution that 
would bring unity through "a centralised and strong leadership in the Executive. " For Weber 
the 21 Conditions were a precondition of establishing centralism in the Comintern. Isaac 
Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed - Trotsky: 1921 - 1929-) 3 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1965) 2: 148; Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A Histo! y of 
Communism From Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 23; Herman Weber, 
Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 3 1. 
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Point 14. Every party that wishes to belong to the 
Communist International is obligated to render unconditional 
assistance to every soviet republic struggling against the 
forces of the counterrevolution. 
Point 21. Party members who reject on the principle the 
conditions and theses laid down by the Communist 
International must be expelled from the party. This applies in 
particular to delegates to the special congress. " 173 
It is clear that Lenin viewed his authoritarian attitude as necessary during the 
revolutionary period. A centralised party structure and strict discipline were 
what enabled the Bolshevik party to survive revolution and civil war. The 
advancement of revolution in Europe was no different. 
Third, Lenin's desperation to spread the revolution prevented him from 
taking into consideration some very important features of the Comintern's 
parties, primarily the issue of legality versus illegality. The Statutes and the "21 
Conditions" demonstrated the rigid attitude of operating during wartime 
conditions. The revolution was coming and, therefore, strictness could be 
tolerated for a short period. The adoption of measures passed during the Second 
Congress reflected the hopeful mood in the Communist movement during the 
early 1920's. One could fully understand the necessity of discipline when an 
organisation was attempting to survive under the conditions of illegality in 
Tsarist Russia. But was this discipline necessary under peaceful conditions, 
during times of legality or semi-legality? For Lenin the answer was yes - 
discipline was necessary until a world wide Socialist outcome had been 
achieved. By 1920 the KPD operated as a semi-legal party and Lenin 
173 John Riddell, ed., The Communist International in Lenin's Time - Workers of the World and 
Oppressed Peoples, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress, 1920,2 vols. 
(New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991) 2: 767,769,77 1. 
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emphasised that during times of illegality Party discipline was crucial. He 
attempted to explain the basis for leadership and the difference between 
operating during legality and illegality. For Lenin the Leftist (comprising of 
mostly young radicals) did not comprehend the nature of an illegal organisation., 
having been accustomed to working solely under legal conditions as part of the 
SPD. However, Lenin had never experienced a party that operated under legal 
conditions and did not understand that the conditions in Western Europe were 
fundamentally different than those of Tsarist Russia. ' 74 Lenin wanted to force 
the German party to adopt party practice that went against their traditions. 
Lenin may not have understood the difference between working under legal 
and illegal conditions but he was fully aware of the importance of a European 
victory. The oppressiveness of "21 Conditions" appeared as a means to an end. 
The rank and file of many of the Comintern's parties were willing to adhere to 
Bolshevik's demands of discipline because they believed that the Bolsheviks 
held the key to victory. Lenin's Policy of Uniformity and the "21 Conditions" 
were intended as means of pushing the revolution forward. In order to do so 
sympathy for the Second International had to be destroyed. The Comintem had 
hoped to split the parties of the Left-Centre most notably the USPD, the Italian 
Socialist Party and the British ILP by discrediting their leaders and by luring 
their rank and file to the side of the Comintem but at the same time the "21 
174 The conditions that existed in Western Europe were different from those in Tsarist Russia. 
For example, "reformism" was a rival to the revolutionary movement in Western Europe, 
whereas in Russia it did not really mean anything since parliamentarianism did not really hold 
much meaning. There was also the question of legal versus illegal actions. Lenin had difficulty 
understanding why workers in the West were reluctant to engage in illegal activity whereas in 
Russia it was the natural order of things inside the revolutionary movement. E. H. Carr, A 
History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution 3 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 
1953) 3: 180; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: 
Brill, 2005) 405; Franz Borkenau, The Communist International (London: Faber and Faber 
Limited, 1938)191-192; Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch, Lenin and the 
Comintern (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972) 265. 
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Conditions" were not designed to exclude the dissidents of the Left. As 
demonstrated with Lenin's "Left-Wing" Communism - An Infantile Disorder 
the Comintern. viewed the dissent of the Left as childish rhetoric - misguided 
children who could potentially be shown the correct path and brought back into 
the fold. This sympathetic attitude was not extended to the Centrists such as 
Kautsky and Hilferding whom Lenin and the Comintern regarded with hostility. 
It is clear from Lenin's writing that he hoped that the Policy of Uniformity - 
through its promotion of strict discipline - would lead to a world revolution. 
While Lenin's Policy of Uniformity appeared repressive, in reality Lenin did 
not possess enough power to enforce the "21 Conditions" or the Statutes 
adopted at the Second Congress. Unfortunately in less than a decade following 
Lenin's death all of that would change. By the Sixth Congress the Comintern 
dominated the world's Communist parties. Stalin had consolidated his power 
and dissent was no longer treated as "childish rhetoric" but rather it was 
severely punished. Stalin's speech at the Presidum meeting in 1928 made it 
quite clear that the time for tolerance and open debate had come to an end. 
Stalin used the "21 Conditions" and Lenin's drive toward centralism and 
discipline to rationalise his own position and to prove that the Comintern's 
parties were subordinate not equal to the Central Committee. "Point 12 of the 
21 conditions stipulates that the Party must 'be organised in the most centralised 
fashion', that 'iron discipline bordering on military discipline must prevail'. , 175 
175 Interestingly point 12 of the "21 Conditions" (quoted in full above) did not mention "strict 
discipline bordering on military discipline. " Point 12 insisted that it was the condition of civil 
war that necessitated the need for "iron discipline" and stipulated that the party required the 
confidence of the party members. In his speech, Stalin did not mention any of these conditions 
to Point 12. Instead he pilfered the sections that would suite his needs and discarded the rest. 
John Riddell, ed., The Communist International in Lenin's Time - Workers of the World and 
oppressed Peoples, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Cong[ess, 1920,2 vols. 
(New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991) 2: 769; Joseph Stalin, "Stalin's Speech at the Presidium 
Meeting of the ECCI held on December 19,1928, " Communist International 6.4 (1929) 146. 
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Lenin had hoped to utilise the centralism and strict discipline to destroy the 
capitalist system and to liberate the world's proletariat. Stalin, over a short 
period of time, manipulated Lenin's words and in the name of Lenin destroyed 
the world's revolutionary movement. 
Consequences of the Lenin's Policy of Uniformity for the KPD 
Lenin's Policy of Uniformity reflected the Bolshevik's desperation to 
spread the revolution. Believing that a German revolution was imperative to 
their own survival they attempted to force their party model onto the KPD 
without taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the German 
party. 176 The murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht placed the KPD at a crucial 
176 The Kapp-LUttwitz Putsch signified the unsettled state of the Weimar Republic. On March 
13,1920 General von Liittwitz, leading a Right wing military band known as the Freikorps, 
marched into Berlin and established a right wing dictatorship under Dr. Wolfgang Kapp. The 
Ebert government fled to Stuttgart and then to Dresden. The General Federation of Labour 
under the leadership of Karl Legien called a general strike in support of the SPD government. 
SPI) members followed suite and the mass movement brought the country to a stand still. In the 
Ruhr strikes were called in defence of the government and quickly manifested themselves into 
an offensive action. Workers began arming themselves, workers' councils were established, and 
a Red Army was established, which managed to successfully defeat the Reichswehr and the 
Freikorps in armed clashes. By March 17 Kapp fled Germany to Hungary. Although the Kapp- 
Lfittwitz Putsch had been defeated the workers councils remained firmly in place with a list of 
demands for the SPD, government. By April 1920 the Reichswehr had regained control of the 
Ruhr and had set up military courts to punish militant strikers. The KPD's response to the 
Putsch was confused. The KPD Zentrale initially did not support the strikes and called for 
passivity. Many of the local organisations ignored the Zentrale and called for a general strike. 
Levi, who was in jail at the time sent a scathing letter to the Zentrale insisting that it take 
advantage of the revolutionary situation. The KPD's confused reaction to the Kapp-Lattwitz 
Putsch cost it dearly. 
Brou6 insisted that that Kapp-Liittwitz Putsch revealed the most serious weakness of the 
party and it in effect instigated the split with the KAPD in April 1920. Angess insisted that it 
was actually the issue of National Bolshevism that instigated the split. Ever since the party's 
founding in 1919 a section of the KPD favoured cooperation with the Right wing Nationalists. 
Levi's failure to purge them allowed an opposition to develop. Initially Radek condemned the 
idea National Bolshevism, but in 1923 he promoted it through the "Schlageter Campaign. " 
While the KPD's flirtation with National Bolshevism fluctuated during the Weimar Period, the 
KPD's relationship with Right Wing Nationalists falls outside the scope of this thesis. For 
Zetkin's account of the Putsch see Clara Zetkin, "The Situation in Germany, " The Communist 
international 2.13 (1920): 2496-2500; G. Zinoviev, "When and Under what Conditions Soviets 
of Workers' Deputies Should be Formed, " Communist International 2.11-12 (1920): 2162-2163; 
Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 
325-326,351-380,393; Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890- 1990: From 
Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) 96-97; Julius 
Braunthal, History of the International: 1864 - 1914,2 vols. (London: Thomas Nelson and 
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turning point. Without a strong internal leadership to guide and protect it from 
the medalling of the Bolsheviks, the KPD was left particularly vulnerable. 
Bolshevik interference had tremendous impact on the theoretical and practical 
development of the KPD. The Bolshevik's arrogance in their own theoretical 
superiority prevented them from taking into consideration the needs and 
historical experiences of the German party. 
This section will demonstrate that although it was not Lenin's intention, his 
drive for uniformity in the Comintern served to cripple the Communist 
movement in Germany by preventing it from naturally developing a strong 
leadership from within the movement. Discipline and loyalty to the Comintern 
overrode the German Communist Party's need for strong leadership. The 
Comintern's interference in the KPD and the party's inability to create leaders 
pushed it into the shadow of the CPSU and the Comintern, eventually 
weakening the movement leaving the party as a subordinate of the Soviet 
Union. 
Firstly, Lenin's Uniformity Policy thwarted the efforts of the newly formed 
KPD leadership to advance the theoretical traditions of the KPD by forcing 
policies onto it that, based on their history and traditions, the leadership could 
not tolerate. Shortly after the murder of their friend and leader, the old 
Spartacist found themselves increasingly isolated and marginalized as the party 
fell under the influence of Karl Radek and the Comintern. The old Left of the 
Sons LTD, 1966) 2: 218-219; Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid 
For Power in Germany, 1921 - 1923 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 41-42; 
Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1970) 89-90,119-123; Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism: A Study of the Origins 
gLIhL31gLeý (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948) 92-96,267-273; Siegfried 
Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' Deutschland zur Geschichte eines Politischen Begriffs, " 
10.2 (1965): 212; Evelyn Anderson, Hammer or Anvil: 
ian Working-Class Movement (1945; New York: Oriole Editions, 1973) 
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SPD were suddenly labelled the Right wing of the KPD. In February 1921 
those on the Right - Paul Levi, Clara Zetkin, Ernst Ddumig, Adolf Hoffman and 
Otto BraI3 177 - resigned from the party leadership over differences with the 
Comintem. 178 
As they departed the party leadership they took with them the history and 
SPD traditions that Rosa Luxemburg had hoped to utilise to build a mass based 
party -a decentralised party structure, a democratic party similar to the SPD but 
without the bureaucracy, and ultimately the old SPD's dedication to Marxism. 
Levi and his colleagues on the Right not only played a key role in keeping the 
old traditions alive but on a practical level the Right wing of the party 
determined the party's policy and set its course. They highlighted the 
importance of maintaining the relationship between Marxist theory and 
177 Clara Zetkin had been involved in the labour movement since the days of the anti-Socialist 
laws and she had also been a close friend of Rosa Luxemburg. At this point, in 1921, she was 
still critical of the Bolshevik involvement in the KPD, but her views began to change after the 
Third Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1921. By October 1921 she had begun 
advocating the need for unity. Ernst Daumig was a former leader of the Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards and was rather displeased with the notion of taking orders from Zinoviev with regard 
to party matters. Adolf Hoffman and Otto Braf3 had joined the KPD from the USPD. For further 
details on Zetkin's position on party unity see Clara Zetkin, "On the Situation in the German 
Party, " International Press Correspondence 1.2 (1921); Werner T. Angress, Stillborn 
Revolution: The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 1921 - 1923 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963) 100-101. 
178 A disagreement took place over the recent split in the Italian Socialist Party. Levi rejected 
the Comintern's schism policy and he warned that repeated splits in the movement would be 
detrimental to the Communist movement as a whole. When a vote was taken to decide whether 
Levi's position was right or wrong he resigned as chairman along with his four colleagues. 
They produced a joint statement in Die Rote Fahne claiming that they could not carry out party 
policy that they fundamentally disagreed with. The Comintern Executive Committee 
condemned their resignation. "In a Communist party the leaders nominated by workers have as 
little right to leave their posts without permission, as a red army man has to leave his sentry 
post. " Heinrich Brandler and Walter Stoecker shared the chairmanship, replaced Levi and his 
colleagues. Paul FrOlich, Ernest Meyer, Paul B6ttcher, and Max Sievers became secretaries, 
and Paul Wegmann replaced Hoffmann as alternate. "Withdrawal of Five Members of the 
Central Committee of the United Communist Party of Germany, " Communist International 
3.16-17 (1921): 30; Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid For Power 
in Germany, 1921 - 1923 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 99-101; Herman 
Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Komminismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der 
Weimarer Republik, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 40-41; 
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revolutionary practice. They utilised Marxist methods to determine the ripeness 
of the movement for revolution. They debated issues in terms of "objective" 
versus "subjective" factors i. e. the relative strength of the State in relation to the 
German labour movement. 179 The Right maintained that the only way to 
achieve their ultimate goal of Socialism was to build a mass party, educated in 
Marxism. 
Essentially the Right wing's reluctance to become involved in premature 
uprisings centred around their past experiences under the repressive Anti- 
Socialist Laws and the backlash that occurred in 1919. Once Levi and his 
colleagues resigned these theoretical relations lost importance. The new 
members of the KPD had not lived through the repression of the Anti-Socialist 
laws nor were they grounded in the tradition of Marxist theory. They were 
younger, more radical, and impatient. They did not understand the Right wing's 
tendency towards caution. The Right wing counter balanced the young radicals 
and attempted to keep the traditions and the legacy left behind by Rosa 
Luxemburg alive. The resignation of the Zentrale from the Comintern marked 
the beginning of a dramatic theoretical shift in the KPD. Rather than strike a 
blow in the face of the Bolsheviks, their resignations merely left theoretical a 
void, which Lenin and the Comintern were all too eager to fill with Russian 
traditions and Russian methods. 
Secondly, Lenin's Uniformity Policy undermined the creation of leadership 
from within the German movement. 180 Certainly one can acknowledge that the 
179 Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 1921 
: z_1923 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 112. 110 Levi was annoyed that the KAPD and the USPD had been invited to the Second World 
Congress and had been granted consultative powers. He felt his position undermined when he 
found out that the Bolsheviks had been secretly negotiating with the KAPD and the USPD. 
Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 1921 
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resignation of Levi and his four colleagues was a political statement and one 
cannot blame them for the consequences that followed. 181 In reality their 
resignations demonstrated the actual weakness of the leadership itself. A strong 
leadership does not need to resign in order to demonstrate its opposition even in 
the face of the majority. Once the opposition resigns it loses its influence in 
shaping any further legislation and a leadership that cannot comprehend this 
does not have a grasp of the wider picture. 
Traditionally, the KPD leadership had always been weak and unable to 
control the chaos that existed throughout the German labour movement in the 
early 1920's. This issue of weak leadership was not limited to the KPD in the 
1920's. In reality the problem goes back to the decentralised tradition of the 
SPD which heavily influenced Rosa Luxemburg's notion of a mass party. It is 
clear from her decision to take part in the January uprisings in 1919 that Rosa 
Luxemburg was prepared to capitulate to the will of the majority regardless of 
whether she viewed the action as a complete mistake. One can argue that this 
was because she held a highly democratic horizontal structure above all other 
things. 1 82 However, movements with horizontal structures can only function if 
they posses a strong base. In 1919 the revolutionary labour movement in 
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181 Rosa Levin6-Meyer, wife of Ernest Meyer, was quite keen to blame many of the KPD's 
problems on Paul Levi. She claimed that Levi was impatient and dismissive of intellectual 
inferiors and that he frightened away a large number of people who could have been relied on to 
be the backbone of the movement. She insisted that this was the root cause that led to the 
disintegration of the Communist movement in Germany. However, it also appears that she was 
writing in defence of her husband's chairmanship, who was heavily criticised, particularly by 
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TCPT) in der Weimarer Republik, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 
1969); JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). 
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Germany was strong but that is not to say that the KPD possessed a strong 
power base. It was a new party caught up in the revolutionary tide of the time. 
Unlike the Bolshevik party, the KPD never possessed a strong leadership 
that was capable of guiding those that were sympathetic to the revolutionary 
cause. Luxemburg was not willing to dictate party procedure to the masses nor 
was she willing to desert the masses and go into hiding - this mistake cost her 
her life. Luxemburg failed to realise that once she became the leader of a 
movement her life was no longer her own to gamble with. She did not see the 
bigger picture, her survival meant the life or death of the movement. This 
problem of weak leadership plagued the KPD from the onset and was further 
exasperated by the dominating role played by the Comintern. The drive for 
revolution existed in the KPD, but it lacked strong leadership to guide it. The 
resignation of the Right, merely proved their willingness to yield to the 
Comintern rather than fight for their position. 
Finally, Lenin's Policy of Uniformity demonstrated that internal party 
matters were secondary to discipline, obedience, and loyalty to the Comintern, 
thus leaving the KPD a subordinate of the Soviet Union. Paul Levi was 
expelled from the Communist Party for his open criticism of the Mansfeld 
uprising in March 1921.183 He insisted that if the KPD were to take the 
offensive position that it would result in bloodbath and he refused to take part. 
The uprising, led by Bela Kun, took place regardless of Levi's warnings and 
183 Conan Fischer claimed that Levi resignation actually had to do with the National Question 
and his attempts to recruit right wing extremists in Munich. Under scrutiny by his Berlin 
colleagues he resigned. Unfortunately Fischer did not offer a primary source for this fresh 
allegation and he failed to mention Levi's conflict with the Bolshevik party over the Bolsheviks 
schism policy in Italy and the Mannsfeld uprising. Fischer's allegation of Levi's nationalism 
seemed to play into his Cold War premise that Cornmunism and Fascism were no different. 
Conan Fischer, German Communism and the Rise of Nazism (London: MacMillan Press, 1991) 
32-33. 
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true to Levi's predictions the Mansfeld uprising was a massacre. 184 Yet no one 
in the Comintern took responsibility for the actions. 
185 Levi, who refused to 
participate in the action was essentially, hung with his own rope. The 
Comintern insisted that regardless of Levi's position it was the KPD's duty to 
place itself at the front a workers' uprising. Levi was expelled for his failure to 
comply with Comintern policy. In reality Levi was not only expelled for 
braking ranks but, more precisely, he was expelled for his post-uprising 
criticism, in which he criticised the Comintern and the Soviet leaders. ' 86 
Lenin, in a letter to Zinoviev, stated, "The crux of the matter is that Levi in 
very many respects is right politically. Unfortunately, he is guilty of a number 
of breaches of discipline for which the Party has expelled him. "187 The 
Bolshevik leaders held Levi's open criticism of the Mansfeld massacre as more 
devastating to the revolutionary cause than Bela Kun, who actually led the 
uprising. Levi's "braking in the ranks" was highlighted while Kun's 
184 B61a Kun is most well known for his role in the failed Hungarian revolution in 1919, in 
which his disastrous attempt to establish a Hungarian Soviet fell under the assault of counter- 
revolutionary forces. Following the Mansfeld uprising Kun was recalled to Moscow. 
185 It remains unclear who actually sent B61a Kun to Germany, whether he arrived on his own 
volition or if he was commissioned to incite revolution by one of the Bolshevik leaders. Levi 
insisted that the "action" originated from the head of one man - B61a Kun. The "Rightist, " 
certainly, had not requested his presence and neither Radek nor the Bolsheviks claimed 
responsibility for his destructive actions. Paul Levi, Unser Weg Wider den Putschismus (Berlin: 
A. Seehof & Co., 1921) 36. 
186 While Levi claimed that he did not blame the Executive Committee of the Comintern, he 
insisted that there was a lot of pressure on the Zentrale to make up for its "inactivity" during the 
Kapp Putsch. Levi insisted that the Communists became victims of their own slogans. The 
members were not savvy enough to know when a revolutionary situation did not exist and the 
Zentrale failed in its task to guide the party in the right direction. The Zentrale itself appeared to 
be unaware of its relationship to the proletariat during an action. Levi concluded that the 
leadership of the ECCI was inadequate. The reason for this inadequacy had to do with technical 
difficulties and poor postal communications leaving Western Europe isolated. Paul Levi, Unser 
Wejz Wider den Putschismus (Berlin: A. Seehof & Co., 1921) 29-30,33-37,53-55; Karl Radek, 
"The Downfall of Levi, " Communist International 3.16-17 (1921): 20-29; Paul Fr6lich, "Der 
Fall Levi, " Die Internationale 3.4 (1921): 115-22; Karl Radek, "Lehren der Mdrzkdmpfe, " Die 
Internationale 3.8 (1921): 277-280. 
187 Lenin had not intended the expulsion of Levi to be permanent. In the same letter Lenin 
stated that Levi's expulsion should be afixed tenn "say at sixth months. " After the six months 
he would be permitted to seek readmission. This is a striking contrast to expulsion under Stalin 
where expulsion was a form of political death. V. I. Lenin, "Remarks on the Draft Theses on 
Tactics for the Third Congress of the Communist International - Letter to G. Y. Zinoviev, " 
Selected Works, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971) 3: 566,569. 
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misjudgement of the revolutionary situation was relatively ignored. In fact, in 
Trotsky's personal notes he dismissed Levi's criticism as a distortion of the 
"political perspective" and asserted that such action threatened to introduce 
"demoralisation" into the ranks of the KPD during a time when unity was 
required. 188 Responsibility for the massacre was of secondary importance to 
discipline and obedience. This sent a very strong message to other Comintern 
parties - right or wrong party discipline overrode the needs of individual parties. 
The accuracy of Levi's evaluation was of little importance to the Comintern. It 
did not matter if the masses were headed for a massacre, if the Comintem 
ordered the party's participation then the party's leaders must obey. 189 
During a time when the fledgling KPD needed to nurture and develop the 
working class movement in Germany, rather than offer guidance, Lenin and the 
Comintem attempted to impose their model on the KPD in order to force the 
revolutionary struggle in Germany forward. Desperation and arrogance 
prevented the Bolsheviks from acknowledging the internal needs of the 
Germany party. The drive for revolution existed in Germany, however, as 
Lenin put it in What is to be Done, in embryonic form. Lenin could not see that 
188 Trotsky's personal notes actually blame the "blatant treachery of the social-democrats and 
Independents" as being the responsible parties in the massacre. Levi, in turn, was merely 
repeating their arguments. Leon Trotsky, "The March Revolutionary Movement in Germany 
(personal notes), " The First Five Years of the Communist International, 2 vols. (London: New 
Park Publications, 1973) 1: 197. 
189 The clamp down on open opposition did not end with Levi's expulsion. By the fall of 1921 
Lenin had begun advocating the need for a purge of the Russian party. "The purification of the 
Communist Party is apparently developing into a most serious and enormously important task. 
[ ... ] We must cleanse the party of the swindlers, of the 
bureaucrats, of the insincere and 
unsteadfast communists and the Mensheviks, who, have changed their color but who at heart 
still remain Mensheviks. " It certainly must have caused enough of a stir in the German Party 
for Wilhelm Pieck, a former student of Rosa Luxemburg at the SPD Marxist school, to come to 
the defence of the Lenin's policy. Pieck insisted that Levi's accusation, that Lenin was more 
interested in building a small, unblemished party rather than building a mass party, might appear 
true. However, it was important for the Russian party to keep clear of "hostile forces. " Pieck 
insisted that "cleansing" actually strengthened the workers' government rather than weakened it. 
V. I. Lenin, "On Cleansing the Party, " International Press Correspondence 1.2 (1921): 18-19; 
Wilhelm Pieck, "Enter the Communist Party! " International Press Correspondence 1.4 (1921): 
34. 
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his insistence on developing a conscious working class also pertained to the 
situation in Germany. Revolutions, just as working class movements, can not 
be created by force. The development toward a conscious working class 
struggle must come from within the movement. The movement itself must 
develop its own leadership who will guide the revolutionary struggle. A 
leadership that is imposed from the outside - one that does not take into 
consideration the history and the traditions of the movement - will find itself 
unable to guide the struggle. The fledgling KPD was absent of strong 
leadership, however, given time it may have developed leaders from within to 
guide the struggle. The Bolsheviks did not have time to wait - their survival 
depended on the revolution spreading. Their impatience prevented the KPD 
from developing into a mass based party envisioned by Rosa Luxemburg. Once 
discipline and loyalty overrode the need of the movement the revolutionary 
struggle in Germany became handicapped. The KPD ceased to be in a position 
where it could develop leaders and the movement from within. 
H. The Comintern's Policy of "Bolshevisation" 
The Ruhr crisis of 1923 and rising inflation marked a period of political and 
economic instability in Germany. French and Belgium forces invaded the Ruhr 
in January because the Germans had fallen behind on their reparation payments 
as stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles. The German govenunent advocated a 
policy of "passive resistance" whereby a united front of workers, employers, 
and officials was formed against the French. This fon-n of resistance lasted a 
few months until the German government lost control of inflation. By April 
1923 the economic situation had deteriorated and the Cuno government was 
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forced to resign in August. The KPD had hoped to transform the economic and 
political instability into a revolutionary situation and the KPD awaited 
instructions from Moscow. Brandler was summoned to Moscow where he 
asked the Comintern to send Trotsky to assist in organising the Gennan 
revolution. The CPSU and the Comintern leaders were too embroiled in the 
power struggle inside the CPSU to allow Trotsky out of their sight. Radek was 
sent instead. The KPD's attempts to rally the masses was disjointed and 
disorganised. The result was a brutal defeat and followed by severe 
repression. 190 Although Brandler had asked the Comintern and the CPSU for 
guidance, neither the Comintern nor the CPSU shared in the responsibility for 
the 1923 failure. Brandler, Thalheimer, and Radek were used as scapegoats and 
held responsible for the defeat. Zinoviev's article clearly blamed the German 
party and its leaders for the defeat. 
"The political situation in Germany before and during the 
October events was objectively revolutionary.... The retreat 
of the party in the October struggles is to be explained not 
only by organisatory, military or technical defects, nor by the 
unfavourable general proportion of forces, which was far more 
unfavourable when the party adopted its measures for the 
struggle than in the decisive month, but before all by the 
mistakes in regard to the tactical and strategical attitude of the 
190 For our purposes a detailed description of the events that transpired during 1923 is not 
essentially as this thesis is concerned with the aftermath of 1923 and its consequences for the 
KPD. For a more detailed description see Victor Serge, Witness to the German Revolution: 
Writings from Germany 1923, trans. Ian Birchall (London: Redwords, 2000); Pierre Brou6, The 
German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Ruth Fischer, Stalin 
and German Communism: A Study of the Origins of the State Party (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1948); Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid For 
Power in Germany, 1921 - 1923 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Herman Weber, 
Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
&e , 211blic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969); Julius Braunthal, History of the International: 1864 - 1914,2 vols. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons LTD, 
1966). 
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party in the struggle for winning over the majority of the party 
which was the first premise for success. These mistakes were 
the result of a false valuation of the Party's role in these 
struggles. "' 91 
Brandler and Thalheimer were removed from their leadership positions and 
Radek was recalled to Moscow. Trotsky, who had very little to do with the 
planning of the Gennan revolution was also implicated in its failure. As Agnew 
and McDermott put it, Trotsky "was guilty by association. " The Comintern and 
the CPSU never reflected on their own role in the German defeat. 192 
The devastating defeat of the "German October" in 1923 marked the end of 
a revolutionary era. Up to this point the German party believed that the world 
revolution was imminent. However, no successful socialist revolution had 
occurred in any other country except Russia. All attempts had been 
systematically put down by counter-revolutionary forces and were followed by 
severe backlashes. By the end of the revolutionary period of 1919 - 1923 many 
Communist parties throughout Western and Eastern Europe operated on a semi- 
legal or illegal basis. Capitalism had firmly managed to re-establish itself This 
period became known as the "period of relative stabilisation. " 
Lenin's death in 1924 and the failed revolution of 1923 changed everything. 
The Soviet leaders were forced to refocus their attention on rebuilding the 
Soviet economy until the revolutionary tide turned. In the CPSU the power 
191 G. Zinoviev, "Theses on the Tactics of the October Retreat and on the next Tasks of the C. P. 
of Germany, " International Press Correspondence, 4.1 (1924): 1. 
192 Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of Communism From 
Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 45; Pierre Brou6, The German 
Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 817-818; Ruth Fischer, Stalin 
and German Communism: A Study of the Origins of the State Party (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1948) 311-317; Herman Weber, Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: 
r KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 43-52. 
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struggle that followed Lenin's death served to discredit the old Bolshevik's and 
paved the way for Stalin to emerge as the premier lone leader. In the 
Comintern, Lenin's death and the "period of relative stabilisation" had a 
detrimental effect on the development of revolutionary theory as well as the 
political practice of the Comintern"s parties, in particular the German party. In 
an effort to contain and control its member parties the Comintern introduced the 
policy of "Bolshevisation. " "Bolshevisation, " in reality, was a form of 
Russification. Loyalty and obedience became important features of the 
Comintern even when its course was marked by contradictory zigzag shifts 
between the Right and Left. This policy of "zigzags" had a profound effect on 
the CPSU and the Comintern. Prior to the battle between the "Right" against 
the "Left Opposition" all Marxist parties believed that the Soviet Union must 
bide its time and wait until revolution broke out in other countries. The policy 
of Bolshevisation was developed by Zinoviev in the battle against Trotsky and 
began the destruction of old Marxist theory. 193 Internationally Bolshevisation 
targeted Trotsky, in Germany Bolshevisation attacked Luxemburg and her 
supporters. 
This section will discuss the power struggle inside the CPSU, the 
Comintern's policy of Bolshevisation, and the detrimental effect that it had on 
the theoretical and practical development of the German movement. The 
"period of relative stabilisation" and the Comintern's policy of Bolshevisation 
marked a tremendous watershed in the course that KPD pursued. Essentially it 
193 According to Deutscher "Bolshevisation" was not only Zinoviev and Stalin's method of 
refashioning the European Communist movement into the Russian image but also it was a way 
to stamp out International opposition i. e. it was a way of ridding the Comintern. of any 
individual members who supported Trotsky. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed - Trotsky- 
192 
_I- 
1929,3 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965) 2: 150. 
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was during this period that the foundations were laid for the development of 
Social Fascism in Germany. 
Power Strunle in the CPSU 
Lenin's third stroke, 10 months before his death, left him unable to speak let 
alone work. In effect his role as leader had been terminated. Lenin's ill health 
threw the Bolshevik party into a frenzy over who would succeed him. A power 
struggle ensued that forever changed the political practice of Communist parties 
around the world. Inside the Soviet Union the struggle for power was plagued 
with fluctuations in alliances, which led to dramatic changes in tactics and 
policies. Originally the alliances were forged with the specific purpose of 
defeating Trotsky. 1 94 By the time Lenin had died in 1924 Trotsky had been 
stripped of any real influence in the party. 195 Those that supported Trotsky were 
systematically purged. 196 The power struggle left the entire CPSU tamished. 
The brutal nature of the power struggle discredited the reputation of the old 
Bolshevik leaders, with the exception of Stalin. Although the power struggle in 
the CPSU was marked by fluctuations in alliances and zigzagging polices, it had 
194 Subtle assaults were launched against Trotsky. Although Zinoviev's article did not name 
Trotsky it subtly attacked the value of Trotsky's theory of pennanent revolution. The article 
played up the role of the peasantry and claimed that without the peasantry as an ally the victory 
of the proletariat would not have been possible. Trotsky's theory of pernwnent revolution was 
inadequate because it "ignored" the peasantry. G. Zinoviev, "What is Bolshevism? " 
International Press Correspondence 4.3 (1924): 18; also see Leon Trotsky, My Life: An 
Attempt at an Autobiography (1971; Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) 535. 
195 According to Trotsky, he was officially relived of his duties as the People's Commissary of 
War in January 1925. By his own admission he yielded his military post without a fight, 
"thereby wresting from [his] opponents' hands their weapon of insinuation concerning [his] 
military intentions. " Leon Trotsky, My Life: An Atte]ppt at an AutobiogEqphy (1971; 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) 540. 
196 Carr sited the example of student demonstrations. In December several articles were 
published in Pravda launching the Stalinists full-scale attack on Trotsky. The paper refused to 
print any articles favouring Trotsky and the opposition. Students held demonstrations in favour 
of the opposition. The result was a purge of the Central Committee of the Komsomol. E. H. 
Carr, The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin (1917 - 1929) (Basingstokes: Palgrave, 
1979)67. 
120 
a tremendous impact inside and outside the Soviet Union. The battles scarred 
the reputations of the most likely candidates for leadership, Trotsky, Kamenev, 
and Zinoviev and paved the way for Stalin to emerge as the premier lone leader. 
First, Trotsky was targeted because he appeared to be the best suited 
candidate to succeed Lenin. 197 He had worked alongside Lenin during the 
Bolshevik revolution and during the Civil War he had been the Commissar of 
the Red Army. After the Civil War he maintained ties with the military and 
some of his greatest support came from the military, as well as from the youth 
movement. His close ties to the military certainly made him appear threatening 
to his opponents. However, there was a lot of animosity towards him and his 
sudden closeness to Lenin. Trotsky had joined the Bolsheviks much later than 
the others and, in fact, had spent many years in disagreement with Lenin. It 
seemed unacceptable that someone who had not struggled alongside the 
Bolsheviks should be allowed to lead their party. However, not a single 
candidate was strong enough to challenge Trotsky on his own. Therefore, an 
alliance (known as the Triumvirate) was formed between Zinoviev, Kamenev, 
and Stalin. ' 
98 
Second, the power struggle changed the way in which internal disputes were 
handled. Rather than conduct open debates based on theoretical and practical 
differences the participants lost sight of what was important - pushing the 
revolution forward. The battles were forged on a personal basis with the 
197 The Twelfth Congress of the CPSU assembled in April. Its opening paid a spontaneous 
homage to Trotsky and Lenin. The chairman read tributes that had poured in from all over the 
country - from party cells, trade unions, and groups of workers and students - paying homage to 
Lenin and Trotsky. The Triumvirs were surprised and annoyed. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet 
Un med - Trotsky: 1921 - 1929,3 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965) 2: 94. 
198 According to Carr, Zinoviev openly believed that he was the best suited to be Lenin's 
successor and, at the time, Trotsky appeared to be his greatest obstacle. During this period 
Stalin remained rather silent about his ambitions toward the position. E. H. Carr, The Russian 
Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin 0 917 - 1929) (Basingstokes: Palgrave, 1979) 68. 
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purpose of discrediting one another's reputations. At first, the battles were 
mostly forged between Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky. Accusations 
against Trotskyism began appearing in the press. ' 99 During this time Stalin, 
who was not seen as a threat, remained in the background with clean hands, and 
almost appeared as the moderate in the battles. 
By 1925 the Triumvirate had managed to isolate Trotsky and stripped him 
of any real influence in the party but this was done at a great CoSt. 
200 Rather 
than a clear victor in the battles, the power struggle damaged the reputations of 
both sides, with the exception of Stalin, who walked away stronger. In their 
battle against Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were unable to see the forces 
working against them. When Zinoviev and Kamenev realised the vulnerability 
of their positions and danger that Stalin really posed, they joined forces with 
Trotsky, however, by this time it was too late. 201 Trotsky was reluctant to join 
199 According to Trotsky, during the autumn of 1924 the "press and orators did nothing but 
expose Trotskyism, although no one knew exactly what it meant. " Day after day Trotsky's 
polemics with Lenin were drawn up from the past and "falsified" and "mutilated. " At the time 
he was ill and did nothing. Leon Trotsky, My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography (1971; 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) 535-536. 
200 According to Deutscher Trotsky missed the opportunity to discredit Stalin. He failed to "act 
as Lenin's mouth piece" and present Lenin's final testament against Stalin. "He kept silent 
when the cry for inner-party democracy rose from the floor. " He presented his economic ideas 
in such a manner that his audience was unable to understand, thus leaving the door open for his 
opponents to twist his words. Deutscher also pointed out that Trotsky shared the Triumvirate's 
anxiety over what the shock of Lenin's death would do to the party. For Deutscher, Trotsky's 
eagerness to strengthen the party actually weakened his own position. Isaac Deutscher, The 
Prophet Unarmed - Trotsky: 1921 - 1929,3 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965) 2: 103- 
104. 
201 Carr insisted that the rift in the Triumvirate, in the beginning, took the form of a geographical 
rivalry between Leningrad and Moscow. Furthermore, it was this geographical rivalry that 
determined the ideological mould and led to the reversal of attitudes. The Opposition and the 
Triumvirate disagreed over role of the peasantry, methods of industrialisation, NEP, etc. On 
April 20,1923 Trotsky presented his speech on the "Scissor Crisis. " He surveyed Russia's 
industrial development in the two years of NEP. The rise in industrial productions was still 
slow and trailed behind agricultural development. As farmers increasingly sold their products 
this led to the fall in the price. The industrial sector was the opposite. Farmers could not afford 
to buy industrial products. The discrepancy between agriculture and industrial sectors resembled 
scissors opening high industrial and low agricultural prices. Therefore there was no incentive for 
the farmers to sell their products to the towns. The "scissors" threatened to cut the economic 
ties between town and country. Trotsky concluded that the "scissor crisis could be averted by 
lowering the price of industrial goods rather than raising the price of agricultural goods. The 
debates between the Right and the Left, at the time were over how to industrialise and 
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forces with Zinoviev and Kamenev. ) especially after their recent battles but in 
1926 he agreed to ally with them and they formed the "United Opposition" 
against the "Right" - Bucharin and Stalin. However, this alliance came too late 
and by November 1927 Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky had been expelled 
from the Communist Party. 202 Stalin then embarked on his "Left-Turn" and 
used Trotsky's arguments on agrarian policies to defeat his former allies 
Bucharin, Rykov, and Tornsky. By 1929 the old Bolsheviks had been defeated. 
Stalin had emerged as the undisputed leader and was firmly in control. 
Lenin was ambiguous over whom he thought should succeed him. 203 The 
power struggle that ensued was brutally fought in the open for the sole purpose 
of isolating and destroying the reputation of Trotsky. Unbeknownst to Trotsky, 
Kamenev, and Zinoviev their battle to take over the party leadership 
inadvertently led to dramatic changes in the Comintern and the CPSU. In their 
efforts to gain the party leadership for themselves, Kamenev and Zinoviev 
discredited themselves and left the door open for Stalin to take over the party 
leadership. 
collectivise not whether or not to industrialise and collectivise. Although Stalin made the 
divisions appear enormous, in reality they were not. One must also recall that open 
disagreements were acceptable prior to this period. E. H. Carr, A History Of Soviet Russia: 
Socialism in One Country 1924 - 1926,2 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1959) 2: 57- 
58; also see Leon Trotsky, My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography (1971; Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) 542-543; Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed - Trotsky: 1921 - 
1929,3 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965) 2: 99-103. 
202 According to Yaroslavsky, the expulsion of the opposition demonstrated maximum 
strengthening of Bolshevik unity ie unity behind Stalin. Yaroslavsky, "For Bolshevik Unity, for 
Bolshevik Discipline, " International Press Correspondence 8.1 (1928): 5. 
203 According to Trotsky, from his death bed Lenin had been preparing to strike a blow at Stalin 
and his allies. Deutscher insisted that Lenin had intended to demote Stalin. Leon Trotsky, My 
(1971; Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) 527; 
Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed - Trotsky: 1921 - 1929,3 vols. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1965) 2: 88,91. 
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Comintern After Lenin 
Lenin's death and the power struggle in the CPSU had an incredible impact 
on the policies pursued by Comintern. The Fifth Congress of the Communist 
International met in 17 June -8 July 1924 and officially announced the slogan 
of "Bolshevisation. , 204 Officially the policy of "Bolshevisation" was supposed 
to apply the principles of "Leninism" to the Comintern's member countries. 
The Comintem's drive toward Bolshevisation reflected the power struggle 
inside the Soviet Union. According to the Theses adopted at the Fifth Plenum, 
"The slogan bolshevization arose in the struggle against the right danger.... 
Bolshevization of the Comintern sections means studying and applying in 
,, 205 practice the experience of the RCP in the three Russian revolutions.... In 
reality it set the precedent for relations between Communist parties, the 
Comintern central bodies and the Russian party. The "Theses and Tactics on 
the Bolshevisation of Communist Parties Adopted at the Fifth ECCI Plenum, "' 
elaborated on Lenin's "21 Conditions. " The principles adopted at the Second 
Congress were used to further marginalize the Trotsky and his supporters. 
This section will demonstrate the way in which the Triumvirate used the 
policy of Bolshevisation, while hiding behind Lenin's rhetoric of uniformity and 
discipline to permanently change the revolutionary movement. The Comintern 
after Lenin's death changed the role of the party as well as the role that theory 
played in the revolutionary movement. 
204 The resolutions were further modified at the Fifth ECCI Plenum that took place on 26 March 
-6 April 1925. Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A HistoEy o 
Communism From Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 45; Isaac Deutscher, 
The : 1roj2het Unarmed - Trotsky: 1921 - 1929,3 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965) 2: 
146; Julius Braunthal, History of the International: 1864 - 1914,2 vols. (London: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons LTD, 1966) 2: 295. 
205 "The Theses on the Bolshevization of Communist Parties Adopted at the Fifth ECCI 
Plenum, " The Communist International 1919-1943 - Documents, ed. Jane Degras, 3 vols. 
(London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1971) 2: 189,190. 
124 
First, the Fifth Plenum of the Comintern in 1925 changed the role of the 
party in the revolutionary movement. Lenin was a great advocate of strict 
discipline inside the revolutionary movement. As mentioned previously, this 
was seen throughout his writing until the end of his life. However, the new 
policies dictated by the Fifth plenum went farther than Lenin intended. With 
Lenin dead and out of the way there was no one around to stop the Comintern 
from developing obscure policies based on personal vendettas. The Fifth 
Plenum claimed to carry on Lenin's revolutionary desires, hence the need for 
Bolshevisation, but in reality it manipulated Lenin's words to suite their own 
purposes. For example, the document exaggerated Lenin's insistence for strict 
discipline. 
"Iron proletarian discipline is one of the most important pre- 
conditions of bolshevization. Parties which carry on their 
banner 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' must realize that there 
can be no talk of a victorious proletarian dictatorship without 
iron party discipline, acquired in the course of years and 
decades. Bolsheviks ... must realize that the civil war cannot 
be fought, political power conquered, or the proletarian 
dictatorship maintained and strengthened, without the strictest 
internal discipline founded on ideological unanimity; without 
this the civil war is doomed in advance to failure. ")206 
Essentially the Fifth Plenum doomed the revolutionary movement to failure if 
parties did not impose strict discipline within their rank and file. Lenin also 
called for strict discipline, but unlike the Comintern of 1925 Lenin was unable 
206 "The Theses on the Bolshevization of Communist Parties Adopted at the Fifth ECCI 
Plenum, " The Communist International 1919-1943 - Documents, ed. Jane Degras, 3 vols. 
(London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1971) 2: 198. 
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to strictly enforce his desire for discipline in the Comintern. In Lenin's time the 
Comintern's parties retained autonomy. He treated the "Ultra-Left" as unruly 
children rather than enemies. The Theses of the Fifth Plenum changed this - the 
Statutes were developed as a means in which to defeat the Left Opposition 
rather than as a method in which to lure them back to the "correct path. ") 
Lenin's usage of the concept of "strict discipline" was a form of self-discipline 
and commitment to the struggle, whereas, the Comintern's new usage of the 
term demanded blind obedience. 
Second, the Fifth Plenum changed the role of revolutionary theory and 
replaced it with "Marxism and Leninism, " as it became known. In Stalin's 
quest for power he deified Lenin by projecting himself as nothing more than 
Lenin's humble student whose desire was to continue the legacy left behind by 
Lenin. The Comintern did not claim to change theoretical tactics after Lenin's 
death, rather the opposite, it went to great pains to show that it was following 
methods laid out by Lenin. The document discussed the way in which Leninism 
(not Lenin the man who rejected the term Leninism) had enriched Marxism. 
There was a constant attempt to link Leninism to Marxism. 
"The idea that Marxism is only theory, and Leninism only 
practice, is false. Leninism is the theory and practice of 
Marxism in the period of imperialism, of imperialist wars and 
proletarian revolutions ushered in by the proletarian 
,, 207 dictatorship in Russia. ... 
207 "The Theses on the Bolshevization of Communist Parties Adopted at the Fifth ECCI 
Plenum, " The Communist International 1919-1943 - Documents, ed. Jane Degras, 3 vols. 
(London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1971) 2: 191. 
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This convoluted quote does not actually mean anything. It does, on the other 
hand, imply that Marxist theory was not enough to carry a revolution. It 
required Leninism to come along and develop the correct applications to the 
imperialist world and Stalin, the pupil of Lenin, was the only person who could 
continue this legacy. 
The Stalinist use of Leninism clearly contradicted Lenin's actions and 
theories. Lenin was deeply committed to the relationship between theory and 
political practice. In What is to Done? written in 1902 he wrote, "Without 
revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. "208 Lenin further 
insisted on the necessity of a conscious working class and a vanguard party that 
would help guide them in their revolutionary struggle. As previously discussed, 
the role of the party was to guide and assist the working class in developing 
consciousness. Lenin remained committed to the crucial link between 
revolutionary theory and political practice throughout his life even when the 
prospect of world revolution had faded. Following Lenin's death there is no 
evidence to suggest that this commitment to theory continued, in fact the 
opposite is true. The Comintem and Stalin's entourage appeared to do 
everything in their power to rewrite or destroy the renmants of theory within the 
Comintern. Rather than encourage the development of revolutionary theory 
slogans were used instead. 
Third, Bolshevisation was used to destroy any theoretical opposition. In 
order to maintain their power base and ensure that the "theory" of Marxist- 
Leninism went unquestioned the Comintern embarked on the task of destroying 
the remainder of Marxist theory within the Comintern. The Theses of the Fifth 
208 V. I. Lenin, "What is to be Done? " Collected Works, 48 vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1961)5: 369. 
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Plenum attacked what it referred to as "theoretical mistakes, " particularly those 
of Luxemburg, Trotsky, and the Dutch Marxists - Gorter and Pannekoek. 
209 
Unlike Luxemburg and Trotsky, Gorter and Pannekoek ceased to be perceived 
as great threats and, therefore, were named but not systematically attacked in 
the same way. They were charged with their attempts to apply Marxism to the 
66 new epoch" but it claimed, unsuccessfully. 
In the Soviet Union, Trotsky was the greatest victim of the Fifth Plenum. 
Unlike Luxemburg, Trotsky had not yet died a martyr's death and was openly 
and viciously attacked. Many viewed him as the most natural to succeed Lenin, 
therefore, the Triumvirate perceived him as their main threat. Hence, a 
campaign was developed to rid the Comintem of his supporters . 
210 The term 
"Trotskyism, " was coined by Zinoviev and served a dual purpose - it destroyed 
support for Trotsky and disassociated him from Lenin. The creation of 
"Trotskyism" served a similar purpose as that of "Leninism" it helped remove 
the man from the ism. Trotsky was the Commissar of the Red Army during the 
209 During the spring and summer of 1925 a group of young communists, led by Ruth Fischer 
and Arkadi Maslow, led an offensive against the remnants of Social Democracy and 
Luxemburgism in the Communist Party under the banner of Bolshevisation. The main victim of 
this offensive was Rosa Luxemburg and her theories. The main targets were the old Spartacists, 
who still remained loyal to Luxemburg's ideas, and were considered the right wing of the party. 
The attacks were strategically played out. The Spartacists, who were former members of the 
SPD prior to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, could not claim loyalty to Bolshevism during 
this period. In fact, no one in Germany really could, as the Bolshevik party was a relatively 
unimportant party in Europe. It only placed itself on the revolutionary map with its seizure of 
power in 1917. Luxemburgism not only became a political weapon against the opponents of 
Soviet hegemony but also irrevocably changed the nature of the German Communist Party 
politics. Any opposition had to be stamped out. Therefore, Luxemburg, as a critic of Lenin, had 
to be purged into insignificance. JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966) 2: 797-805. 
210 Throughout 1925 Trotsky was viciously attacked in the Comintern press. The Comintern 
went to great pains to demonstrate Trotsky's deviations away from Lenin as well as his 
isolation. He was accused of trying to replace the ideology of Russia with "Trotskyism" and 
then proceeded to attack this so called ideology. Trotsky's supporters were not allowed to come 
to his defence, thus giving the impression that he was indeed completely isolated. "Decision of 
the Central Committee of the C. P. of Russia Regarding the Attitude of Comrade Trotsky, " 
International Press Correspondence 5.7 (1925): 65; "Frotsky Completely Isolated in the C. P. of 
Russia and the Communist International, " International Press Correspondence 5.7 (1925): 74- 
75; also see Leon Trotsky, My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography (1971; Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) 535-536. 
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Civil War and had developed a reputation inside the Soviet Union as well as 
abroad. Somehow this image of the war hero had to be destroyed. Trotsky was 
no longer associated with revolutionary theory and collaboration with Lenin but 
rather he was associated with "Trotskyism, " which the Fifth Plenum deemed as 
an especially dangerous deviation from Leninism. The Statues insisted that if 
the legacy of Lenin were to live on then Trotsky and any influence he wielded 
had to be destroyed. 
"Trotskyism is not an isolated deviation towards menshevism, 
but a yearlong system of struggle against Leninism. Nor is 
Trotskyism a purely Russian phenomenon; it is international 
in character. To achieve Leninism in the Comintem means to 
expose Trotskyism in all parties and to liquidate it as a 
tendency. "211 
In reality the attacks on "Trotskyisa' had nothing to do with protecting the 
legacy of Lenin. Fuelled by an extremely destructive battle for power, 
"Trotskyism" served one purpose - to isolate and destroy any influence held by 
Trotsky inside the Soviet Union and in the Comintern's parties. The Statutes of 
the Fifth Plenum not only served to isolate those who might favour Trotsky over 
the Triumvirate but also acted as an excuse for purging. Any opposition to the 
Triumvirate could be perceived as a Trotskyism, the worst form was deviation 
from Leninism. 
The campaign against Trotsky was successful. He was expelled from the 
Russian Communist Party in 1927 and sent into exile. In effect, the 
211 "The Theses on the Bolshevization of Communist Parties Adopted at the Fifth ECCI 
Plenum, " The Communist International 1919-1943 - Documents, ed. Jane Degras, 3 vols. 
(London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1971) 2: 192. 
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consequences of the Bolshevisation were devastating to the Russian 
revolutionary movement, as well as the European revolutionary movement. 
Shortly after his death, the theoretical model that Lenin had dedicated his life to 
create was manipulated into a weapon used to build the foundations of a 
dictatorship that was completely alienated from Lenin's "dictatorship of the 
proletariat. " The open forum for debate, which the Marxist revolutionary 
parties had always enjoyed, slowly withered away. Theory ceased to be the 
driving force of the revolutionary movement. Rather than being developed 
from within the Comintern's parties, theory was dictated from the Comintern 
down to the national parties. The party was no longer a group of professional 
revolutionaries who had armed themselves with theory and hoped to guide the 
masses. It became a bureaucratic machine that received orders from Moscow 
and passed down them down to the rank and file. 
Consequences of Bolshevisation on the KPD 
The catastrophic outcome of the failed German uprising in 1923 and Lenin's 
death marked a dramatic change in tactics for the Soviet Union and the 
Comintern. The failed revolution of 1923 was a disappointing reality check for 
the Soviets. It became clear that a German revolution was not forthcoming. 
The failed revolution and Lenin's death forced the Soviets to become inward 
looking and they began the arduous task of the rebuilding the Soviet Union. By 
1924 the world economic situation had stabilised and revolutionary prospects 
were morose. 
In Germany the acceptance of the Dawes Plan led to an influx of foreign 
capital resulted in an economic uptum. It was during this period of "relative 
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stabilisation" that the course and theories adopted by the movement no longer 
came from within movement but were dictated from the top down by the 
Comintern. Although Lenin's Policy of Uniformity was misguided, it strove to 
drive the revolution forward. Bolshevisation on the other hand was not intended 
to push the revolution forward but rather it served to contain and control the 
Comintern's parties. In Germany, Bolshevisation was used to divide and rule 
the movement, however the true death blow was wielded from within the KPD 
leadership and when their deeds were done the Comintem turned against them. 
This section will discuss the way in which the Comintern and the German 
Left destroyed the KPD's theoretical traditions through their assaults against 
"Luxemburgism" and the Right. During an extremely transitional period the 
German Left not only laid the foundations for the Stalinisation of the German 
Party, but also inadvertently created the environment for Social Fascism to 
develop. 
First, Rosa Luxemburg remained an important feature of German 
Communist politics. In 1921 Lenin introduced his Policy of Uniformity in an 
attempt to forcibly change the course that the KPD and push the revolution 
forward. Lenin's policy may not have taken into consideration the KPD's 
theoretical traditions but it did not attempt to destroy them. To the old 
Spartacists, who were critical of outside interference, the Bolshevik's meddling 
came as shock. However, the damage to the German movement caused by 
Lenin's Policy of Uniformity was superficial compared to the destruction 
caused by Bolshevisation. During Lenin's lifetime, the Bolsheviks were never 
in a position to truly control the theory or political practice of the KPD without 
support and assistance from the rank and file. But this is not to say that 
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opponents to Bolshevik domination did not exist. Indeed, old Spartacists 
members remained within the movement, albeit, increasingly marginalized. For 
the old Spartacists the choice was clear - they chose Luxemburg over Lenin. 
212 
For them, her theories represented the German situation while her polemics with 
Lenin highlighted their unique importance and were indicative of a time when 
open debates were encouraged in the Socialist movement. 
213 
After her death, Luxemburg, as a figure, remained popular, particularly 
amongst the youth movement. For the youth, Luxemburg represented a hero 
that died for their cause. 214 Lenin was aware of the importance, as well as the 
fragile nature, of his relationship with the German Communists. He was 
sensible enough to realise that regardless of his differences with Luxemburg, 
212 Herman Weber, Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD 
in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 
89. 
213 Although Lenin disagreed with Luxemburg on many points, he had great respect for her and 
remained friendly with her until the end of her life. Lenin did not suffer fools, therefore, it is 
clear from his behaviour before and after her death that he viewed her as his intellectual equal 
rather than as his subordinate. Lenin was deeply saddened by the news of Luxemburg's death 
and rose to her defence when he felt her name had been misused. In response to Levi's 
publication of Russian Revolution Lenin insisted, "in spite of her mistakes she was - and 
remains for us - an eagle. And not only will Communists all over the world cherish her 
memory, but her biography and her complete works ... will serve as useful manuals for training 
many generations of Communists all over the world. " Based on Lenin's Notes, it is abundantly 
clear that he would not have approved of the assault on Luxemburgism. V. I. Lenin, "Notes 
from a Publicist, " Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. Mary Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder 
Press, 1970) 440; JP Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 
2: 794-796. 
214 This idolisation of Luxemburg and Liebknecht was particularly strong in the Communist 
Youth League, which was instrumental in developing the LLL (Lenin-Liebknecht-Luxemburg). 
Annual rallies were held in January to honour the murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht in 
1919. Lenin was included after his death in 1924. The festivals continued throughout the 
Weimar period and were endorsed by the KPD Central Committee. Weitz pointed out that the 
listing of the names was not only alphabetical but also signified each leader's importance in the 
movement. "Prepare for the Commemoration Day of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, " 
International Press Correspondence 4.1 (1924); Eric D. Weitz, Creatiniz German Communism 
1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1997) 180-185; Eric D. Weitz, " 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German Communism and 
the Luxemburg Legacy, " Central European History 27.1 (1994): 47-48; "Anweisung des 
Zentralkomitees zur Durchfiffirung der LLL-Kampagne, " SAMEPO RY 1/12/5/21 FBS 
241/11373; also see Victor Serge, "The Anniversary of 15 January: Karl Liebknecht and Rosa 
Luxemburg, " Witness to the German Revolution: Writings from Germany 1923, trans. Ian 
Birchall (London: Redwords, 2000) 19-24. 
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once she became a martyr, any posthumous attack on her theories could 
potentially backfire. 
Second, the KPD was the most important (and strongest) party in the 
Comintern outside of the Soviet Union. Unlike other smaller and weaker 
parties, the Comintern could not send its agents to take over the party. 
Therefore any successful assault against the Right wing, Luxemburg, and her 
theories could only come from inside the German movement. 215 Brandler's 
failure to carry out a successful revolution in 1923 not only led to his demise, 
but coupled with political and economic stabilisation in Gennany, inadvertently 
created the right conditions for the rise of the Left, led by Ruth Fischer and 
Arkadij Maslow. 216 The rise of the Left and the introduction of Bolshevisation 
marked a watershed in the relationship between revolutionary theory and 
political practice in the German Communist Party. 217 Neither Maslow nor 
21 5 Ruth Fischer's book blamed the Soviet Union and in particular Stalin. She insisted that 
Manuilsky was sent to Germany to manipulate and prevent the party from forming a united 
opposition to Moscow. He supported the Left bid for power against the Right and then the Right 
against the Left. Fischer claimed he manipulated KPD politics with promises of Soviet support 
pitting the Right and Left against one another in an effort to gain supremacy over the KPD. 
Fischer asserted, "If the party could no longer be manipulated, then its integration into a 
stronger form could only be opposed by the manipulator. His job was clear: by some means to 
prevent the integration of the three principal factions of the German party into one working 
unit. " However, it is clear from the vicious method in which the attacks against the Right were 
carried out that the Left were not eager to unite the various factions in Germany. Ruth Fischer, 
Stalin and German Communism: A Study of the Origins of the State Earty (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1948) 441-443. 
216 In fact, Rosa Levin6-Meyer asserted that it was the Left leadership that had devised the term 
"bolshevisation" and had begun using the term in their propaganda prior to the Fifth Plenum. 
She claimed that they were years ahead of the Russians in ruling by fear and intimidation. 
According to Weber the Left took over Bolshevisation as their main slogan from the Comintern. 
Rosa Levin6-Meyer, Inside German Communism: Memoirs of Party Life in the Weimar 
Republic (London: Pluto Press Ltd., 1977) 68; Herman Weber, Die Wandung Des Deutschen 
Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am 
Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 85. 
217 It is interesting that Ruth Fischer's book did not mention her role in the Bolshevisation 
process. She discussed the Fifth Congress and its fight against Trotskyism, but did not discuss 
the Bolshevisation of the German party. Weber was very critical of Fischer's account because 
of her failure to discuss her role as leader during Bolshevisation. See Ruth Fischer, Stalin and 
German Communism: A Study of the Origins of the State Party (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1948) 401-405; Herman Weber, Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: 
Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 85; see Siegfried Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' Deutschland 
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Fischer had any theoretical training and did not comprehend the vital 
relationship between revolutionary theory and political practice. While Maslow 
and Fischer were not Stalinists, they happily employed Bolshevisation as a 
means to rid the KPD of the Right and Centre wings. They were not concerned 
with the theoretical ramifications of Bolshevisation. Where previous 
leaderships had been cautious regarding Russian interference, the Left 
leadership welcomed Bolshevisation. 218 They were hostile to what they 
perceived as the theoretical "remnants" of Social Democracy. Rather than 
celebrate the party's theoretical past the Left blamed the past for the party's 
failings: 
"Our progress towards Bolshevisation is difficult not only 
because of the objective situation in Germany, but also 
because of our party's past makes it particularly difficult to 
deal with the Party questions now before us. I am convinced 
that with the help of the decisions of the Executive and with 
the help of our comrades ... 
in the struggle against the right 
elements we will yet come to truly Bolshevik tactics in 
Germany. " 219 
The attacks launched by Maslow and Fischer struck at the very heart of the 
KPD's theory and attempted to destroy it. No elements of the KPD's past were 
sacred. 
zur Geschichte eines Politischen Begriffs, " International Review of Social History 10.2 (1965): 
225-228. 
218 In her speech to Fischer stated, "we welcome the chapter of the Bolshevisation theses on 
Luxemburgism as peculiarly applicable to the CPG. " Ruth Fischer, "Meeting of the Enlarged 
Executive, Third Session, " International Press Correspondence 5.31 (1925): 407. 
219 Ruth Fischer, "Meeting of the Enlarged Executive, Twelfth Session, " International Press 
Correspondence 5.37 (1925): 495. 
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"We must take the good points of the Social Democrats into 
consideration, and the revolutionary tradition of the Spartacus 
League trebly so. But that must not prevent us from 
,, 220 destroying certain holy legends [ie Rosa Luxemburg]. 
They were willing to destroy the KPD's past with their assaults against 
Luxemburg's theories to consolidate their own power. Maslow and Fischer did 
not comprehend that it was the KPD's rich historical past and its long tradition 
of opposition, which revolved around Rosa Luxemburg that allowed the KPD 
not only to flourish but to exist in the first place. Having no theoretical 
traditions of their own Maslow and Fischer created no concrete alternatives to 
replace the SPD's "remnants" or Luxemburg's theories. 
The relationship between theory and political practice, one that Lenin and 
Luxemburg worked hard to build, ceased to command great importance in the 
party. The attacks against oppositional theory in the KPD were acceptable to 
the Comintern who had begun their own assaults against the Trotskyist 
opposition. At first, the Comintern treaded carefully in their attacks against 
Rosa Luxemburg and allowed the brunt of the assaults to come from the KPD 
leadership. In early 1925 Luxemburg was still valued as a theoretician and even 
appeared on the "syllabus for elementary party courses" under the section 
"theory of revolution. ), 221 In fact, Zinoviev wrote an article in January 1925 
regarding the Bolshevisation of the Comintern's parties and did not even 
mention Luxemburg. The only past errors that Zinoviev cited, were in reference 
220 Ruth Fischer, "Meeting of the Enlarged Executive, Third Session, " International Press 
Correspondence 5.31 (1925): 407. 
221 ironically the piece that appeared on the party reading list was her pamphlet on mass strikes. 
Bela Kun, "Explanatory Remarks Re Syllabus of Elementary Party Courses, " International Press 
Correspondence 5.5 (1925): 50. 
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to Brandler. 222 The Comintern observed the proceedings in Gennany before 
they added fuel to the fire. The Comintern used subtle tactics to undennine the 
Right's support for Luxemburg's theories. The Left believed that the 
Comintern favoured their leadership over the Right. 223 The Comintern 
demonstrated their support for the Left's assaults by including specific sections 
targeted against Luxemburg in the Theses and Resolutions adopted at the Fifth 
Plenum of the Comintern. Unlike Trotsky, the Comintern did not attack 
Luxemburg as a traitor or deviator but rather as "mistaken" and "erroneous. ") 
"Among the most important Luxemburgist errors of real 
importance at this present time, are: 
(a) The unbolshevik treatment of the question of 'spontaneity' 
and 'consciousness', of 'organization' and 'the masses'. Their 
false ideas on this question ... prevented them 
from appraising 
correctly the role of the party in the revolution.... 
(b) The underestimation of the technical factor in preparing 
insurrections was, and is in part today, an obstacle to the 
correct treatment of the question of 'organizing' the revolution 
(c) The error in the question of attitude towards the 
peasantry. ). )224 
The Comintern and the German Left used Bolshevisation as a weapon to 
marginalize the theoretical opposition and secure their own positions. The 
Comintern claimed that the German party's tendency to hold on to its 
222 G. Zinoviev, "The Bolshevising of the Parties of the Communist International, " International 
Press Correspondence 5.7 (1925): 63-65. 
223 At the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Russian Party held on October 10, 
1925 Zinoviev insisted that the Comintern had its reservations about the Maslow-Fischer group 
but supported them because they "had no choice. " G. Zinoviev, "The Situation in the German 
Communist Party, " International Press Correspondence 5.79 (11925): 1203-1205. 
224 "The Theses on the Bolshevization of Communist Parties Adopted at the Fifth ECCI 
Plenum, " The Communist International 1919-1943 - Documents, ed. Jane Degras, 3 vols. 
(London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1971) 2: 19 1. 
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"Luxmeburgist" past hindered the process of Bolshevisation. The Comintern 
regarded Lenin as an infallible god and claimed that only his path was the true 
path to a glorious Communist future. The Comintern attempted to devalue 
Luxemburg's contribution to German Marxism and only revered "Leninism. " 
In reality, Bolshevisation and the attacks on the KPD's hero, Rosa Luxemburg, 
were only possible with the approval of the KPD Left leadership. Maslow and 
Fischer's arrogance and ignorance of theory prevented them from seeing the 
damage they were causing to the movement. 
Third, Bolshevisation was not only used to destroy the KPDs theoretical 
traditions but also it targeted Luxemburg's supporters - the Right and Centre 
wings of the KPD. 225 Both Right and Centre claimed to carry forward the 
legacy of Rosa Luxemburg and were cautious over Soviet dominance. 226 The 
Left utilised their support from the Comintern and used the KPD's Social 
Democratic past to destroy their opposition. Prior to 1923 the Right wing of the 
party played an influential role determining party practice and, in the spirit of 
Rosa Luxemburg, they were apprehensive of role played by the Soviet Union in 
KPD affairs. The Comintern clearly found their resistance threatening. In an 
effort to consolidate their control over the KPD the Right needed to be 
marginalized. After 1923 the Right were blamed for Brandler's failure as 
neither the Left nor the Comintem made a distinction between Right and 
225 Aside from the theoretical differences, the main difference between the Right and Left was 
their attitude toward the treatment of SPD workers. The Right wanted to lure the SPD workers 
toward the cause of Communism, while the Left treated them as enemies. From 1924 onward, 
KPD policy toward SPD workers fluctuated between these two attitudes. 
226 Clara Zetkin attempted to protest over the tendency in the KPD to refer to all the old 
Spartakus as "Right" and accused the Central Committee of not having fought enough against 
this tendency. Clearly, Zetkin did not see how the creation of factions benefited the Comintern. 
It was not in their interests to have a strong unified party in Germany who possessed their own 
theoretical traditions. For the Comintern, a divided party was much easier to control. Clara 
Zetkin, "Meeting of the Enlarged Executive, Sixth Session, " International Press Correspondence 
5.32 (1925): 423. 
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Centre. 227 Brandler was, in fact, a Centrist, however, Luxemburg was blamed 
for his leadership and his failed revolutionary efforts in 1923. Fischer claimed, 
"The Brandlerist deviations are the legitimate offspring of Luxemburgism. ). )228 
These attacks against the Right and "Luxemburgism" were not merely an 
attempt to rid the party of opposition but they were aimed at the historical 
traditions of the movement. Thus, the destruction of the KPD's theoretical 
traditions, and the bearers of those traditions, made the movement easier to 
control and manipulate. 
Bolshevisation had a tremendous impact on the German Communist 
movement. It represented forcible change in the political practice of the parties 
conduct. It began a new trend in Communist movements all over the world, one 
in which "divide and conquer" were used to maintain control. Zinoviev 
claimed, 
"bolshevising of the Parties of the Comintern is the 
making use of the experiences of the Bolshevik Party in the 
three Russian Revolutions (as well as the experiences of the 
best sections of the Comintern), and in applying them to the 
concrete situation of each particular country. " 229 
This clearly was not the case. The actual practice of the process of 
Bolshevisation made it quite clear that the unique situation of each country was 
of no importance. When a party strayed from the course set by the Comintern, 
they were viciously attacked. Although the Comintem appeared to support the 
227 In their expulsion proceedings, Brandler and Thalheimer were referred to as "the leaders of 
the German Right. " "Resolution passed by the Tenth Party Congress of the C. P. of Germany on 
the Work of the Communist International, " International Press Correspondence 5.62 (1925): 
862. 
228 Ruth Fischer, "Meeting of the Enlarged Executive, Third Session, " International Press 
Correspondence 5.31 (1925): 407. 
229G. Zinoviev, "The Bolshevising of the Parties of the Communist International, " International 
Press Correspondence 5.7 (1925): 64. 
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Left bid for power, the Comintem Executive wasted no time in launching 
attacks against Fischer and Maslow. 
The Fischer - Maslow victory was short-lived. By September 1925 the 
Left's dominance of the KPD had come to an end. The Comintern Executive 
accused Fischer and Maslow of "sabotage" and "social democratic deviations" 
when they failed to carry out Comintern policy. 230 The attacks that the Fischer- 
Maslow group used to topple the Right and Centre were turned against their 
creators to destroy them. The Left used the KPD's Social Democratic past to 
destroy those that stood in its path to power and the Comintern used these very 
231 
same arguments to rid itself of the Left leadership. By adopting the policy of 
Bolshevisation the KPD Left leadership under Fischer and Maslow 
unknowingly assisted the Comintern in removing the opposition and weakened 
the party so that it became much easier to control from the outside. Maslow and 
Fischer's acceptance of Bolshevisation and their attacks on the Right wing made 
the Stalinisation of the KPD possible. 
By December 1925, Zinoviev had been defeated at the 14'h Congress of the 
CPSU, which led to a change in policy in the Comintern. Fischer's opponents, 
encouraged by the Comintern, launched a bitter assault. Maslow was eventually 
arrested and imprisoned by the German State, as a dangerous Communist and 
Fischer was recalled to Moscow where she remained under house arrest until 
230 4cLetter ftom the E. C. C. I. to all Organisations and Members of the Communist Party of 
Germany, " International Press Correspondence 5.69 (1925): 1016-1018; "E. C. C. I. Letter to all 
Organisations and Members of the C. P. G., " The Communist International 14 (1925): 66-74. 
231 In the party press Maslow and Fischer and their supporters were accused of being 
66effoneous, " "Right Deviators, " "Trotskyists, " "renegades, " and "Social Democratic Deviators. " 
For example see "Zu dem Protest vorn Ruth Fischer, Maslow, Urbahns, Scholern und Schwan 
gegen ihren AusschluB an die Erweiterte Executive, " Die Internationale 9.24 (1926): 761-762; 
Ernst Schneller, "The End of the Maslow-Fischer Opposition, " International Press 
Correspondence 8.29 (1928): 529-530; Ernst Schneller, "rhe Ultra-Left Party as Aiders and 
Abettors of the Reformists in the German Elections, " International Press Correspondence 8.29 
(1928): 546-547. 
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her expulsion. By 1926 Stalin had consolidated his power in the Soviet Union 
and Maslow and Fischer had been ousted from their positions in the KPD. They 
were replaced with someone loyal and obedient to the Stalin, Ernest Thdlmann. 
The LeRacy of Luxemburgism 
By 1926 Rosa Luxemburg had been rehabilitated. But by then the damage 
had been done and she no longer appeared threatening. A division had been set 
up to create a distinction between Rosa Luxemburg the person - Spartacist 
martyr and misguided thinker and Luxemburgism - the false "system" which 
was against "Leninism. " Rosa Luxemburg the martyr was good while her ideas 
and Luxemburgism were bad. Her alleged crimes, particularly her 
disagreements with Lenin, were considered "mistakes [which] towards the end 
of her life [she] began to understand and correct. )5,232 The official Communist 
line claimed that if she had lived she would have seen the error of her ways and 
gone over to the side of the Bolsheviks. Martinov's articles brilliantly manage 
to separate the woman from the system. The Comintern found Luxemburg as a 
symbol difficult to defeat. 233 As result they paid homage to her contributions 
while at the same time they emphasised her "mistakes. " 
"If Rosa Luxemburg and the 'left radicals' had completely 
assimilated the lessons of Leninism at that time, the birth 
pangs of the German Communist Party would undoubtedly 
have been greatly alleviated.... None the less, at that time the 
positive services of Luxemburgism in the German situation 
232 A. Martinov, "Lenin, Luxemburg, Liebknecht" The Communist International 10.3-4 (1933): 
141. 
233 Eric D. Weitz, - 'Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us! ' German Communism and the 
Luxemburg Legacy, " Central European HistoEy 27.1 (1994): 56; Fred Oelfter, Rosa 
Luxemburg: Eine Kritische Biographische Skizze (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1952) 211-217. 
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outweighed its negative aspects, its errors, to an enormous 
degree. Consequently Rosa Luxemburg's historical service is 
enormous, and she, perishing heroically after the Spartacus 
rising, has passed into history with an extraordinarily large 
active balance to her credit. , 
234 
Rosa Luxemburg was no longer a great enemy of "Leninism. " She was, 
however, a poor leader because she had not utilised the lessons placed in front 
of her by Lenin and indeed had the audacity to disagree with him. 
The vacillation between Rosa Luxemburg the hero and the misguided 
leader who was erroneous is quite interesting. 235 Unable to directly destroy 
Luxemburg as a symbol in German Communism, the Comintern had to 
manipulate the KPD's members' image of her. Rosa Luxemburg had not 
committed any great crimes, with the exception of disagreeing with Lenin on 
nearly every topic, so in the Stalinist tradition, crimes had to be invented. 
Despite her great service to Communism, according to Martinov, she was a 
semi-Menshevik who did not understand Marxism. 236 
234 A. Martinov, "Luxemburg to Lenin or Luxemburg to Kautsky? " The Communist 
International 6.7 (1929): 214. 
235 KPD training material described Luxemburg's "erroneous" view on party organisation. The 
pamphlet's section "Rosa Luxemburg's view on the Organisation question, " uses a quote to 
describe her position. The section claimed to be from "an article in Der Neuen Zeit, but does 
not give the title. Although Luxemburg was rehabilitated in 1926, her position on party 
organization was continually attacked in Comintern literature. For example, KPI) training 
material described Luxemburg's "erroneous" view on party organisation. It described her sharp 
opposition to Lenin and described her "mistaken" attitude to the role of party leaders and her 
analysis of opportunism. Kursusmaterial iffier Organisationsfragen der KPD - Mai 1929 3-4. 
SANTO FBS 248/11598, RY 1/12 n07199; also see D. Manuilsky, "Bolsheviation of the 
Parties, " The Communist International 10 (1925): 59. 
236 Despite her apparently great contribution to German Communism she was reinvented as a 
semi-Menshevik. Stalin claimed that she and Parvus developed the theory of permanent 
revolution, not Trotsky. "They [Parvus and Luxemburg] invented a Utopian and semi- 
Menshvist scheme of the permanent revolution (a monstrous distortion of the Marxian scheme 
of revolution. " Joseph, Stalin, "Some Questions Regarding the History of Bolshevism, " The 
Communist International 8.20 (1931): 666; also see Schneller, "Voin Trotzismus in der 
deutschen kommunistischen Bewegung, " Die Internationale 8.3 (1925): 128; Herman Weber, 
Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
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"All the semi-Menshevik mistakes of Rosa Luxemburg arose 
methodologically out of her one main mistake - out of her 
mechanical understanding of Marxism, and submission to the 
spontaneity of the historical process.... Not having 
understood Marx, Rosa Luxemburg raked among the historic 
archive and found the "third persons" theory of the Populists 
long since rejected by Russian Marxists.... Lenin ... criticised 
her in a friendly way, trying to give her support with his 
criticism; to try to assist her to rectify her line and take the 
genuine Marxist road. ý, 237 
Martinov's infantilisation of Luxemburg's capacity as a thinker no doubt served 
to undermine her followers. If she did not understand Marxism, how could she 
be taken seriously as an opponent of Lenin? She could not. Luxemburg had 
been reduced. No longer was she Lenins intellectual equal, but merely a pet 
project - someone he seemed to have taken pity on and hoped to lead to the 
"correct path. " The efforts of the Comintern were partially successftil. 
Although her memory as a martyred leader lived on, her memory as a theorist 
was buried. The Stalinist never attacked her theories head on. For this might 
open the door to formal discussions regarding her criticisms, particularly her 
warnings about Bolshevik methods potentially leading to suppression. She was 
attacked, for something she had never done nor intended to do, follow Lenin. In 
this way her distorted memory lived on and she once again re-emerged as a 
symbol of opposition to the GDR. And this is the legacy of Luxemburgism. 
The distortion of one's work until it is utterly unrecognisable. 
Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 96-97; Pierre 
Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 842-843. 237 A. Martinov, "Lenin, Luxemburg, Liebknecht" The Communist International 10.3-4 (1933): 
140,141-142. 
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The Consequences of a New Doctrine 
"Everything has changed. 
The aims: from international social revolution to socialism in one country. 
The political system: from the workers' democracy of the soviets, the goal of 
the revolution, to the dictatorship of the general secretariat, the functionaries 
and the GPU. 
The party: from the organizations, free in its life and thought andfreely 
submitting to discipline, of revolutionary Marxists to hierarchy of bureaus, to 
passive obedience of careerists. 
The Third International: from a mighty organization ofpropaganda and 
struggle to the opportunist servility of Central Committeesfor the purpose of 
approving everything, without shame or nausea. 
() The Stalinist bureaucracy no longer pursues the policies of the working 
class but its own policies. This is the inner significance of its acts. , 238 
In the few years following the death of Lenin the power struggle inside the 
CPSU changed the face of the international revolutionary movement as the 
conflict spilled over into the Comintern. The campaigns against Luxemburgism 
and Trotskyism provided effective weapons for ridding the Comintern's parties 
of members who might question Soviet authority, while Socialism in One 
Country provided the theoretical rationale for the witch-hunts. The alliances in 
the CPSU were riddled with shifts and tums that affected the policies of the 
CPSU and the Comintern; however, Socialism in One Country remained a 
fixture throughout. 239 Socialism in One Country, although not immediately 
238 Victor Serge, From Lenin to Stalin (1937; New York: Monad Press, 1973) 57,61. 
239 This is not to say that Socialism in One Country did not have its opponents. It certainly did. 
Trotsky was, obviously, opposed to Socialism in One Country as it was developed in direct 
opposition to his theory of Permanent Revolution. Trotsky openly attacked it as impossible. He 
argued that it was utopian and that the Marxist position held that economic systems (i. e. 
capitalism) were not limited by national boundaries; therefore, any system replacing it could not 
be limited by national boundaries. "The theory of Socialism in One Country [is] a reactionary 
theory because it is irreconcilably opposed not only to the fundamental tendency of development 
of the productive forces but also to the material results which have already been attained by this 
development. The productive forces are incompatible with national boundaries. " Deutscher 
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apparent, marked a tremendous shift in the world's revolutionary movements. It 
declared that Socialism was possible without world revolution. This ran counter 
to everything Lenin and the old Bolsheviks had claimed prior to this stage. If 
world revolution was no longer absolutely necessary for the survival of the 
Soviet Union, then what was the purpose of the Comintern? The Comintern - an 
organ committed to encouraging and propagating world revolution - had to be 
changed as well. The new mission of the Comintern was to enforce the 
subservient and subordinate role of its member parties. The new purpose of the 
member parties was no longer to rise up in revolution but to protect the Soviet 
Union. Although Socialism in One Country was used to rationalise the 
rebuilding of Russia, it ran counter to the international nature of Marxist 
revolutionary movements. The theory of Socialism in One Country opened the 
door to the proclamation of the "Third Period" and the repressive statutes 
adopted at the Sixth Congress in 1928. 
This section will discuss Socialism in One Country and how this new theory 
paved the way for the emergence of the "Third Period" of the Comintern, which 
eventually led to the adoption of the theory of Social Fascism. 
claimed that the first signs of the break up of the Triumvirate, which began to appear in April 
1925, were due to Socialism in One Country. Stalin wished to include the theory of Socialism 
in One Country in the resolutions to the upcoming party conference. Kamenev and Zinoviev 
objected on the grounds that Socialism in One Country was anti-Marxist and anti-Lenin. 
However, they did not wish to scandalise the party by showing their disunity in public and did 
not voice their opinions publicly. Carr, on the other hand, asserted that Deutscher's claim is 
false. According to Carr, Zinoviev and Kamenev raised no strong objections and were, in fact, 
indifferent to the whole matter. Leon Trotsky, "The Draft Programme of the Communist 
International, " The Third International After Lenin (London: New Park Publications, Ltd., 
1974) 40; Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed - Trotsky: 1921 - 1929,3 vols. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1965) 2: 241 - 242,245-246; E. H. Carr, The Russian Revolution: From Lenin 
to Stalin (1917 - 19 9) (Basingstokes: Palgrave, 1979) 75. 
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Socialism in One Country 
Up to 1923 all Marxist believed that a world revolution was the only road to 
Socialism. However, the period of "relative stabilisation" and Lenin's death 
altered the CPSU and the Comintern's commitment to world revolution. As the 
CPSU became embroiled in a struggle for power, it became inward looking. 
Revolutionary theory was replaced by the doctrine of Socialism in One Country. 
Socialism in One country marked a crucial turning point in the Comintern. 
Although Socialism in One Country claimed to carry on the revolutionary 
legacy of Lenin, it in fact removed the international character of the 
revolutionary struggle, and thereby, ceased to be Marxist. 
First, Socialism in One Country allowed the Soviet Union to become inward 
looking. It was originally developed in relation to Bucharin's New Economic 
Policy (NEP) . 
240 The Soviets were forced into a contradictory position whereby 
they needed to refocus their attention internally - on rebuilding the Soviet 
economy. NEP was developed in 1921 to stimulate economic growth and 
emphasis was placed on the Soviet Union in a transitory period as it "grew into 
Socialism. " The prospects of world revolution became ambiguous as Europe 
moved into its period of "relative stabilisation. " The Soviet Union, therefore, 
needed to justify its cooperation with capitalist countries and its shift towards 
240 The theory behind Socialism in One Country was actually developed by Bucharin, not Stalin, 
although Socialism in One Country is most notably associated with Stalin and Stalinism. Day 
insisted that it was Bucharin's elimination of dialectics from the theory of NEP as a means of 
securing internal change during the period of stabilisation that precipitated Stalin's formulation 
of Socialism in One Country. Stephen Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A 
Political Biogjaphy 1888 - 1938 (London: Wildwood House, 1974) 187-188; Stephen Cohen, 
"Bolshevism and Stalinism, " Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York: Norton, 1977) 22; Richard B. Day, "The New Leviathan: Bukharin's 
Contribution to the Theory of the State and the Transition to Socialism, " N. I. Bukharin: 
Selected Writings on the State and the Transition to Socialism, ed. Richard B. Day (Armonk: 
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982) x1viii, 1; also see Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed: What is the 
Soviet Union and Where is it Going?, trans. Max Eastman (London: Faber and Faber, Limited, 
1937)277. 
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the market. It was not only the Right that accepted Socialism in One Country 
but also CPSU party members. 241 Socialism in One Country took on a 
nationalist context. It reawakened national pride, which had been buried under 
the burden of awaiting an international revolution. It appeared positive and 
removed the Soviet Union's dependence on other countries for its own survival. 
It offered a sense of hopefulness during the "period of stab il isation") - even 
though international revolutionary situation had stagnated the Soviet Union 
could still be successful. 
Second, Socialism in One Country based itself on the "law of uneven 
development. " The idea was that as capitalism developed unevenly, revolution 
would also take place unevenly. Once revolution took place in one country, it 
would exploit the contradictions within the capitalist system to maintain itself 
and build socialism. 
"Uneven economic and political development is an absolute 
law of capitalism. This unevenness is still more pronounced 
and acute in the epoch of imperialism. Hence it follows that a 
single event occurring simultaneously all over the world; at 
first Socialism may be victorious in a few, or even one single 
capitalist country. " 242 
241 It also can not be neglected that Socialism in One Country did have some support from 
within the Soviet Union and the doctrine began to have an impact during the summer of 1925. 
At first Socialism in One Country had the same appeal as NEP and Carr described it as the 
"legitimate successor of NEP. However, after 1925 it came to mean the opposite of NEP. E. H. 
Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: Socialism in One Coungy 1924 - 1926,3 vols. (London: 
Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964) 2: 47-49; also see Leon Trotsky, The Challenge of the Left 
Opposition (1928-1929), eds. Naomi Allen and George Saunders (New York: Pathfinder Press, 
1981)32. 
242 Following the defeat of the "Trotskyist" Socialism in One Country became the official 
doctrine of the Comintern. Hence, its appearance in the 1928 Comintern programme written by 
Bucharin. Bucharin, "The Programme of the Communist International (Adopted by the VI 
World Congress on I" September 1928, Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 
(1928): 1756. 
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However, Bucharins use of "uneven development" was flawed. It was meant 
to solve all theoretical difficulties. If capitalism developed unevenly then 
Socialism could also develop unevenly. However, Bucharin simply omitted the 
fact that "uneven development" was one of the causes of the general crisis of 
capitalism. It led to instability and wars. Trotsky attacked the "law of uneven 
development" that appeared in the "Draft Programme of the Comintern" in 
1928. Trotsky described the impossibility and the contradictions of the 
doctrine: 
"From the uneven sporadic development of capitalism flows 
the non- simultaneous, uneven and sporadic character of the 
socialist revolution; from the extreme tensity of the 
interdependence of the various countries upon each other 
flows not only the political but also the economic 
impossibility of building socialism in one country. [ ... I It is 
precisely this proposition which excludes, rejects, and sweeps 
away a priori the theory of socialism in one country as a 
reactionary theory because it is irreconcilably opposed not 
only to the fundamental tendency of the development of the 
productive forces but also to the material results which have 
already been attained by this development , 243 
The use of "uneven development" placed Socialism in One Country in a neutral 
position. It did not invalidate Marx's thesis about the worldwide character of 
243 Leon Trotsky, "The Draft Programme of the Communist International -A Criticism of 
Fundamentals, " The Third International After Lenin (1928; London: New Park Publications, 
Ltd., 1974) 40. 
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the revolution and nor did it validate the possibility of Socialism in One 
Country. 244 
Third, Socialism in One Country attacked the international character of a 
Marxist revolution. In fact, it was developed as the antithesis to Trotsky's 
theory of Permanent Revolution. 245 Marxist tended to agree that in order for a 
Socialist Revolution to be successful it would have to be an international 
occurrence. 246 Socialism in One Country claimed it was unnecessary for 
revolutions to occur in other countries, and in fact, Russia could build Socialism 
surrounded by capitalist countries. Anned with the newly created doctrine of 
Marxist-Leninism, Stalin portrayed Socialism in One Country as a continuation 
of Leninism. Once the Soviet Union had abandoned its dependence on other 
countries to rise in revolution it was free to develop itself as a nation-state. As a 
nation-state it bore the wants and needs similar those of capitalist nation-states 
that surrounded it - to maintain its power base, to maintain its borders, to 
244 Claudin pointed out, "Stalin's methodological error is that he uses this 'law' in a 
metaphysical way, isolating it from the other tendencies in world economy and world politics.... 
In the metaphysical way in which Stalin employs it, this 'law' is good for everything and for 
nothing. " Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform 
(1970; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975) 73-75. 
245 Lenin believed that due to Russia's backwardness a socialist revolution would have to take 
place in two phases. The first phase would be a bourgeois revolution. This would establish the 
preconditions for a Socialist revolution. Trotsky developed his theory of Permanent Revolution 
during his imprisonment for his participation in the 1905 Russian Revolution in St. Petersburg. 
For the most part it agreed with the premise of two phases, however, Trotsky took it one step 
further. Trotsky argued that the alliance forged between the peasants and workers created the 
momentum to bring about bourgeois revolution and that this would render it incapable of 
stopping at a bourgeois revolution, it would have to continue to the next step - to Socialism. 
Initially Lenin disagreed with this theory, however, by the time he arrived in Russia in 1917 to 
deliver his April Thesis he seemed to have adopted it completely, with the exception of minor 
modifications, to which Trotsky did not object. E. H. Carr, The Russian Revolution From Lenin 
to Stalin - 1917 - 1929 (Basingstokes: Palgrave, 1979) 74-75. 246 Trotsky insisted that this was something that all the Marxist agreed to up to 1925 - Marx, 
Engles, Lenin, all the Bolsheviks, including Stalin and Bucharin. At first Stalin rejected the 
notion of Socialism in One Country. In early 1924 in his Foundations of Leninism Stalin clearly 
advocated world revolution as the only means by which to accomplish Socialism, however, by 
December 1924 Stalin changed his view. Leon Trotsky, "The Draft Programme of the 
Communist International -A Criticism of Fundamentals, " The Third International After Lenin 
(1929; London: New Park Publications, Ltd., 1974) 40; Isaac Deutscher, Stalin a Political 
BLoZL4phy, 2 nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) 281-282. 
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sustain its economy through growth and trade, etc. If the Soviet Union were to 
survive as a nation-state it must look inward rather than constantly looking 
outward. As Socialism in One Country took on nationalist characteristics it ran 
counter to the revolutionary goals of both Lenin and Trotsky. 247 Once the unity 
between national desires and socialism took place, Marxism no longer existed. 
The defeat of the German October in 1923 and the onset of period of 
"relative stabilisation" left the Soviet Union in a very vulnerable and awkward 
position. The Bolsheviks had believed in order for a socialist revolution to 
survive it needed to be an international occurrence. Socialism in One Country 
began the Soviet Union's rationalisation for refocusing its attention on its 
internal needs. Bucharin utilised the concept of "uneven development" to 
demonstrate that the existence of Socialism solely in the Soviet Union was 
possible. However, Socialism in One Country in his attempt to unite socialism 
and nationalism, Bucharin created an anti-Marxist and anti-revolutionary 
doctrine. After Bucharin's defeat Stalin used Socialism in One Country to 
smother the revolutionary movements in Europe. The acceptance of Socialism 
in One Country changed the face the communist revolutionary movement as it 
paved the way for the emergence of the Third Period of the Comintern. 
247 Carr presented an interesting point. "The appeal [of Socialism in One Country], though 
national (and potentially anti-Marxist) in one respect, was Marxist in another. Socialism in One 
Country might look like the nationalization of the revolution; but it was also its continuation. 
Through the process of industrialization the Soviet Union was to bring to fruition the socialist 
revolution, and to make itself a great and independent Power. Socialism in One Country was 
the synthesis between socialist and national loyalties. " Carr's conclusion is interesting, albeit, 
utterly incorrect. Socialism in One Country was developed to defeat Trotsky and to destroy the 
opposition. Carr neglected the fact that Socialism just as capitalism is an international system. 
Once it becomes limited by national boundaries, it is no longer socialism, and therefore, 
Socialism in One Country is anti-Marxist. E. H. Carr, A HistoKy of Soviet Russia: Socialism in 
One Country 1924 - 1926,3 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964) 50. 
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The Sixth Congress of the Comintern and the Emergence of the Third 
Period 
The Sixth Congress of the ECCI took place on July 17 - September 1,1928 
and marked a turning point in Comintern history. Each new policy in the 
Comintern - the drive towards uniformity in Lenin's time, Bolshevisation, 
Socialism in One Country - placed greater restrictions on the Comintern's 
member parties and built the foundations for a bureaucratic organisation. Stalin 
and his cohorts utilised the restrictions implemented in previous policies in 
order to firmly control the Comintern's parties. 248 In the end the only way to 
protect an illegitimate power base was through increasingly oppressive 
measures and thus, the only possible outcome for the policies introduced in the 
1920's was the Programme adopted at the Sixth Congress in 1928. The Sixth 
Congress not only holds significant importance because of the Programme and 
the repressive statutes it adopted, but also because the Sixth Congress declared 
the end of the "Period of Stabilisation" and the emergence of a new 
revolutionary period - the "Third Period .,, 
249 Although the rhetoric of the 
248 However, Koslov and Weitz disagree with this point. They claimed that it was the Fifth 
Congress that paved the way for the more radical line of the Sixth Congress particularly the 
emphasis on the sharpening contradictions within the capitalist system, which would lead to a 
new revolutionary situation. The Fifth Congress certainly played a significant role but one must 
also bear in mind the situations that allowed the stricter line of the Fifth Congress to take place. 
As Draper pointed out the power struggle in the CPSU certainly played its part, however, it was 
not solely responsible either. Both Lenin's death and the power struggle in the CPSU played an 
enormous role in the outcome of the Fifth Congress. Indeed it was all of these situations 
playing on one another that created the appropriate environment for the Sixth Congress and the 
emergence of the "Third Period. " However, the role played by the "period of relative 
stabilisation" can not be neglected. Stabilisation had a detrimental effect on the revolutionary 
movents and the Communist Parties and the Comintern were eager for it to be declared over. 
Nicholas N. Kozlov and Eric D. Weitz, "Reflections on the Origins of the 'Third Period': 
Bukharin, the Comintern, and the Political Economy of Weimar Germany, " Journal of 
ContemporM HistM 3.24 (1989): 391; Theodore Draper, "The Strange Case of the 
Comintern, " Survey 18.3 (1972): 101. 
249 The "period of relative stabilisation" was devastating to the Communist movements. 
Membership declined during this period and the Comintern was eager to declare it over. In 
1923 the KPD had 294,230 members. In 1924 this figure plummeted to 121,394. As early as 
January 1925 Zinoviev had claimed that 1921 - 1924 marked the Second Period and Fifth 
Congress marked the beginning of the Third Period. However, it was not until the Sixth 
150 
Programme and the "Third Period" claimed to push the revolution forward, its 
true intentions were to repress the European revolutionary movement. 
This section will discuss the Programme and the Statutes adopted at the 
Sixth Congress, as well as the role played by the propagation of the "Third 
Period" in the subordination of the revolutionary movement. 
First, the rhetoric of the Programme claimed to strive for advancement of 
the revolutionary struggle. Prior to his demise in 1929 Bucharin was the chief 
architect of the Programme of the Sixth Congress. The draft of the Programme 
was published in June 1928 in Comintem periodicals and was discussed within 
Communist circles. 250 It claimed it was the first attempt, since the Communist 
Manifesto, to create a uniform programme for the Communist Intemational. 
However, unlike the Communist Manifesto, which was written as a propaganda 
piece the Progranune expected to be followed. Bucharin claimed that the 
Programme satisfied some need for a uniform programme and even implied that 
Congress that the Comintern officially declared the stabilisation as over. G. Zinoviev, 
"Bolshevising the Parties of the Communist International, " International Press Correspondence 
5.7 (1925): 63; for KPD membership statistics see Herman Weber, Die Wanduniz Des 
Deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 362-363. 
250 A lot of press was devoted to inflating the importance of the Sixth Congress and drumming 
up support for the Programme. The programme was painted as "the programme of struggle of 
the world proletarian dictatorship.... " The propaganda also cited the urgent need for the 
Programme. "The need for formulating the basic views of Communism in regard to principles 
and tactics has become still greater, still more necessary. " Even Yablonski's article at first 
seemed critical bearing some disagreements with Bucharin's analysis on the crisis of Capitalism 
and the phases of socialism. However, it appears that he merely wanted to raise the issues and 
not engage in open debate. At the end of his article he reassured his reader of the importance of 
the Programme. "These few remarks on the Draft Programme may possess a certain 
significance, but they should on no account be regarded as derogatory to its real value, its 
historical importance as the programme of the principles of Communism. " Trotsky's critique is 
probably the most famous critique of the Draft Programme, which was first published outside 
the Soviet Union in 1929. It was not made available to the delegates as a whole, though some 
managed to acquire an abridged version. Trotsky claimed the draft "bears obvious traces of 
hasty, even slipshod work, without any preliminary serious and scientific criticism in the press 
or an extensive discussion in all parties of the Comintern. " Editorial, "The Sixth Congress of 
the Comintern, " The Communist International 5.15 (1928): 347; Yablonski, "Some Remarks on 
the Draft Programme of the C. I., " The Communist International 5.14 (1928): 343; Leon 
Trotsky, The Third International After Lenin (1929; London: New Park Publications, Ltd., 
1974)1. 
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the proletarian dictatorship would be impossible without it. 251 The "Programme 
of the Sixth Congress") remained relatively unchanged until the Comintem's 
dissolution after World War 11 and was adopted as the new fonnat by which 
Communist parties modelled themselves. 252 The Programme of the Sixth 
Congress stated its purpose clearly: 
"The Sixth World Congress of the Communist International 
adopted an international programme which is binding equally 
for all sections. For the first time since the existence of the 
revolutionary working class movement, the working class will 
have a document in its hand whose passage are law for the 
millions of organised workers in all countries and amongst all 
races and nations of the globe. [ ... ] This document is the 
guiding star of millions of exploited and oppressed toilers in 
the struggle against the oppressors, in the struggle of the 
proletarian masses ... everywhere the class-struggle is being 
25 1 Bucharin attributed historical significance to the Programme and claimed that all the 
Comintern's historical struggles created "the need for a uniform programme of the Communist 
International.... This programme of the Communist International, being the supreme critical 
generalisation of the whole body of historical experience of the international revolutionary 
proletarian movement, becomes the programme of struggle for the World Proletarian 
Dictatorship, the programme of struggle for World Communism. " It appears that anytime the 
Comintern wanted to convince its member parties of anything they linked their argument to 
history. Bucharin, "The Programme of the Communist International (Adopted by the VI World 
Congress on Ist September 1928, Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 (1928): 
1750. 
252 According to McKenzie, "the Program was never at any time criticized or rejected by the 
leadership of the Comintern. ... [The] Program of 1928 became a universal guide for correct 
Communist thinking on many problems of the revolutionary movement, for the programs of the 
Communist parties were modelled after the Comintern Program. " McKenzie did not address the 
reasons for this, however, it should be noted that no internal opposition to the programme arose 
because internal opposition had been destroyed. Criticism did appear from outside the 
Comintern, particularly from Trotsky, however, as previously mentioned these criticisms had 
little effect on the proceedings. For McDermott and Agnew the real significance of the Sixth 
Congress was that the meeting took place "in an atmosphere of intolerance and name-calling, 
the congress represented a crucial stage in the undermining of Bucharin's authority. " Kermit 
McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution 1928 - 1943: The Shgping of a Doctrine 
(London and New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) 43; Kevin McDermott and Jeremy 
Agnew, The Comintern: A HistoEy of International Communism From Lenin to Stalin 
(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 78. 
152 
carried on. It is the programme of the unity of the working 
,, 253 class.... 
The Sixth Congress and its Statutes attempted to use Marx and Lenin as a 
means of rationalising their oppressive measures. Marx had attempted to write 
a programme for the revolutionary struggle. Lenin attempted to create 
uniformity in the Comintern and insisted that the Comintern's parties follow the 
Bolshevik model. However, unlike Stalin in 1928 neither Marx nor Lenin were 
in a position to dictate party policy. Compared to the Programme of 1928, 
Lenin's Policy of Uniformity appeared utopian. Lenin's drive towards the 
creation of theoretical uniformity inside the Comintern was met with resistance, 
much of which he could do nothing about. Lenin's Policy of Uniformity was 
his method to try to push the revolution forward. It was not developed for the 
purpose of destroying the opposition within the revolutionary movement. The 
Programme, on the other hand, attempted to create a uniform structure with the 
sole intention of maintaining control of the Comintern"s parties. 
Second, the Programme stifled the revolutionary movement by removing all 
remaining autonomy from the Comintern's member parties and eliminating the 
open debates. The Statutes adopted in 1928 left Comintern member parties 
completely subordinated to the will of the Soviet Union. For example, Statute 5 
insisted that, 
"The Communist International and its sections are built up on 
the basis of democratic centralism, the fundamental principles 
of which are: [ ... ] (c) decisions of superior party committees 
253 Bucharin, "rhe Programme of the Communist International (Adopted by the VI World 
Congress on I" September 1928, Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 (1928): 
1770. 
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[are] to be binding on subordinate committees, strict party 
discipline and prompt and precise execution of the decisions 
of the Communist International, of its agencies, and of the 
leading party committees. [ ... I Once decisions have been 
taken by the congress of the Communist International, by the 
congress of the respective section, or by the leading 
committees of the Comintern of the section. ) these decisions 
must be unconditionally carried out even if part of the party 
membership or of the local party organizations is in 
disagreement with it.,, 254 
Individual parties were subordinated to the desires of their higher bodies. In 
effect if a member party disagreed with a Comintem decision they could be 
expelled. Statute 15 made it quite clear that the policy of expulsion was not 
limited to the rank and file; even whole parties could be expelled. 
"The ECCI has the right to expel from the Communist 
International entire sections, groups, or individual members 
who violate the programme and rules of the Communist 
International or the decisions of the world congress and of the 
ECCI. , 255 
The Statues of the Sixth Congress sent out a very important message: The time 
for open debate had come to an end. Neither dissention nor open criticism 
would be tolerated in any Communist Party. This was further emphasised in 
Stalin's speech to the Presidium meeting held on December 19,1928 in which 
254 "Statutes of the Communist International Adopted at its Sixth Congress - 29 August 1928, " 
The Communist International 1919 - 1943 Documents, ed. Jane Degras, 3 vols. (London: Frank 
Cass and Company, Ltd., 1971) 2: 464. 
255 "Statutes of the Communist International Adopted at its Sixth Congress - 29 August 1928, " 
The Communist International 1919 - 1943 Documents, ed. Jane Degras, 3 vols. (London: Frank 
Cass and Company, Ltd., 1971) 2: 468. 
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he offered his support to the Programme and condemned those who criticised it, 
particularly Humbert-Droz and Serra. For their criticism of capitalist 
stabilisation, Stalin accused them of "pusillanimous opportunism, " even though 
his article did not offer an adequate defence of the concept, presumably because 
he had little to due with its theoretical development. But even more striking 
was the question of open debate. Humbert-Droz and Serra appeared to be 
against the expulsion of Rightist factions that had developed in the KPD. They 
suggested combating them with ideological methods rather than expulsion. 
Stalin, on the other hand, defended the decisions taken at the Sixth Congress 
and condemned Humbert-Droz and Serra suggestions and accused them of 
supporting the Rightist themselves. Stalin claimed that the tightening of grips 
over parties, 
"does not imply flat discipline is to be relaxed; on the 
contrary, it implies the general tightening up of iron internal 
discipline, the absolute subordination of the minority to the 
majority, the absolute subordination of the minor 
organisations, as well as the other Party organisations ... to the 
leading party centres. " 256 
The Sixth Congress called forth a new era. One that would not tolerate deviation 
and that was utterly devoid of its original theoretical foundations. 
Third, the Sixth Congress used old Bolshevik rhetoric to stifle the 
European revolutionary movement. The Sixth Congress heralded the beginning 
of a new revolutionary era - the "Third Period. " The concept of the "Third 
256 Joseph Stalin, "Stalin's Speech at the Presidium Meeting of the ECCI held on December 19, 
1928, " The Communist International 6.4 (1929): 146. 
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Period" was not new. It had been introduced at the Third Congress in 1921. 
The First Period was marked by revolutionary upsurge all over Europe. It was 
during this period that the Russian Revolution was fought and the Soviet Union 
was bom. The Second Period was the period of "relative stab il isation. " Just as 
the economic system was characterised by peaks and troughs so too was the 
revolutionary tide. During the period of "relative stabilisation" capitalism had 
managed to build itself up again and the tide was no longer favourable to 
revolution. The idea was that after a time the period of "relative stabilisation" 
would give way to the "Third Period, " meaning a new wave of revolutions. 
Different periods (phases) of the revolutionary movement as well as the 
nature of capitalist development (i. e. the nature of capitalist stabilisation) had 
been debated since the Third Congress in 1921. Trotsky's famous speech 
announced that capitalism had stabilised itself and the revolutionary period was 
at its end. 257 In the "Theses on the International Situation and the Tasks of the 
Comintem" Trotsky proclaimed, 
"The first period of the revolutionary movement after the war 
is characterized by the elemental nature of the onslaught, by 
the considerable formlessness of its methods and aims and by 
the extreme panic of the ruling classes; and it may be regarded 
by and large as terminated. The class self-confidence of the 
bourgeoisie and the outward stability of its state organs have 
257 Although Trotsky's speech took place in 1921 and the Comintern agreed, the Comintem's 
parties were reluctant to accept the notion of "relative stabilisation. " It was not until the 
devastating defeat of the German movement at the end of 1923 that the Germans, in particular, 
accepted that the time for revolution had come to an end. For further discussion on "relative 
Stabilisation" see G. Zinoviev, "Factics of the Communist International, " International Press 
Correspondence 1.4 (1921): 29-30. 
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undoubtedly become strengthened. The dread of Communism 
has abated, if not completely disappeared. , 258 
Trotsky ended the Theses with the point that regardless of whether the period of 
capitalist stabilisation. ended quickly or slowly the communist movement must 
remain poised for action. Shifts in the revolutionary tide were non-nal, and at 
times they favoured the bourgeoisie at others, as in the case of the Russian 
Revolution, it favoured the proletariat. The working class must remain patient 
and it must continue to rebuild. Naturally this proclamation was rather 
unpopular, particularly with the German delegation. Many had joined the 
Communist movement because it promised immediate gains - the misery of the 
workers would be eliminated once the successful revolution had been achieved. 
Pressure for the period of "relative stabilisation" to come to an end certainly 
existed. 
259 
"The entire scope and truly world wide scale of the 
contradictions of capitalism become most glaringly revealed 
258 Leon Trotsky, "Theses on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Comintern: 
Adopted unanimously at the Sixth Session, July 4,1921,11 The First Five Years of the 
Communist International, 2 vols. (London: New Park Publications, Ltd., 1973) 1: 29 1. 
259 There are several different arguments as to why stabilisation was declared over. McKenzie 
claimed that the concept of the "Third Period" was linked to Stalin's struggle for mastery of the 
Comintern and the CPSU. McKenzie further argued that Bucharin's demotion from the head of 
the Comintern and member of the Politburo and the purging of all Bucharin's followers from the 
Comintem's parties were the consequence of this struggle. Draper, however, disagreed with 
McKenzie's argument because he limited the origins of the "Third Period" only to what was 
going on inside the CPSU and furthermore, McKenzie attributed the origins of the Third Period 
to Stalin. Draper claimed that at the end of August 1927 it was Stalin following Bucharin's lead 
and not vice versa. Kozlov and Weitz, on the other hand, agreed that the "Third Period" 
originated with Bucharin but claimed that Draper's argument reduced the "Third Period" to a 
power struggle and ignored the theoretical context of his argument. They concluded that 
Draper's argument presented a "cloud" over the "Third Period" and distorted Bucharin's views. 
Kermit E. McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution 1928 - 1924: The Shaping of a 
Doctrine (London and New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) 122-123; Theodore 
Draper, "The Strange Case of the Comintem, " Survey: A Journal of East and West Studies 3.18 
(1972): 98; Nicholas N. Kozlov and Eric D. Weitz, "Reflections on the Origins of the 'Third 
Period': Bukharin, the Comintern, and the Political Economy of Weimar Germany, " Journal of 
ContemporM History 3.24 (1989): 388 -389. 
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in the epoch of imperialism (finance capitalism).... This new 
historical period set in as a result of the operation of the 
principal dynamic laws of capitalist society. It grew out of the 
development of industrial capitalism, and is the historical 
continuation of the latter. [ ... I The law of uneven 
development of capitalism, which becomes intensified in the 
epoch of imperialism, renders firm and durable international 
combination of imperialist powers impossible. [Imperialism 
is] the highest phase of capitalist development refashioning 
the whole world after its own image.... All at the same time, 
however, the monopolistic forrn of capital increasingly 
develops the elements of parasitical degeneration, decay, and 
decline of capitalism. [ ... ] Imperialism is ... moribund and 
decaying capitalism. It is the final stage of the development 
of the capitalist system. It is the threshold of the world social 
revolution. ', 260 
Although it might have seemed that the Comintern's proclamation of the "Third 
Period" encouraged revolutions, it in fact did not. The "Third Period" merely 
created a false sense of incumbent war. Stalin and Bucharin had learned from 
their revolutionary past. If the Comintern's parties believed that revolution was 
imminent, then they would accept the Comintem's repressive measures. 
The long awaited new era had been declared. Although the economic 
analysis that appeared in the Programme of 1928 was not new and had been 
heavily debated, the major difference was that in 1928 not many were left to 
disagree with Bucharin's analysis. There was nothing new about the "age of 
Imperialism. " Lenin and Luxemburg had devoted many discussions to the role 
of imperialist development and the part it played in the revolutionary 
260 Bucharin, "The Programme of the Communist International (Adopted by the VI World 
Congress on I" September 1928, Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 (1928): 
1751,1752,1753. 
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movement. However, unlike Lenin or Luxemburg's discussion of Imperialism, 
the Programme of 1928 depicted Imperialism as the '! flnal phase of capitalist 
development. " Not long after Bucharin's proclamation the New York Stock 
exchange crashed in October 1929. This certainly worked in favour of the 
propaganda devoted to the promotion of the "Third Period. " As the Comintern 
entered a new revolutionary period strict disciple was required of the rank and 
file of the Comintern's parties. Unbeknownst to the rank and file of the 
Comintern's parties the CPSU was no longer interested in world revolution but 
rather it was only interested in maintaining its own power base. The 
propagation of world revolution was merely a tool to maintain discipline within 
the Comintern's member parties. The "Third Period" also allowed the CPSU to 
use foreign Communist Parties buffers between them and their respective states. 
Summary 
The Comintern played an extremely influential role in the practice and 
theoretical changes that took place in the German Communist movement. 
While not a single Comintern policy can be held completely responsible for the 
KPD's subordination, each policy played a distinctive role in hindering the 
KPD's practical and theoretical development. The Bolshevik's desperation to 
spread the revolution across Europe in order to save the Russian revolution 
influenced Lenin's Policy of Uniformity. As a Marxist, Lenin was profoundly 
committed to pushing the revolution forward and he needed to convince other 
parties to join his cause. He firmly believed that the Bolsheviks possessed the 
correct revolutionary model that could be transplanted all over Europe. 
However, the rigidity and the forceftil methods inherent in Lenin's Policy of 
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Uniformity laid the foundations for the repressive measures implemented by 
Bolshevisation. 
Bolshevisation took Lenin's Policy of Uniformity to its extreme and 
attempted to "russify" the Comintern's parties. Changes and fluctuations in the 
Comintern reflected the upheaval and the power struggle in the Soviet Union. 
In their attempts to gain power the Triumvirate manipulated the strictness of 
Lenin's words to rid the CPSU and the Comintern of its opponents and, thereby, 
removed the Comintern's focus away from Lenin's goal of spreading world 
revolution. In Germany, the policies of the Comintem had a tremendous impact 
on the theoretical development of the German Party. Bolshevisation, in its 
attempts to rid the KPD of the remnants of Social Democracy targeted the old 
Spartacists, who were influential in perpetuating the KPD's theoretical 
traditions. Bolshevisation successfully divided the moment and removed all the 
influence of the old Spartacists leaving behind a severely weakened, albeit, 
more controllable party. Bolshevisation attempted to destroy the old theoretical 
traditions of the KPD and replaced it with propaganda. 
Bolshevisation paved the way for the Statutes of the Sixth Congress and the 
emergence of the "Third Period. " The Statutes of the Sixth Congress took 
Lenin's Policy of Uniformity and Bolshevisation to their utmost extremes. The 
Russians no longer tried to convince the Comintern's parties to follow their 
path. After 1928 they were in a position to dictate individual party policy. The 
Comintern had completely ceased to be an organ of revolution. It became a 
bureaucratic machine intent on securing its own survival. The Comintern 
utilised the emergence of a new revolutionary period as a means of oppression. 
The Comintern had learned from its past. During Lenin's time the Comintern's 
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parties were willing to accept restrictive measures during the revolutionary 
period. They believed the revolution was around the comer. The Comintern 
resuscitated the revolutionary period in order to rationalise their authoritarian 
measures. However, unlike the previous revolutionary period, revolutions in 
Europe posed a threat to the hegemony of the Comintern and the CPSU. 
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Chapter Four: The Third Period and the Development of the Theory of 
Social Fascism in Germany 
261 Social Fascism is Socialism in word, Fascism in deed . 
The link between Social Democracy and Fascism was a relatively new 
concept conceived out of the Communists antagonism toward the SPD. The 
SPD were the creators of the Weimar Republic and consequently the Republic's 
chief defenders. In an effort to protect their creation, the SPD brutally 
suppressed numerous uprisings. As a result, the KPD held the SPD responsible 
for the death of several of its leaders as well as countless members of the rank 
and file. The hostility that the KPD exercised toward the Social Democrats was 
bom out the perceived betrayal of the revolutionary movement and the murders 
of the KPD leaders. 262 While there was no love lost between the Communists 
and the SPD leaders, prior to 1924 the KPD cooperated with the SPD rank and 
file under the various United Front campaigns. 263 The United Front campaigns 
261 "Was ist Sozialfaschismus? " 1930 SAMPO RY 1/12/707/127 FBS 248/11605; Kursmaterial 
Nr. 2: GrundizOge der leninistischen Strageizie und Taktik in der 9ePenwdrtige Periode (Zentral 
Kommittee der Kommunistschen Partei Deutschlands, 1930) 22: SAMPO RY I/I2nO7/99 FBS 
248/11598; Earl Browder, The Meaning of Social-Fascism: Its Historical and Theoretical 
Background (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1933) 14-15. 
262 Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were murdered in January 1919 during the so called 
"Spartakus uprising. " The old and frail Franz Mehring died shortly after hearing the news of the 
brutal murders of Luxemburg and Liebknecht - it is said of a broken heart. Leo Jogiches was 
arrested and shot in March 1919. Brandler claimed that Jogiches' death was in fact a suicide 
and not an assassination. Eugen Levin6 was condemned to death and shot for his role in the 
second Soviet Republic in Munich in 1919. During the Munich Soviet in April and May 1919 
700 people died. In Berlin, 1919 a general strike resulted in repression - 1200 people died in 
what become known as "bloody week. " In January 1920 a demonstration outside of the 
Reichstag left 42 dead. In 1921 the March action also resulted in a bloodbath. Isaac Deutscher, 
"Record of a Discussion with Heinrich Brandler, " New Left Review 105 (1977): 48-49; A. 
Joseph Berlau, The German Social Democratic PjjKjy 1914 - 1921 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1949) 252-253. 
263 While the United Front campaigns were an important feature of the KPD's propaganda 
throughout the Weimar period, this thesis has limited itself to addressing the fluctuations in 
KPD theory. Therefore the United front campaigns fall outside of the scope of this thesis. For 
more on the KPD's United Front campaigns see Siegfried Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' 
Deutschland zur Geschichte eines Politischen Begriffs, " International Review of Social HistoLy 
10.2 (1965): 214-215. 
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were utilised in an attempt to lure the SPD rank and file over to the KPD. 
Hence SPD rank and file were considered something separate from the SPD 
leaders i. e. they were not held responsible for the crimes of their leaders. 
However, this attitude changed during the post- 1923 KPD and particularly 
during the Maslow-Fischer years when the policy of Bolshevisation intensified 
the KPD's opposition of the SPD. During Bolshevisation everything associated 
with the SPD fell deeper under scrutiny - including the SPD rank and file. The 
Maslow-Fischer reign and their pursuit of Bolshevisation created the 
appropriate environment for the term Social Fascism to flourish into a quasi- 
theory. 
Social Fascism as a theory and campaign picked up where Bolshevisation 
left off. It was an extreme form of Bolshevisation. Like Bolshevisation before 
it, Social Fascism served to divide the working class movement by creating a 
constant enemy from within the working class - the SPD leaders and later the 
SPD workers. However, it was not until the declaration of the arrival of the 
Third Period that Social Fascism became truly destructive - where mere name 
calling was transformed into a fully fledged campaign. Masquerading as a 
theory, Social Fascism was justified and validated as an effective weapon, not 
against Social Democracy, but against the working class as a whole. The May 
Day events in 1929 provided the appropriate catalysts for the hardliners to 
launch Social Fascism into a theory. 
This chapter will discuss the KPD's development of the theory of Social 
Fascism. Although the theory of Social Fascism has been accused of being a 
dramatic shift, in reality KPD theory merely followed the course laid down for 
it by the previous Comintern policies and arrived at its natural conclusion - the 
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theory of Social Fascism. The evolution of Social Fascism took place in two 
phases. At first glance the first phase seemed to be a relatively han-nless form of 
name calling during the early years of the Weimar Republic. The second phase 
took place toward the end of the Weimar Republic. It not only reflected the 
overt hostility toward all aspects of Social Democracy, but it also became a 
destructive weapon in the German working class movement and ensured the 
impossibility of any working class unity. The proclamation of the Tbird Period 
had an incredible impact on the practical and theoretical course that the German 
Communist Party pursued after the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928. 
While not a single Comintem Policy could be held responsible for the 
destruction the KPD)s theoretical and practical development, each policy 
changed the internal dynamic of the German movement and in the Comintern's 
attempts to create uniformity, they merely subordinated the movement. In the 
end it was inevitable for the KPD to create the theory of Social Fascism. 
The first section of this chapter - "Benign" Use of Social Fascism - will 
discuss Social Fascism in its name calling form. Zinoviev's use of the term in 
1924 was no accident. Zinoviev appeared to first use the tenn within the 
German context as a means of diverting attention away from his involvement in 
the defeat of the failed Gennan revolution in 1923. While Zinoviev can not be 
blamed for what Social Fascism developed into, he did possess ulterior motives 
in perpetuating the term in Germany and was instrumental in developing the 
Comintem's policy of Bolshevisation. 
In many ways the theory of Social Fascism was a more extreme version 
of Bolshevisation. While the use of the term Social Fascism seemed to have 
taken a hiatus under Bucharin, his role in developing Social Fascism into a 
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theory was dubious. Bucharin was under tremendous pressure, particularly 
from the German hardliners, to intensify the campaign against Social 
Democracy. He appeared reluctant to do so. Bucharin never directly equated 
Social Democracy with Fascism, but he did compare the two in the programme 
of the Sixth Congress and thereby helped lay the foundations for Social Fascism 
as a theory. The theory of Social Fascism drew on the programme of the Sixth 
Congress to prove the more extreme measures that were pursued. 
The second section - The Practical Foundations of a Pseudo Theory - 
will discuss the KPD)s transition into the acceptance of Social Fascism as a 
theory. Essentially two key events took place in Germany that helped launch 
Social Fascism into a theory - the Wittorf Affair and the Bloody May Day 
1929. What is significant about these two events is how the Comintern and the 
German party responded to them. First, when oppositional leaders took 
advantage of Thdlmann's involvement in a financial scandal to oust him, Stalin 
and Molotov intervened in favour of ThdImann. A special Plenum was held 
which demanded the "liquidation" of all opposition. The Wittorf Affair 
signified a change in the Comintern's relationship with the KPD. Previously, 
the KPD possessed a certain degree of autonomy. The Wittorf Affair 
demonstrated that the Soviet leaders had clearly decided who the KPD leader 
should be and opposition within the KPD was in such a weakened state that it 
was not able to challenge this. 
Second, the role of May Day 1929 in the perpetuation of the theory of 
Social Fascism is highly debated. This chapter wishes to argue that May Day 
was an important tool in the rationalisation of Social Fascism in Germany. The 
May Day events were used to demonstrate the "correctness" of the Sixth 
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Congress and the awakening of a new revolutionary tide. While neither event 
can be credited with creating the conditions for the development and 
perpetuation of Social Fascism as a theory, both played a role in the 
rationalisation of the party's harsher line against Social Democracy. 
The third section of this chapter - Pseudo Theory Takes Hold - will 
discuss the second phase of Social Fascism - the more belligerent use of the 
term. The Tenth Plenum of the Comintern held in 1929 not only used the 
events of Bloody May Day as unadulterated proof that Social Democracy had 
declined into Social Fascism, but attempted to provide theoretical foundations 
for Social Fascism. The key features of the theory of Social Fascism were its 
increased attacks on the Left wing of the SPD, its claim that a new revolutionary 
upsurge was occurring and that it coincided with the Third Period, and attempts 
to theorise the reasons behind Social Democracy's "corruptness. " However, the 
theory of Social Fascism was extremely problematic. In utilising the working 
class' association of the SPD with the Weimar State and feeding off this 
hostility the KPD theoreticians failed to comprehend the nature of Fascism. 
Fascism was developing before their eyes and the KPD leaders and the KPD 
spin doctors refused to acknowledge it. 
"Benign" Use of Social Fascism 
The use of the ten-n Social Fascism has often been associated with Stalin 
and Stalinism. The origins of the theory that wrecked havoc on the socialist 
movement appeared humble and seemed to have sprung to life almost by 
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accident. 264 Although the use of the term Social Fascism appeared benign in its 
name calling form, it was anything but harmless. In the same way that a limp or 
a cough may appear harmless, but in fact hidden beneath the surface lurks a 
cancerous tumour. From the onset the use of the term Social Fascism in 
Gen-nany was contrived and hid the Comintern's ulterior motives. Underneath 
the intense loathing of Social Democracy and the Social Fascist rhetoric lurked 
Comintern's desire to redirect the working class' focus away from revolution. 
The perpetuation of Social Fascism in its name calling form allowed it to 
flourish into a dangerous theory. As a result the concept enabled Social 
Fascism to endure and evolve into its second phase - that of a weapon against, 
not only Social Democracy, but all opposition in the KPD. 
This section will discuss the first phase of Social Fascism from its 
coinage in the German context by Zinoviev, to its association with the policy of 
Bolshevisation, and its supposed abandonment by Bucharin in the Programme 
of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. 
Zinoviev and Social Fascism 
The first phase of Social Fascism began in the early 1920's. When 
Social Fascism was first introduced in Germany it did not appear to mean any 
more than Lenin's use of "social- chauvinist" or "social-patriot" during the First 
World War. Yet, it still reflected the Comintern's belligerence and extreme 
264 Draper traced the first use of the term to an Italian report printed in the Russian periodical 
Izvestia on November 12,1922. In fact, he alleged that the term may have been the invention of 
a headline writer and there was nothing too significant about the term at the time. Draper 
attributed the invention of the term to the Bolsheviks habit of amalgamating negative phrases 
such as "social-chauvinist" and "social-patriot" to describe Social Democracy. Carr offered the 
slightly earlier date of November 10,1922. Theodore Draper, "The Strange Case of the 
Comintern, " Survey -A Journal of East and West Studies 3.84 (1972) 119-120; E. H. Carr, A 
History of Soviet Russia: Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929,3 vols. (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1979) 3: 638. 
167 
distrust of the SPD. The use of the term Social Fascism seemed to continue in 
this capacity until Bucharin's defeat following the Sixth Congress of the 
Comintern in 1928. In Germany the first official use of the term "Social 
Fascism" can be traced back to Zinoviev (not Stalin) following the disastrous 
defeat of the German October in 1923.265 Zinoviev claimed, 
"The leading strata of the German Social Democrats are at the 
present moment nothing else than a fraction of German 
Fascists under a socialist mask. [ ... ] It is not just now that the 
German social democrats have passed over to the side of 
capitalism. At the bottom, they have always been the class 
enemies of the proletariat. 9266 
Stalin, following Zinoviev's lead, further asserted, 
"Fascism is a fighting organisation of the bourgeoisie 
dependent upon the active support of Social Democracy. 
Objectively, Social Democracy is a moderate wing of 
265 In his unpublished memoirs housed at the University of Glasgow, Rudolf Schlessinger 
claimed that he "had been one of the first who had coined the term. " It is clear, under the 
pseudonym R. Gerber, that Schlessinger was responsible for the development of Social Fascism 
into a theory. In his German memoirs Schlessinger explained that the term had taken on a life 
of its own and had begun to mean something different than its origination. However, there is no 
physical evidence to suggest that Schlessinger coined the term Social Fascism to suit the 
German situation, although it is difficult to ascertain what his involvement was in an unwritten 
capacity. It is also difficult to understand why he would claim responsibility for such a 
diabolical phrase. Rudolf Schlessinger, Memoirs: In a Time of Struggle, 2 vols. (Unpublished 
memoirs, 1957) 1: 363; Erinnerjeun, 2 vols. (Unpublished memoirs, n. d. ) 1: 27 1. 
266 While Zinoviev can be credited for bringing the term to Germany, it is doubtful that he can 
be credited with developing the theory of Social Fascism. Zinoviev's use of the term, in the 
early 1920's, remained in the form of name calling. G. Zinoviev, "Lessons of the German 
Event, " International Press Correspondence 4.14 (1924): 110; Theodore Draper, "The Ghost of 
Social-Fascism, " Commentgy 47.2 (1969): 30; also see Siegfried Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' 
Deutschland zur Geschichte eines Politischen Begriffs, " International Review of Social History 
10.2 (1965): 224-225; Herman Weber, Die Wandung Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die 
Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 101-102; Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A 
History of Communism From Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 50. 
168 
Fascism. They are not poles apart, but immediate 
,, 267 neighbours. 
Initially, Stalins analysis attributed the rise of Fascism to a by-product of 
imperialism -a power block that formed and developed in retaliation to the 
threat of the proletarian revolution. Clearly, Stalin's use of the term merely 
imitated Zinoviev's observation. The correlation between Fascism and 
Imperialism reflected the time period and the dominating theories of this 
specific period. Zinoviev and Stalin tossed the term "Imperialism" around 
much in the same way that the term "globalisation" is used to describe 
everything today. Clearly neither Zinoviev nor Stalin possessed the knowledge 
or depth on the topic of Imperialism to discuss it in anything other than a 
superficial manner. The statements made by both Zinoviev and Stalin 
demonstrated this fact. Although Zinoviev's declaration accurately depicted his 
267 It is rather remarkable that even party members and witnesses to the failed German 
Revolution of 1923 blamed Stalin for developing the concept and theory of Social Fascism. 
These supposed eye witnesses also placed the birth of Social Fascism in the late 1920's. For 
example, Ruth Fischer insisted that "the new theorem of 'social fascism', which Stalin 
enunciated in person, " took place in the years of the Nazi ascendancy, 1929-1933. Borkenau 
correctly asserted that the intensification of hostility toward Social Democratic workers 
occurred after May Day 1929. He was incorrect to place the origins of Social Fascism in 1929. 
"As a result of [of May Day] a new theory was proclaimed, to the effect that every single 
member of the socialist parties and every single active member of the trade unions was ... an 
active enemy of the proletariat. All through the years 1929 and 1930 the war-cry of 'social- 
fascism' was raised.... " Therefore, it is not surprising that later historians and commentators 
also blamed Stalin for Social Fascism. While Mandel correctly provided the original date for 
the Stalin's first utterance of Social Fascism, citing the above mentioned quote, he nonetheless 
made the same mistake as his predecessors and claimed that the whole notion and theory was 
developed by Stalin. For example in a footnote Ernest Mandel insisted, "Social Democracy 
was labelled social fascist in accord with Stalin's theory. " While Trotsky was correct to assert, 
"It is absolute balderdash to identify Social Democracy with fascism. " He mistakenly associated 
it with Stalin - "Stalin himself was enmeshed with social fascism. " However, Trotsky also 
pointed out that German Communists were responsible for the perpetuation of the Stalin myth. 
He insisted that the Rote Fahne traced the origins of Social Fascism to Stalin's first use of the 
term in 1924 and completely ignored Zinoviev's use of the term shortly before. J. Stalin, "On 
the International Situation, " International Press Correspondence 4.72 (1924) 792; Ruth Fischer, 
Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins of the State Party (1948; New 
Brunswick and London: Transaction, Inc., 1982) 655; Franz Borkenau, The Communist 
international (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1938) 341-342; Leon Trotsky, The Struggle 
Against Fascism, intro Ernest Mandel (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1971) 454; Leon 
Trotsky, "What Next? Vital Questions for the German Proletariat, " The Struggle Against 
Eascism, intro Ernest Mandel (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1971) 145,157. 
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complete and utter ignorance surrounding the topics of both Fascism and 
Imperialism, his use of the term Social Fascism was an artificial diversion. It 
was used to redirect blame away from his responsibility for the failed German 
revolution of 1923 and focus the blame onto the Social Democrats. This 
intensification in hostility towards Social Democracy gave rise to the policy of 
Bolshevisation 
First, Zinoviev used the term Social Fascism to refocus blame for the failed 
German revolution of 1923 onto the Social Democrats. Given that the theory of 
Imperialism was used to explain the war and as a result the forthcoming 
collapse of the Capitalist system, one can see why Zinoviev, and at his heels 
Stalin, used the term Imperialism to discuss Social Democracy's decline. 
However, one must wonder why Zinoviev chose to associate Social Democracy 
with Fascism? If one performs acrobats and applies fools logic then he can 
almost see the round about crooked connection between Socialism and Fascism. 
The historical characters (in the pre-1924 world) who had called themselves 
268 Fascist had started off as Socialists . In the face of the First World War both 
Mussolini and Pilsudski had chosen to support the State and side with the war 
effort. 269 Zinoviev drew the parallel that this mimicked the behaviour of the 
German Social Democratic Party. The SPD had begun as Socialists and in the 
268 The term Jascio had existed in Italian politics since 1890. Originally it merely referred to 
radical revolutionary politics. It later evolved into the more common term fascism. Fascism 
became an organised political movement in Italy following a meeting in Milan on March 23, 
1919. The Fascists formed armed squads to terrorise Anarchists, Socialists, and Communists. 
269 J6zef Pilsudski in Poland had joined the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in 1892. The PPS 
formed in an attempt to unite the underground Polish Socialist movement. However the party 
split over the national question. Rosa Luxemburg was a member of the PPS, but broke away to 
form the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKiL). 
Pilsudski's desire for an independent Poland precipitated his decision to join the army during 
the First World War. Benito Mussolini followed a similar progression. Mussolini, following in 
his father's footsteps also joined the Socialist party as a youth. A group of syndicalists broke 
with the Socialists over Italy's entry into the First World War. In 1914 he joined the pro-war 
group Fasci dAzione Rivoluzionaria. 
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face of the war were overcome with nationalism and turned their back on their 
Marxist rhetoric, and thereby betrayed the workers movement. The conclusion 
to this logic was as follows: if Pilsudski and Mussolini started off as Socialists, 
supported and joined the war effort, and became Fascists, then the SPD must 
also be Fascists because they started off as Socialists and supported the war 
effort. Unfortunately, this conclusion was utterly illogical and dismissive of the 
whole concept of Fascism. It implied that Fascism was nothing more than a 
pro-State form of Socialism and ignored the possibility that Fascism might be 
an entity unto itself with motivations unto itself. In hindsight this pattern of 
thinking turned out to be extremely dangerous. 270 By superficially aligning 
Social Democracy with Fascism and refusing to acknowledge Fascism as new 
political movement in the wake of Hitler's rise to power in 1933, the 
Communists found themselves completely unprepared. 
It is obvious that Zinoviev had a propensity for throwing around 
fashionable terminology. The concept of Fascism was new to the world stage - 
Mussolini's "march" on Rome took place at the end of October 1922 - and 
generally, any analysis of Fascism was associated with Italy not Germany. 271 
Zinoviev's use of the term appeared in a fashionable and superficial sense as he 
did not overtly attach any real depth or meaning to it. The newness of Fascism 
may also explain why the term had such an enduring shelf life and managed to 
evolve, as opposed to "social-chauvinist" or "social-traitor. " However, in 
practice Fascism had been around for two years before Zinoviev appropriated 
the concept to suit his own purposes. It, therefore, becomes clear that 
270 It is true that there were some who opposed this pattern of thinking and believed that the 
Fascists were indeed dangerous, more dangerous than the Social Democrats. However, in true 
Stalinist style, they were purged for their opposition. 
271 Siegfried Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' Deutschland zur Geschichte eines Politischen 
Begriffs, " International Review of Social HLsLory 10.2 (1965): 241. 
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Zinoviev's choice to unearth the term "Social Fascism" in 1924 was no 
accident. 
The failed German Revolution of 1923 signified an incredible turning 
point in the history of the KPD. Although both the CPSU and the Comintern 
played a leading role in dictating to the party leaders their prescribed course of 
action, no one in Russia took responsibility for their role in the defeat. 272 Blame 
was very strategically scattered throughout Germany. Brandler and Thalheimer 
(the Centre leaders of the KPD) and Radek (the Comintem representative in 
Germany) were used as scapegoats. 273 With the leaders in Germany attempting 
to blame the Executive Committee of the Communist International ie Zinoviev 
- the head of the Comintern - for mistakes made in Germany, Zinoviev needed 
272 Brou6 quite accurately pointed out that the October defeat of the German revolution was 
never discussed. In October 1923 Zinoviev wrote a series of articles entitled, "Problems of the 
German Revolution. " But these articles were written during the events. The articles were 
translated and circulated by the KPD, but were quickly withdrawn. The October defeat became 
a weapon in the power struggle inside the CPSU and the Comintern. Pierre Brou6, The German 
Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden and London: Brill, 2005) 817-818. Also 
see G. Zinoviev, "Problems of the German Revolution, " The Communist International (1923): 
3-57. 
273 Brandler and Thalheimer produced an unsuccessful joint article explaining the reasons for 
the German defeat in an attempt to return some of the blame back to the Comintern. In their 
explanation they claimed that the main reason for the defeat in 1923 was "objective" and not 
due to practical mistakes made by the KPD. They also blamed the Executive Committee of the 
Communist International and Central Committee of the KPD. Although the KPD was critical of 
the ECCI's assessment of the German situation they did not protest loudly enough against it. 
The consequence of the ECCI's false estimations was that they fixed the date for the revolution 
too early. 
Interestingly Ruth Fischer's account of the German events is inconsistent. At times her 
account of Brandler's attitude was for revolutionary action but then she contradicted herself and 
insisted that he was against it. She insisted that Brandler's leadership position in Germany was 
in a delicate state. He maintained his leadership position because his party colleagues believed 
he was backed by the Comintern. If he lost their backing his party would desert him if he 
opposed the Russians proposals regarding entering into an alliance in Saxony and Thuringia. 
He therefore, accepted the Russians' line "in general" and did not object to referring to the 
German situation as "revolutionary. " But when the Russians attempted to set a date for action he 
was reluctant. It was Zinoviev that led the compromise - Brandler agreed that he was for a 
revolution "in principle. " A. Thalheimer and H. Brandler, "The Situation in the Communist 
Party of Germany. Theses on the October Defeat and on the Present Situation, " International 
Press Correspondence 3.4 (1924): 20; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. 
John Archer (Leiden and London: Brill, 2005) 823-832; Werner T. Angress, Stillborn 
Revolution: The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 1921 - 1923 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963) 462-470; Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the 
Origins of the State Party (1948; New Brunswick and London: Transaction, Inc., 1982) 313, 
317. 
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to deflect the responsibility for disastrous defeat of the 1923 Gennan Revolution 
away from himself. The introduction of Social Fascism was a way to redirect 
the blame to the Social Democrats. 274 Thereby, allowing Zinoviev to walk 
away from the disastrous mess he helped to create - the German revolution of 
1923. Zinoviev's superficial use of the term Fascism in 1924 may have 
appeared harmless, but it was in fact a precursor for things to come. 
Second, in maintaining his innocence over 1923 and blaming the Social 
Democrats, Zinoviev continued to describe the alliance between Social 
Democracy and the bourgeoisie as Fascist without offering any significant depth 
for his assessment. In July 1925 Zinoviev pointed out eight reasons why Social 
Democracy was so tenacious. Amongst those reasons included: 
1. Social Democracy was an ally of the bourgeoisie and drew its strength 
from the strength of the bourgeoisie, 
2. The fatigue of the working class after the war, 
3. The change in the social composition of Social Democratic Parties and the 
aristocracy of labour, 
4. The bureaucracy of the German Social Democratic machine, 
5. The role of the refonnist trade unions and their counter revolutionary 
influence in the SPD, 
6. The Dawes Plan and the role errors of the Ultra-Left, 
274 As the tides turned in the CPSU Trotsky was blamed. But it is clear he was used as a 
scapegoat as well. His role in planning the German Revolution was limited. According to 
Angress, Zinoviev was eager to condemn Brandler, Thalheimer, and Radek because he believed 
it would weaken Trotsky's position in the CPSU. Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The 
Comintern: A History of Communism From Lenin to Stalin ndon: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 
1996) 45; Pierre Brou6, The German Revolution 1917 - 1923, trans. John Archer (Leiden: 
Brill, 2005) 817-818; Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism: A Study of the Origins of 
the State EgIty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948) 311-317; Herman Weber, Die 
Wandunz Des Deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
Rgpublic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europdische Verlagsanstalt, 1969) 1: 43-52; Wemer T. 
Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 1921 - 1923 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 462-470. 
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7. German Social Democracy's exploitation of the difficult times in Russia 
following the revolution, especially the period 1921-1923, 
8. The 1923 defeat of the German revolution and the errors committed by the 
(. 6 opportunist right" leaders of the KPD. 
From these eight points Zinoviev concluded that the Comintern was correct to 
describe German Social Democracy as the "third party of the bourgeoisie" and a 
((modem wing of Fascism. " 275 
Zinoviev's use of the term Social Fascism set a dangerous precedent during 
a transitional period and laid the foundations for something more sinister - the 
Comintern's policy of Bolshevisation. Bolshevisation was instrumental in the 
development of Social Fascism into a theory as it intensified hostility toward the 
Social Democrats. While the term Social Fascism was not used as part of the 
policy of Bolshevisation, Zinoviev continued to perpetuate the notion of the 
SPD as a "wing of Fascism. " Bolshevisation itself played a dual role in the 
KPD. It eliminated all theoretical and practical opposition from the KPD by 
demonising anything to do with Social Democracy. As old Spartacists the Right 
wing of the KPD were the direct decedents of the German Social Democratic 
Party. Therefore, the SPD could be blamed for the failings of the KPD. 276 
Everything that was wrong with the Socialist movement was blamed on Social 
Democracy. Under the guise of the purging the "remnants" of Social 
275 G. Zinoviev, "Letter from the Executive Committee of the Comintern to the Tenth Congress 
of the Communist Party of Germany, " International Press Correspondence 5.55 (1925): 757. 
276 It appears that the only redeemable period that the SPD experienced was during the Anti- 
Socialist Laws. According the Theses and Resolutions, "German Communists must not forget 
the experience of the struggle conducted by the better sections of Social Democracy in the 
period of the anti-socialist laws. The better works of Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel 
must be used by the German Communists against the Social Democrats. " It also appears that 
Zinoviev failed to realise that the SPD did not take form until after the Anti-Socialist Laws. 
"Theses and Resolutions Adopted at the Session of the Enlarged ECCI Plenum - Theses on the 
Bolshevisation of the Parties of the Comintern, " International Press Correspondence 5.47 
(1925): 616. 
174 
Democracy, the Comintern rid itself of any opposition by lumping the Centre 
and Right wings together as Luxemburgist and Right wing. 
Zinoviev's estimation of the role of Social Democracy, the bourgeoisie, 
and Fascism was, if anything consistently flawed. Unlike Bucharin, Zinoviev 
was unable to see beyond the surface of the alliance between Social Democracy 
and the bourgeoisie. Zinoviev claimed that his desire for understanding the 
enduring qualities of Social Democracy was motivated by his aspiration of 
destroying them. Rather than weaken the stronghold of Social Democracy in 
the German labour movement, his role in increasing the hostility against Social 
Democracy merely exacerbated the divide within the working class. Zinoviev 
insisted that workers who followed the "counter revolutionary" Social 
Democratic leaders were still considered the class brothers of the Communist. 
However, the recognition of class similarities between SPD and KPD workers at 
an official level and the actual practice of this were two entirely different 
matters. The animosity of the Comintern toward SPD leaders naturally trickled 
down to the rank and file. 277 Very often the rank and file of the SPD were 
targeted as enemies of the KPD. It is clear that rather than take responsibility 
for 1923 Zinoviev escalated tensions between Social Democracy and the KPD. 
This was a significant step in the theory and practice of the Comintern. 
Zinoviev may have lacked enough theoretical understanding to substantiate his 
Social Fascist accusations and develop Social Fascism into a theory, but his 
influence was enduring in Communist parties. Zinoviev's true legacy was that 
277 For Zinoviev's description see G. Zinoviev, "Letter from the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern to the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, " International Press 
Correspondence 5.55 (1925): 758; for a further discussion of the violent relationship between 
KPD, SPD, and NSDAP at the rank and file level see Eve Rosenhahaft, Beating the Fascists? 
The Communists and Political Violence 1929-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983). 
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of creating campaigns and enemies in an effort to remove attention from what 
was really going on in the Comintern. 
Bucharin and Social Fascism 
Bucharin's role in the development of Social Fascism into a theory is rather 
ambiguous. Bucharin, unlike Zinoviev, did possess the theoretical basis to turn 
Social Fascism into a theory. He was, after all, the Bolshevik's chief 
theoretician and possessed some understanding regarding the decline of 
capitalism and political trends. Yet, Bucharin did not employ the term Social 
Fascism. However, this does not exonerate Bucharin from any responsibility in 
the development of Social Fascism as a theory. Bucharin, as chief architect of 
the Programme of the Sixth Congress, played a key role in the theory of Social 
Fascism. Bucharin provided the political, economic, and social rationale for the 
development of Social Fascism into a theory in the Programme of the 
Communist International adopted by the Sixth Congress in 1928. 
First, Bucharin attempted to explain Social Democracy's role as a part of 
the State. He regarded Social Democracy as having betrayed Marxism and 
crossed over from revisionism to complete liberal bourgeois reformism and 
avowed "social-imperialism. , 278 Although Bucharin clearly differentiated 
between Fascism and Social Democracy, he maintained that Social Democracy 
demonstrated Social Fascist tendencies. Bucharin insisted 
"The bourgeoisie resorts either to the method of Fascism or to 
the method of coalition with Social Democracy according to 
278 N. Bucharin, "The Programme of the Communist International. Adopted by the VI World 
Congress on the Is' September 1928, in Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 
(1928): 1764. 
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the changes in the political situation; while Social Democracy 
itself, often plays a Fascist role in periods when the situation 
is critical for capitalism. In the process of development Social 
Democracy reveals Fascist tendencies which, however, does 
not prevent it, in other political situations, from 
acting ... against the 
bourgeois government in the capacity of 
an opposition party. The Fascist method and the method of 
coalition usually employed in 'normal' capitalist conditions; 
they are symptoms of the general crisis of capitalism, and are 
employed by the bourgeoisie in order to stem the advance of 
revolution. , 279 
Bucharin recognised that the alliance between Social Democracy and the 
bourgeoisie was unnatural. Social Democracy and Fascism may have stood side 
by side in aiding the bourgeoisie in suppressing the workers, but they were not 
the same thing. He further warned that it was a mistake to lump Social 
Democracy with Fascism and that these tendencies did not complete the Fascist 
process. 
280 
Yet the admission that Social Democracy possessed Fascist tendencies 
offered some validity to the notion that "Social Democracy is Social Fascism. " 
If Social Democracy possessed Fascist tendencies, could it not then become a 
Fascist party? After Bucharin's demise - in Comintern logic - this certainly was 
the case. It is clear that Bucharin's was attempting to approach the concept of 
Social Fascism with some delicacy. However, admitting any link between 
Social Democracy and Fascism left it open to future exploitation. 
279N. Bucharin, "The Programme of the Communist International. Adopted by the VI World 
Congress on the I't September 1928, in Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 
(1928): 1754. 
280 N. Bucharin, see International Press Correspondence (1928): 1039. 
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Second, Bucharin provided the economic rationale for Social 
Democracy's decline into Social Fascism. Bucharin used the relationship 
between Social Democracy and the bourgeoisie to demonstrate his own theories 
regarding the general crisis of Capitalism. Yet Social Democratic rhetoric still 
placed the party in opposition to the bourgeoisie. According to Bucharin, Social 
Democracy was not the natural ally of the bourgeoisie and during other periods 
they would have stood opposed to one another. However, as Capitalism had 
reached a critical point the bourgeoisie were using Social Democracy to 
suppress the working class. While Social Democracy might behave in a Fascist 
manner, it was the actual Fascist who would take advantage of Social 
Democracy's inaction and work to destroy the "revolutionary labour vanguard. " 
Bucharin used the behaviour of Social Democracy to substantiate his own 
theory of Imperialism and Capitalist decline and perpetuate the notion of the 
emergence of the Third Period . 
28 1 He explained that the alliance of the SPD and 
the bourgeoisie as demonstrative of the weakness of the period of relative 
stabilisation i. e. if the bourgeoisie felt secure there would be no need for them to 
make alliances with their natural enemies the Social Democrats. It is clear that 
Bucharin saw the relationship between Social Democracy, Fascism, and the 
bourgeoisie as signs of the impending collapse of the Capitalist system. 
Third, Bucharin attacked the social make up of Social Democracy. In the 
Programme of the Sixth Congress Bucharin cited the Right wing of Social 
Democracy as avowedly counter revolutionary while the "Left wing Social 
Democracy, in practice acts against the workers, particularly in acute and 
281 Kozlov and Weitz pointed out that following Bucharin's defeat in the Comintern, his 
disproportional ity economics were replaced with Varga's underconsumptionist views. Nicholas 
N. Kozlov and Eric D. Weitz, "Reflections on the Origins of the 'Third Period': Bukharin, the 
Comintern, and the Political Economy of Weimar Germany, " Journal of Contemporary History 
3.24 (1989): 402-403. 
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critical situations... and is therefore, the most dangerous faction in the Social 
, 99282 Democratic parties. While Bucharin declared both Right and Left wings of 
Social Democracy as dangerous his approach toward Social Democracy was 
met with opposition. Antagonism against Social Democracy was mounting and 
Bucharin's approach was considered too moderate for some of the German 
hardliners who had hoped that the Sixth Congress would provide an all out 
assault against Social Democracy. Yet even Bucharin's "moderate" attitude 
toward Social Democracy played a role in the escalation of hostility toward 
Social Democracy. This was a distinct shift away from the United Front tactics 
in which the KPD attempted to ally with the Left wing of Social Democracy in 
an effort to lure away its members. By the time the Sixth Congress actually 
met, Bucharin had fallen out of favour and the hardliners were able to get what 
they wanted - anti-Social Democratic hostility was developed into the theory of 
Social Fascism. 
Bucharin's role in the development of Social Fascism into a theory is 
rather ambiguous. His economic policies did not survive his demise nor did his 
distinction between Social Democracy and Fascism. However, as demonstrated 
above, Bucharin clearly played a role in the perpetuation of hostilities against 
Social Democracy. Bucharin insisted that Social Democracy at times "behaved 
in a fascist manner, " the alliance between the SPD and the bourgeoisie 
demonstrated the weakness of the Capitalist system, and the Left wing of Social 
Democracy was the most dangerous section of Social Democracy. These things 
were picked up by the so-called theorist of Social Fascism, albeit they were 
exaggerated and distorted. 
282 N. Bucharin, "The Programme of the Communist International. Adopted by the VI World 
Congress on the I" September 1928, in Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 
(1928): 1754. 
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11. The Practical Foundations of a Pseudo Theorv 
At the end of 1928 and at the beginning of 1929 a general political shift 
in the KPD occurred. As previously discussed by the time of the Sixth 
Congress in September 1928, Bucharin had already lost influence and was 
officially ousted at the Tenth Plenum in 1929. In Germany a significant shift, 
both politically and socially, was also taking place. As the Comintern and the 
KPD changed, the meaning of Social Fascism also evolved. The notion that 
"Social Democracy is Social Fascism" experienced a revival after the Sixth 
Congress and the proclamation of the Third Period. The second wave of Social 
Fascism occurred in 1929 and lasted until the end of the Weimar Republic. In 
its second wave Social Fascism was marked with the exaggerated characteristics 
of Stalinism. In 1929 two key events took place that helped rationalise the use 
of Social Fascism as a theory - the Wittorf Affair and the May Day 
demonstrations or what became known as Blutmai (Bloody May). Although 
neither event can be credited for creating the conditions for the development of 
Social Fascism into a theory both occurred at the appropriate time to add fuel to 
the propaganda fires. The Wittorf Affair was used to rid the party of any 
remaining opposition while May Day 1929 was used as a springboard for the 
hardliners to transform anti-Social Democratic propaganda. 283 
283 Draper disputed the cause and effect scenario described by the official East German 
Communist history of the Weimar Republic. He claimed that they insisted that the May Day 
street battles were the reason for the Communist's accusation that the SPD had "developed into 
Social Fascism. " Draper claimed that the revival of the "theory" of Social Fascism had taken 
place before May Day 1929 and the application of the theory in Britain did not require a 
catalyst. It is clear that the accusation that "Social Democracy is Social Fascist" was used as a 
slogan well before 1929.1 am not disputing Draper's cause and effect argument, but rather I am 
disputing his use of the term "theory. " I am arguing that Social Fascism did not become a 
"theory" until after the May Day events and therefore, the "theory" of Social Fascism was not 
the cause of the May Day demonstrations in 1929. Theodore Draper, 'The Ghost of Social 
Fascism, " Commentgy 47.2 (1969): 33; see Siegfried Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' Deutschland 
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This section will discuss the historical reasons during the latter part of 
the Weimar Republic for this theoretical shift in the KPD. The Wittorf Affair 
and May Day were used to prove the "correctness" of the KPD's shift toward a 
more extreme party line against Social Democracy in the form of the theory of 
Social Fascism. 
Wittorf Affair 
In March 1928 Thdlmann appointed his friend John Wittorf as the 
political secretary of the Hamburg district party organisation. 284 It was soon 
discovered that Wittorf had misappropriated a large amount of his district's 
party funds. The scandal became known as the Wittorf Affair. 285 In May 1928 
Thdlmann and his Hamburg colleagues, fearing what the scandal would do to 
the party decided to conceal the scandal. The financial discrepancies were 
eventually discovered and his opponents, who were referred to as the 
64 conciliators, " seized the opportunity to oust Thdlmann. His expulsion was 
ratified at a meeting of the Central Committee of the KPD and the KPD 
Politburo. Ernst Thdimann's involvement in the Wittorf Affair actually 
zur Geschichte eines Politischen Begriffs, " International Review of Social History 10.2 (1965): 
243. 
284 There appears to be a discrepancy about what Thalmann's relationship was to Wittorf. Many 
have alleged that he was Thalmann's brother-in-law. According to Weber and Carr he was not, 
but rather one of his friends. Herman Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: 
Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Europaische Verlagsantalt, 1969) 1: 199; E. H. Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: Foundations of 
a Planned Economy 1926-1929,3 vols. (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 
1979)3: 443. 
285 Also see Herman Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung 
der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsantalt, 
1969) 1: 199-210; Herman Weber, Der Thdlmann-Skandal: Geheime Korresoondenzen mit 
Stalin (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag GmbH, 2003); Kevin McDermott, "Stalin and the Comintern 
During the 'Third Period', 1928-33, " European History Quarterly 25 (1995): 412-413; Norman 
LaPorte, "Presenting a Crisis as an Opportunity: The KPD and the Third Period, 1929-1933, " 
in Search of Revolution: International Communist Parties in the Third Period, ed. Mathew 
Worley (London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 2004) 40; E. H. Carr, A History of 
Soviet Russia: Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929,3 vols. (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1979) 3: 442-448. 
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accelerated the shift in the Germany party's line i. e. it accelerated the 
acceptance of Social Fascism. 
At Thdlmann's request the matter was referred to the Executive 
Committee of the Communist International. The Comintern's intervention on 
Thdlmann's behalf signified that a new type of party was about to emerge. 
Moscow responded rather quickly and defensively as he was considered the 
party favourite. At a special presidium of the ECCI held in October 1928 
Thdlmann was not only cleared of any wrong doing, but accusations of 
misconduct were turned onto his opponents. The Presidium claimed, that 
although ThdImann had made a "serious mistake" in not alerting the Central 
Committee of Wittorf's monetary indiscretions, he did so only because he was 
trying to protect the party from a scandal. It was as though the SPD and the 
bourgeoisie were waiting in the lurch for such a scandal so that they could 
exploit the opportunity to discredit the KPD and prevent it from carrying out its 
work. The ECCI also insisted that the Central Committee of the KPD was not 
only wrong to publish the resolution to condemn ThdImann, but more 
importantly the ECCI declared that the KPD Central Committee was "mistaken" 
to condemn ThdImann in the first place. However, this mistake was only 
possible because the majority of the members were ill informed and "allowed 
themselves to be misled by political opponents within the CC.... These 
comrades proceeded to exploit the Wittorf Affair in their fractional group 
interests against comrade Thdlmann. , 286 The Presidium accused Thdlmann's 
opponents, the so called "conciliators" of attempting to change the party 
286 "Extracts from a Decision of the ECCI Presidium on the Circumstances Connected with the 
Embezzlement of Party Funds in Hamburg, " eds. Jane Degras, The Communist International 
1919-1943 - Documents, 3 vols. (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1960) 2: 550- 
551. 
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leadership and further insisted that the Central Committee of the KPD should 
take steps "to liquidate all fractional groups in the party. 99287 Stalin and Molotov 
also became involved in the matter and openly supported Thdlmann. 288 Stalin's 
support made it abundantly clear that Thdlmann was untouchable. The 
consequences of the Wittorf Affair were extremely significant. 
The Comintern's veto of the Central Committee's decision to remove 
Thdlmann overtly removed any remaining autonomy the KPD possessed. 
Comintern's declaration of ThdImann's innocence and his backing by Stalin and 
Molotov created a situation, similar to that of the Soviet Union, where the 
decisive majority supported the KPD's subordination to the Soviet Union. 289 
The Presidium's insistence that fractional groups be liquidated was used as the 
green light for Thdlmann to rid the party of his opposition. Massive purges of 
local and district branches ensued and party leaderships were uprooted . 
290 Even 
respected members of the KPD such as Emest Meyer and Arthur Ewert were 
demoted or forced to capitulate. With the full backing of Moscow Thdlmann 
287 "Extracts from a Decision of the ECCI Presidium on the Circumstances Connected with the 
Embezzlement of Party Funds in Hamburg, " eds. Jane Degras, The Communist International 
1919-1943 - Documents, 3 vols. (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1960) 2: 550- 
551. 
288 Humbert-Droz was critical of the way in which the Wittorf Affair was handled as the Right 
Wing had been excluded from the discussion. Stalin responded by accusing Humbert-Droz of 
opportunism. Stalin further insisted on "a general tightening up of iron discipline" and called 
upon the 21 conditions of membership to rationalise his claim. In reality this meant the purging 
of any - real or perceived - opposition. J. Stalin, "Stalin's Speech at the Presidium Meeting of 
the ECCI held Dec. 19,1928, " The Communist International 6.4 (1929): 143-149. 
289For McDermott this was "the deciding moment in the 'Stalinization' of the Comintern. " 
However, LaPorte insisted that it was Blum& that marked the completion of "party's political 
and organisational Stalinisation. " Kevin McDermott, "Stalin and the Comintern During the 
'Third Period', 1928-33, " European History Quarterly 25 (1995): 413; Norman LaPorte, " 
'Social Fascism', 'Stalinisation' and the Case of the Saxon Communist Party, 1928-9, " Labour 
History Review 67.1 (2002): 74. 
290 The Wittorf Affair kicked off a series of purges in the Comintern's parties. By 1930 the 
seven members who had been elected at the Sixth Congress had been expelled. According to 
McDermott, between September 1929 and January 1930 a Purge Commission screened 239 
Communist officials, 201 were verified as loyal members, 31 were given penalties, and 7 were 
expelled from the Russian Party. McDermott insisted that the process unleashed a wave of fear 
amongst Comintern employees. Kevin McDermott, "Stalin and the Comintern During the 
'Third Period', 1928-33, " European History Quarterly 25 (1995): 413-415. 
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was able to consolidate his leadership position. As a consequence a new type of 
party emerged - one that was staunchly loyal to the Comintern, the Soviet 
Union, and to Stalin. 
While the Wittorf Affair did not create the conditions for the 
advancement of Social Fascism into a theory it certainly created a new 
environment in the KPD. The Wittorf Affair demonstrated the overt weakness 
of the KPD Central Committee and the KPD Politburo in the face of Soviet 
intervention. It rid the party of what little opposition existed so that the 
leadership could change its course without any resistance and sent a very clear 
message. The KPD was subordinated to the will of the Soviet leaders. 
Blutmai - May Day 1929 
The acute divisions in the working class and the looming Great 
291 Depression were exasperated by the events that took place on May Day 1929 . 
May Day 1929 marked the first time that Communists and Socialists held 
separate celebrations. Traditionally May Day in Berlin had always been a 
single united event sponsored by the Trade Unions, which were generally 
dominated by the SPD. In 1929 Communists refused to march in the same 
demonstrations as Social Democrats. On December 13,1928 Karl Zbrgiebel, 
291 Also see Evelyn Anderson, Hammer or Anvil: The Stoly of the German Working-Class 
Movement (1945; New York: Oriole Editions, 1973) 130-135; Kevin McDermott and Jeremy 
Agnew, The Comintern: A History of Communism From Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan 
Press, Ltd., 1996) 101-102; Hsi-Huey Liang, The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar Republic 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970) 106-108; Herman Weber, Die 
Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
RepjIblic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsantalt, 1969) 1: 224-225; Stefan 
Berger, Social Democracy and the Working Class in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century 
germ Mgny (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000) 105-106; Chris Bowlby, "Blutmai 1929: 
Police, Parties and Proletarians in Berlin Confrontation, " The Historical Journal 29.1 (1986): 
137-158; Siegfried Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' Deutschland zur Geschichte eines Politischen 
Begriffs, " International Review of Social History 10.2 (1965): 233-234; E. H. Carr, A Histoly of 
Soviet Russia: Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929,3 vols. (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1979) 3: 457-463. 
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the Social Democratic Police President of Berlin, announced a 
Demonstrationsverbot in Berlin. The measure proclaimed all open air meetings 
and marches illegal on the grounds that such activities posed a danger to public 
safet Y. 
292 Communist hostility exercised against the Social Democrats was 
intensified in March 1929 when the Social Democratic Prussian Minister of the 
Interior, Albert Grzesinski issued a "final warning" against radical violence and 
threatened to intervene ruthlessly. 293 
At this point it is important to point out the dramatic chasm between the 
SPD rank and file and the bureaucratised SPD leaders. The issue of 
Demonstrationsverbot merely highlighted this divide. Many of the old pre-war 
SPD members were horrified at the notion that a SPD dominated government 
should ban a traditional SPD event. The SPD were, after all, responsible for its 
institution in Gennany forty years prior. The KPD press was keen to publish 
the outrage of the SPD rank and file, while the National Socialists emphasised 
the dramatic irony that SPD members should put the police on alert on a day of 
proletarian celebration. The National Socialists interpreted this action as the 
tides turning in their favour. 
Regardless of their outrage Social Democrats organised their 
celebrations behind closed doors, while the KPD insisted that its members take 
to the streets. The Central Committee called for peaceful demonstrations but 
292 Bowlby insisted that the Demonstrationsverbot was a result of the Sixth Congress at the end 
of 1928 and its pronouncement of the arrival of the "Third Period. " Communist press 
propagated an improvement in revolutionary prospects. The KPD press also expressed extreme 
indignation at Zbrgiebel and Grzesinski. Bowlby claimed that in psychological terms that the 
tone of the press may have provided the preconditions for the clashes that occurred on May Day 
1929. Chris Bowlby, "Blutmai 1929: Police, Parties and Proletarians in Berlin Confrontation, " 
The Historical Journal 29.1 (1986): 138. 
293 For a more detailed description on the political career of Grzesinski see Anthony Glees' 
article. While Glees celebrated the political life of Grzesinski, he rather surprisingly passed 
over the significance of the Demonstrationsverbot in 1929. Anthony Glees, "Albert Grzesinski 
and the Politics of Weimar Prussia, 1926-1930, " The English Historical Review 89.353 (1974): 
814-834. 
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told workers to be prepared to strike on May the 2 nd if the police spilled 
workers' blood. 294 Certain working class areas were deemed "problem areas" 
and tactical forces Bereitschaftspolizei had been on alert for several weeks. 295 
On the morning of May the 1" demonstrators began to gather in working class 
areas. The police had little problem breaking up these small groups. In most 
cases the police resorted to the use of their rubber truncheons. However, by 
mid-afternoon the problem ceased to be that of crowd control and "warning" 
shots were fired in Bfilow-Platz, Mitte, Neukblln, and Prenzlauer Berg, and the 
situation very quickly became a running street battle. During the afternoon and 
evening indoor meetings held by the SPD, KPD, and Trade Unions ended and 
thousands of people poured into the streets - some joined the demonstrators 
others were merely on their way home while others were simply lost in the 
confusion. As the crowds grew the police became more aggressive. The police 
acted indiscriminately and attacked civilians, which merely served to outrage 
onlookers. Parks and open spaces were cleared with the use of truncheons, 
pistols, and water canons. In Schbneberg police were attacked and beaten after 
they had been seen to strike girls and women. In other areas the police were hit 
with rocks, bottles, rubbish, and even excrement to which the police responded 
with shots. Everywhere in the city the police performed house raids and mass 
arrests. By late afternoon the police had sealed off certain sections of the city 
294 Bowlby also pointed out that there seemed to be an expectation among KPD leaders that 
despite government warnings that in the face of popular support the ban would be lifted. 
Rosenhaft, on the other hand, claimed that the expectation of violence was strong on both sides. 
The police were just better prepared. Regardless of whether the KPD leaders thought that May 
Day would pass without violence or whether they expected the violence the fact remains that the 
rank and file were obviously unprepared for an armed clash with the police. Chris Bowlby, 
"Blutmai 1929: Police, Parties and Proletarians in Berlin Confrontation, " The Historical Journal 
29.1 (1986): 141; Eve Rosenhaft, "Working-Class Life and Working-Class Politics: 
Communists, Nazis and the State in the Battle for the Streets, Berlin 1928 - 1932, " eds. Richard 
I Besel and Edgar J. Feuchtwanger Social Change and Political Development in Weimar 
QgLmany (London: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1981) 224. 
295The Bereitschaftspolizei were special squads used for riot control. 
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and over the next few days whole working-class districts were placed under 
Martial Law. 
In Wedding and Neuk6lln the demonstrations were quickly transformed 
from running street battles into street combat. Wedding was notoriously 
considered a bastion of Communism. The area around K6sliner Strasse, in 
particular, was regarded as the most "solidly revolutionary community. , 296 
Demonstrators had gathered in the early morning behind Communist banners. 
By mid-morning they attempted to make their way into the city centre and the 
police moved in. Police efforts to disperse crowds were frustrated by the 
demonstrators' familiarity with their own neighbourhoods, which allowed them 
the advantage of ducking into side streets and alleyways. The police were 
showered with hard objects from the houses. Thinking that they had been fired 
upon from one of the houses, the police opened fire. By evening demonstrators 
had erected a barricade. The police responded by sending in two tactical teams 
in armoured cars. Within a few hours three city blocks had been sealed off by 
the police and by midnight the police were firmly in control. The area remained 
sealed for the next two days and residents' homes were searched for weapons. 
In Neukijlln the situation was similar. Demonstrators erected barricades in the 
area around Hermanstrasse. The police responded by sending in armoured cars 
to assault the barriers. In Neuk6lln, just as in Wedding, police believing that 
they had been fired upon fired shots into the surrounding houses. By the 6th of 
May most of the Martial Law regulations that governed Wedding and Neukijlln 
had been lifted. The police had officially registered 1,228 arrests, 194 wounded 
296 Chris Bowlby, "Blutmai 1929: Police, Parties and Proletarians in Berlin Confrontation, " The 
Historic alJoumal 29.1 (1986): 144. 
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and 25 deaths. None of the dead were police officers and at least six of the dead 
were shot in their own homes. 297 
KPD's Reaction to the May Day Demonstrations 
The impact of Blutmai was extremely significant in the formulation of 
Social Fascism into a theory. May Day served as a demoralising blow to entire 
working class communities all over Berlin. Victimisation by the police was not 
limited to individuals or members of certain parties. Even people who were 
innocently on their way home from indoor activities were apprehended and 
beaten by the police. 298 As a result the police actions on May Day 1929 served 
to widen the gap between the working class and the SPD supported State. 
While the May Day events were not significantly different than what the KPD 
had experienced in its "revolutionary" days - leaders were not rounded up and 
tried and hundreds of civilians were not dead - May Day 1929, nonetheless, had 
a considerable impact on the course that the KPD pursued after the events. 
First, May Day was used to rationalise the party's new course and party 
officials wasted no time in generating propaganda. In fact, the Twelfth Party 
Congress of the KPD was scheduled to be held in Dresden, but was transferred 
297 Eve Rosenhaft, "Working-Class Life and Working-Class Politics: Communists, Nazis and 
the State in the Battle for the Streets, Berlin 1928 - 1932, " Social Change and Political 
Development in Weimar Germany, eds. Richard J. Besel and Edgar J. Feuchtwanger (London: 
Croom Helm, Ltd., 1981) 227; Hsi-Huey Liang, The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar 
Republic (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970) 107; Kevin 
McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of Communism From Lenin to 
Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 101; Herman Weber, Die Wandlung des 
deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsantalt, 1969) 1: 224. 
298 Rosenhaft pointed out, "The peculiar horror of the reports of what happened in every 
working-class neighbourhood of Berlin on that first day lies in the impression they convey of 
the powerlessness of the individual civilian.... Nobody was safe from the police. " Eve 
Rosenhaft, "Working-Class Life and Working-Class Politics: Communists, Nazis and the state 
in the Battle for the Streets, Berlin 1928 - 1932, " Social Change and Political Development in 
Weimar Germany, eds. Richard J. Besel and Edgar J. Feuchtwanger (London: Croom Helm, 
Ltd., 1981) 225. 
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,, 299 to Wedding to be closer to the Berlin "street battles. The Congress did not 
hesitate in interpreting the significance of the May Day events. The Twelfth 
Congress declared, 
"The Berlin May struggle represented a turning point in the 
political developments in Germany. The preconditions 
emerged for the approach of an immediate revolutionary 
situation with whose development the question of armed 
insurrection inevitably gets placed the agenda. The May 
,. )300 struggle was the first test for the KPD. 
The Tenth Plenum of the ECCI held in Moscow in July 1929 reinforced the 
prognosis established by the Twelfth KPD Congress: 
"On the background of the unfolding strike battles and the 
new revolutionary upsurge, the action of the Berlin proletariat 
on May Day acquires the very greatest significance. This 
struggle not only revealed the fighting initiative of the German 
proletariat, but also the strength of the influence of the 
Communist Party of Germany which, notwithstanding the 
prohibition of the demonstration by Zoergiebel and the 
reformist trade unions, succeeded in leading nearly 20,000 
workers into the street. The party has not retreated one step 
under the onslaught of the reaction, nor did it allow itself to be 
provoked by the bourgeoisie to an armed insurrection which in 
299 The Twelfth Party Congress was originally scheduled for May 5-10,1929, but was 
postponed and moved to Wedding at the last minute. The Congress took place on June 9-15, 
1929 and met a few blocks from where the fighting took place. Herman Weber, Die WandIlLng 
nismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsantalt, 1969) 1: 225. 
'00 Waffen Fur den Klassenkampf: BeschRisse des XII. Parteitages der K. P. D.. (Berlin: 
Internationaler Arbeiterverlag, G. m. b. H., 1929) 25. 
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the then existing situation would have led to the isolation of 
the revolutionary vanguard and the loss of its position. 
The Berlin May Days constitute a turning point in the 
class struggle in Germany and accelerate the tempo of the 
revolutionary upward trend of the German working class 
movement. ýý301 
The KPD leadership insisted that the events in Berlin demonstrated that the 
predictions of the Sixth Congress were correct - the working class had become 
more revolutionary and that the tide was turning in their favour. Clearly this 
rise in the revolutionary tide was a figment of the Comintern's imagination. 
Second, the KPD leadership was eager to present the May Day events as 
revolutionary and link them to the upturn predicted at the Sixth Congress in 
1928. The Communist press interpreted the Berlin barricades as a sign that the 
working class had become increasingly revolutionary. The barricades 
themselves were the "reflection of the growth of the revolutionary 
perquisites. ' 302 But as the KPD leadership was applauding its predictions, it 
failed to examine its own failure to anticipate the unrest of both the KPD and 
SPD workers and their mutual hostility toward the State for the banning of the 
May Day processions. By their own admission the Berlin workers were 
unprepared for the conflict with the police. 
303 Rather than take any 
responsibility for calling on the workers to take up arms against the police with 
little or no preparation, the KPD blamed the police for "strategically" planning 
30' The World Situation & Economic Struggle: Theses of the Tenth Plenum of the E. C. C. I 
(London: Dorrit Press, Limited, n. d. ) 14-15. 
302 "May Day in Berlin, " The Communist International 4.16 (1929): 618. 
303 "May Day in Berlin, " The Communist International 4.16 (1929): 618. 
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the Berlin blood bath by provoking the working class into a confrontation. 304 
This is not intended to remove any responsibility from the police. The police 
acted in an extremely aggressive fashion. The details of the police's behaviour 
during the May Day events have already been well documented by historians 
such as Rosenhaft, Bowlby, LaPorte, and Liang. The point here is to 
demonstrate the KPD's manipulation of the May Day events to not only 
rationalise the Comintern's proclamations of the Sixth Congress, but also to 
relinquish responsibility for their own lack of preparation. 
The Berlin demonstrations were not highly organised attempts at 
insurrection. Although the police had issued warnings and insisted that they 
would be upholding the Demonstrationsverbot, the KPD leadership seemed to 
have not taken the warnings seriously. 305 It is clear that the KPD had no other 
alternative but to challenge the Demonstrationsverbot, nevertheless, they 
seemed to have been caught entirely unprepared by the spontaneous actions of 
not only their own members, but the working class in general. Locales were 
increasingly frustrated that their requests for guns were denied. May Day 1929 
highlighted the KPD propaganda for what it was -a lot of talk with no intention 
of following through. 
304 Interestingly Remmele insisted that the systematic cruelty exercised by the police, the 
dissolution of Communist press, and the banning of Communist literature signalled the 
beginning of deeper repression. Liang insisted that the police could have avoided the violence 
had it allowed open air demonstrations, which had taken place in previous years. Herman 
Remmele, "Die Lehren des Berliner Blutmai und dass drohende Verbot der Kommunistischen 
Partei Deutschlands, " Die Internationale 12.12 (1929): 387-388; Hsi -Huey Liang, The Berlin 
Police Force in the Weimar Republic (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1970) 106. 
305 LaPorte asserted that the KPD leadership intended to use the Demonstrationsverbot to justify 
their shift in policy. However this argument implies that the KPD leadership possessed a certain 
level of competency in order foresee the consequences of challenging the 
Demonstrationsverbot. Norman LaPorte, "Presenting a Crisis as an Opportunity: The KPD and 
the Third Period, 1929-1933, " In Search of Revolution: International Communist Parties in the 
1hird Period, ed. Mathew Worley (London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 2004) 43. 
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Finally, and by far the most important outcome of the May Day events, 
was the way in which the KPD used the events as irreftitable proof that the SPD 
were indeed Fascists. The Communist International accused Zbrgiebel of being 
"drunk with the blood of the workers. " The paper further described "Gennan 
social-democracy, which plays the role of leader to the other socialist parties 
has, during these May days, openly taken the road of fascism has openly 
become a social-fascist party. 93-306 The assertion that May Day proved the 
Communists accusations that Social Democracy had delved into Social Fascism 
neglected the fact that many of the dead and wounded were Social Democratic 
workers. 307 Rather than use the events to try to recruit fellow members of the 
working class, the KPD's accusations merely served to further alienate 
significant numbers of the working class from each other. The police's 
devastating and demoralising blow to working class communities, coupled with 
the shift in social make up of the KPD, meant that the divide and conquer tactics 
of the KPD met with little or no resistance. May Day 1929 was the last time 
that German Communists erected barricades and engaged in street battles of this 
nature with the police. Even when the KPD faced an all out ban in 1933 and 
Nazis surrounded Karl Liebknecht House neither Communists nor Social 
Democrats took to the streets. The animosity toward one another ran so deep 
that they failed to see the Nazi assault was being launched against the entire 
working class and not just their enemies. 
306 "May Day in Berlin, " The Communist International 4.16 (1929): 620. 
307 "Vorbereitung der Maikampagne 1930" Rundschrieben SAMPO RY 1/12/5/21 FBS 
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The significance for the German movement of the May Day events in 
1929 can not be over emphasised. 308 While it is true that in other countries the 
perpetuation of Social Fascism did not require a blood bath to launch it as a 
theory, the situation in Germany was significantly different from other 
European countries. In Germany the Socialist and Trade Union movements 
were quite strong and had the support of the working class. Therefore, in order 
to divide and conquer the movement i. e. irreversibly separate the two working 
class parties - the Social Democrats and the Communists -an event such as May 
Day was absolutely necessary. The impact of the May Day events was further 
exacerbated by the deepening depression. In Germany the acceptance of Social 
Fascism as a campaign and as a theory reflected the social and political shift in 
the KPD brought on by the depression. An increase in the number of 
unemployed, who were only interested in the struggle for their immediate needs, 
revealed the reasons for the acceptance of the KPD's "Left turn. " 
111. Pseudo Theory Takes Hold 
Prior to the Sixth Congress the Comintern and the KPD were split on their 
official position on Social Fascism. While the German moderates did not 
necessarily object to the use of Social Fascism, they were concerned with the 
rate that it was being introduced into the German party. This was certainly 
reflected in the programme of the Congress itself. The programme of the Sixth 
Congress of the Comintem, under the penmanship of Bucharin, took a cautious 
view toward the notion of Social Fascism. However, this official cautious 
attitude shifted as the political tide changed. While the shift toward Social 
308 Siegfried Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' Deutschland zur Geschichte eines Politischen 
Begriffs, " International Review of Social Hiýý 10.2 (1965): 233-234. 
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309 Fascism may have appeared random and sharp, it was in fact gradual. 
Tendencies within the Comintern had always existed that favoured a harsher 
line against Social Democracy, particularly from the German hardliners. 
Stalin's support for Th5lmann during the Wittorf Affair and the police's show 
of brutality on May Day 1929 turned the tides in favour of the German 
hardliners. The consequences of these events not only led to the purging of the 
"Conciliators, " but they also created a new enviromnent - one where there was 
no opposition. The German party followed the Soviet Union's lead and made 
its "Left turn. " As a result Social Fascism experienced a renaissance. The 
propaganda formulated from Blutmai lent the German hardliners the 
ammunition required to use the Tenth Plenum of the Comintern to turn the 
concept into a theory. 
In its later usage, after the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 and 
Bucharin's demise, the term Social Fascism became the dominating theory of 
the Third Period of the Comintern. This section will attempt to explain the key 
features of the theory of Social Fascism and the consequence that the adoption 
of Social Fascism had on the German Communists. The true significance of 
turning Social Fascism into a theory was that it marked the anti-Marxist and 
anti-theoretical path that Comintern's parties began to pursue from the 1930's 
onwards. Social Fascism changed the Marxism of the German Movement in the 
same way that Soviet Union's adoption of Socialism in One Country changed 
309 For a discussion on the evolution of Social Fascism see Siegfried Bahne, " 
'Sozialfaschismus' Deutschland zur Geschichte eines Politischen Begriffs, " International 
Review of Social History 10.2 (1965): 211-245; Theodore Draper, "The Ghost of Social- 
Fascism, " CommentLy 47.2 (1969): 29-42; Theodore Draper, "The Strange Case of the 
Comintem, " Survey -A Journal of East and West Studies 3.84 (1972): 91-137; E. H. Carr, A 
History of Soviet Russia: Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929,3 vols. (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1979) 3: 638-643; Mathew Worley, "Courting Disaster? 
The Communist International in the Third Period, " In Search of Revolution: International 
Communist Parties in the Third Period, ed. Mathew Worley (London and New York: I. B. 
Tauris & Co., Ltd., 2004) 9. 
194 
the Marxism of the Soviet Union. Social Fascism was the final nail in Marxist 
coffin of the German movement. 
1. Social Fascism as a Speciflc Form of Fascism 
The theory of Social Fascism insisted that German Social Democracy 
represented the specific form that German Fascism was taking. The Tenth 
Plenum declared, 
"In this situation of growing imperialist contradictions and 
sharpening of the class struggle, Fascism becomes more and 
more the dominant method of bourgeois rule. In countries 
where there are strong Social-Democratic parties [ie 
Germany], Fascism assumes the particular form of Social- 
Fascism, which to an ever-increasing extent serves the 
bourgeoisie as an instrument for paralyzing of the activity of 
the masses in the struggle against the regime of Fascist 
,, 310 dictatorship. 
The Tenth Plenum claimed that it continued to uphold the proclamations of 
Sixth Congress and insisted that it had been correct in predicting the increasing 
general crisis of Capitalism. The Tenth Plenum utilised the Political Economy 
developed by Bucharin for the Sixth Congress in true Stalinist style - picking 
and choosing what was useful and discarding the rest. The Programme of the 
Sixth Congress of the Comintern did not directly refer to Social Democrats as 
Social Fascists. However it did in fact concede that at times "Social Democracy 
"' The World Situation & Economic Struggle: Theses of the Tenth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. 
(London: Dorrit Press, Limited, n. d. ) 8. 
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,, 311 reveals Fascist tendencies. Generally, in the pre-May Day accounts, the 
Social Fascist propaganda followed Bucharin's lead and claimed that Social 
Democracy showed signs or "tendencies" towards Social Fascism. 312 The 
Plenum took Bucharin's analysis that Social Democracy's relationship with the 
bourgeoisie depicted the general crisis of Capitalism and adapted his claim that 
at times Social Democracy might take on a Fascist role and reinterpreted this to 
mean that Social Democracy was actually a form of Fascism. This notion that 
Social Democracy was actually a wing of Fascism was not new, both Zinoviev 
and Stalin had made these accusations in 1924.313 What is significant is the 
force with which Social Fascism was revived and the way in which the theory 
was rationalised. 
Obviously the logic followed a faulty path - if Social Democracy showed 
Fascist tendencies during a period of Capitalist decline, then in a period of 
severe Capitalist crisis it would become a fully fledged Fascist party. However 
in aligning Social Democracy with Fascism the Communist's merely 
demonstrated their own lack of understanding regarding the nature of Fascism 
as a movement. In hindsight this proved to be a very costly mistake. Bucharin 
defined Fascism as 
311 While it is true that Bucharin was cautious over referring to Social Democracy as form of 
Fascism, his analysis was not significantly different than what was later adopted. Essentially it 
was not a far jump from Bucharin admitting that Social Democracy sometimes behaved in a 
Fascist manner to Social Democracy actually being a form of Fascism. N. Bucharin, "The 
Programme of the Communist International Adopted at the VI. World Congress on Ist 
September 1928, Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 (1928): 1754. 
312 Koenen's article is an excellent example of this as it was published before the May Day 
events and described German Social Democracy as showing "increasingly definite fascist 
tendencies. " Interestingly, Koenen pointed out that it would be incorrect to assume that 
Germany would face the establishment of a Fascist government similar to that of Mussolini in 
Italy. He insisted that the method in which Fascist employed would depend on various 
circumstances such as the time period and the economic and political situation of each country 
and in Germany this would take the form of Social Fascism. Wilhelm Koenen, "Social Fascism 
in Germany, " The Communist International 6.11-13 (1929): 529-530. 
313 G. Zinoviev, "Lessons of the German Event, " International Press Correspondence 4.14 
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"The Fascist system is a system of direct dictatorship, 
ideologically masked by the "national idea" and representation 
of the 'professions'. ... It is a system that resorts to a peculiar 
form of social demagogy ... in order to utilise the discontent of 
the petty bourgeoisie - the creation of a compact well paid 
hierarchy of fascist units, a party apparatus and a 
bureaucracy. ' 314 
Like Zinoviev before him, Gerber defined "Fascism is the general tendency of 
the development of bourgeois democracy in the period of capitalist decline. , 315 
Communist training material defined Fascism as "a method of direct 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. " 316 Each definition created by the Communists 
both for theoretical and propaganda purposes led back to Social Democracy and 
their relationship as the protector of the Weimar State. 317 The theory of Social 
Fascism clearly had nothing to do with combating the growth of Fascism in 
Germany. In featuring Social Democracy as Fascist the Comintern completely 
ignored the growth of the Right. 
2. The Third Period and the Upsurge in Revolution 
The Comintern's declaration of an upsurge in the revolutionary 
movement during a non-revolutionary time ran counter to the Bolshevik and 
314 N. Bucharin, 'The Programme of the Communist International Adopted at the VI. World 
Congress on I't September 1928, Moscow, " International Press Correspondence 8.92 (1928): 
1754. 
315 Rudolf Schlesinger used the pseudonym of R. Gerber. R. Gerber, "The Face of German 
Social Fascism, " The Communist International 6.21 (1929): 801. 
316 Lehrbrief Nr. 2: Faschismus und Sozialfaschismus! 1930 SAMPO RY IlUnO71100 FBS 
248/11599: 3; Kursusmaterial Nr. 4- Aktuelle Fragen des proletarischen Kassenka! Lipfes 
SAMEPO RY 1/12/707/97 FBS 248/11598. 
317 Social Democracy was charged with being the "Fascist reserve" of the bourgeoisie. 
Kur; usmaterial Nr- 4- Aktuelle Fragen des proletarischen Kassenkampfes SAMPO RY 
1/12/707/97 FBS 248/11598: 16. 
197 
German Marxist tradition of waiting for the appropriate time to conduct a 
revolution. The Comintern used the May Day events of 1929 to prove that the 
proletariat had indeed arrived at the new revolutionary Third Period. 
"The new feature in the situation since the Sixth World 
Congress is the sharply marked radicalisation of the 
international working class and the rising of the revolutionary 
labour movement.... The growth of influence of Communism 
among the masses is leading the masses of workers to resort to 
more active methods of fights against the bourgeoisie. , 318 
Descriptions of Social Democracy as Social Fascist were used to demonstrate 
the "correctness" of the Sixth Congress and the notion that the contradictions in 
the "relative stabilisation" of German economy would lead to a serious crisis in 
the Capitalist system. Social Democracy's cooperation with Finance Capital 
merely highlighted the fragility of the system. This type of analysis was meant 
to bolster the proclamation of the Third Period and spark hope that revolution 
was indeed on the horizon. 319 Social Democracy's defence of the Finance 
Capital and the State during the May Day events showed the decay of the 
system. The workers' answer to the KPD's call for demonstrations meant 
revolutionary potential had shifted in their favour. 
3. Hidden Nature of Social Fascism 
318 The Comintern claimed that it had control over the situation on May Day and under the 
guidance and influence of the KPD 200,000 workers took to the streets. The World Situation & 
Economic Struggle: Theses of the Tenth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. (London: Dorrit Press, 
Limited, n. d. ) 12-14. 
3 19 To a certain extent this type of campaigning gained the KPD support. Membership increased 
from 105,744 in May 1929 to 135,160 in December 1929. However, KPD membership never 
came close to matching its March 1921 figure of 359,000 members. Herman Weber, Die 
Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung, der KPD in der Weimarer 
Rep. lLblic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsantalt, 1969) 1: 362-363. 
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In formulating his theory of Social Fascism Schlesinger claimed the hidden 
nature of Social Fascism made it more dangerous than open Fascism. He 
conceded that there were different forms of Fascism. He insisted that Social 
Democracy had an advantage over other Fascist groups in Germany because it 
began as an anti-Capitalist organisation and continued to propagate "anti- 
Capitalist demagogy" in which they hoped would win the workers. In an effort 
to suit a working class who had been brought up in Socialist traditions, "a 
Socialist label is stuck on to [a fascist] bottle. The contents are unadulterated 
fascism. , 320 Social Democracy hid behind "bourgeois democracy, " whereas 
Fascism in Italy or Poland was "unmasked" and open. 
"Social Fascists prefer a moderate and 'lawful' application of 
bourgeois class coercion ... they guard their 
'democratic' 
drapings, and strive chiefly to preserve its parliamentary 
forms, for without these, the social fascists would be 
hampered in carrying out their special function of deceiving 
the working masses. At the same time, the social fascists 
restrain the workers from revolutionary action against the 
capitalist offensive and growing fascism, play the part of a 
screen behind which the fascists are able to organise their 
,, 321 forces, and build the road for the fascist dictatorship. 
Communist propaganda insisted that as the contradictions within the Capitalist 
system were becoming more acute the SPD lost its capacity to conceal itself 
behind a "mask" and "the social fascist character of Social Democracy was 
320 R. Gerber, "The Face of German Social Fascism, " The Communist International 6.21 (1929): 
804. 
321 "Thesis of the Twelfth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. on the Report of Comrade Kuusinen, " 
and Resolutions of the Twelfth Plenum of the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 
1932): 11-12. 
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becoming more and more clear, transparent and unconcealed. 9,322 However, 
both Fascism and Social Fascism could be characterised by their use of a 
parliamentary democracy to rationalise the use of terror against the working 
class. The only thing that differentiated Social Democracy's (the Social Fascist) 
programme from other forms of Fascism was its terminology. 323 
4. Attacks on the SPD's Social Basis 
The theory of Social Fascism attacked the social basis of Social 
Democracy. Gerber insisted that Social Democracy's development from a 
reformist party into a Social Fascist party of the bourgeoisie in turn corrupted 
the social basis of the party. 324 In Germany, in particular, this led to the 
corruption of the "aristocracy of labour. " 325 The refonnist nature of the party 
led to the development of the "anti-proletarian attitude of the new labour 
aristocracy. " For Gerber this was one of the key characteristics of Social 
Fascism. The Communist training material explained that Social Fascism was a 
new stage in the development of Social Democracy in the international arena. 
In the epoch of Imperialism the bourgeois workers' party used bribes on a small 
layer of workers, thereby creating the aristocracy of labour. In the pre-war era 
322 Propaganda insisted that the economic crisis would "unmask" the Social Fascist and expose 
them. R. Naumann, "The Social Fascists on the 'Solving' of the World Economic Crisis and 
Unemployment, " The Communist International 8.5 (1931): 144; R. Gerber, "Der Bankrott der 
sozialfaschistischen Theorie, " Die Internationale 14.5 (1931): 205. 
323 Trotsky declared "Social Democracy has prepared all the conditions necessary for the 
triumph of fascism. But by this fact it has also prepared the stage for its own political 
liquidation. [But even so] it was complete balderdash to identify Social Democracy with 
fascism. " Leon Trotsky, "What Next? Vital Questions for the German Proletariat, " The 
Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, intro Ernest Mandel (New York: Pathfinder Press, 197 1) 
144-145. 
324 Thdlmarm referred to the SPD as the "social mainstay" of the bourgeoisie. Ernst Thdlmann, 
"Faschismus und Sozialfaschismus, " Im Kampf Geizen die Faschistische Diktatur (Berlin: Ernst 
Schneller, 1932) 16. 
325 R. Gerber, "The Face of German Social-Fascism, " The Communist International 6.21 (1929): 
801-802; Kursmaterial Nr. 2: GrundizUge der leninistischen Stragegie und Taktik in der 
geizenwdaige Periode (Zentral Kommittee der Kommunistschen Partei Deutschlands, 1930) 21- 
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this took the form of higher wages and parliamentary protection especially for 
skilled workers. These workers became accustomed to their privileged 
positions and felt themselves above their fellow workers. This in turn led to 
their support of the Capitalist system. 
In the post-war era highly skilled workers found their privileged 
positions under threat due to increased mechanisation and rationalisation of 
production. The SPD, therefore, was forced to develop a new form of "direct 
bribery" in the fonn of State jobs in the civil service. These highly skilled 
workers also took on the role of community arbitration and other stately and 
communal undertakings. 326 In essence, in an effort to retain the support of the 
"aristocracy of labour" Social Democracy was forced to create protected jobs 
for them. These "workers" were absorbed into the State machine. In an effort 
to protect their new jobs the "aristocracy of labour" needed to work for the 
advancement of Finance Capital and consequently toward the subjugation of the 
revolutionary aspiration of the proletariat. Essentially this new labour 
aristocracy had aspirations above their station. According to the propaganda 
their hopes rested on becoming part of the petty bourgeoisie and advancing into 
the bourgeoisie. The idea was that within the labour bureaucracy their 
advancement would assist the advancement of the entire working class. 
However, once they became a part of the State bureaucracy they ceased to be 
workers and their interests no longer coincided with the members of their fellow 
class. 
Gerber's analysis of the role of the labour aristocracy was rather 
problematic. While it is true that Lenin warned of the problems associated with 
... Lehrbrief Nr. 2: Faschismus und Sozialfaschismus! 1930 SAMIPO RY 1/12/707/100 FBS 
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the increasing aristocracy of labour, Gerber's association with it in 1929 appears 
out of date. When Lenin addressed the issues of the aristocracy of labour, the 
world economy was on an up turn and the working class was benefiting from 
this. By 1929 the world economy was very clearly on a downturn - the Young 
Plan was being draw up in Paris to avert an economic crisis and Black Friday 
would occur a few months after the publication of his article in October 1929. 
While it is true that the nature of German Social Democracy had become 
increasingly bureaucratic, particularly during the Weimar period, Gerber's 
analysis did not offer any in depth reasons for why this tendency, during this 
specific period, was any different than during any other period. Why was a 
supposed increase in the aristocracy of labour a sign of Social Fascism as 
opposed to what occurred during Lenin's time? In this area, Gerber made no 
attempt to offer a Marxist analysis for the correlation between Fascism and 
Social Democracy. Unemployment was indeed on the rise and those in 
privileged positions certainly guarded their jobs. However, this did not mean 
that certain sections of the working class were becoming Fascist. 
5. Attack on Trade Unions and Finance Capital 
Gerber insisted that the economic programme of Social Democracy had 
become "reformist"" and had revived the old revisionist notion of "growing into 
socialism. " The Communists claimed that Social Democracy's "reformist" 
relationship with the economic system led it to its Social Fascist conclusions. 327 
327 In 1930 KPD propaganda claimed that the process of Fascism displayed itself in all Capitalist 
countries through the emergence of Monopoly Capitalism. "Arbeitsplan zurn Kampfkongress 
gegen Faschismus, " Agi! prop SAMEPO RY 1/14/9/1 FBS 317/13188; Kursmaterial Nr. 2: 
Grundiziige der leninistischen Stragegie und Taktik in der gegenwqftige Periode (Zentral 
Kommittee der Kommunistschen Partei Deutschlands, 1930) 21: SAAVO RY 1/12/707/99 FBS 
202 
Gerber's analysis of Social Democracy's economic programme appeared 
regressive as it merely regurgitated the old revisionist debates. 328 He insisted 
that Social Democracy amalgamated the State apparatus with the "reformist" 
Trade Unions, while at the same time joining the party and the Trade Unions 
together with Finance Capital. This, according to the KPD material, was the 
foundation of Social Fascism, essentially the amalgamation of the SPD, the 
State, Trade Unions, and Finance Capital. Gerber further insisted "The greatest 
practical advance of German social-fascism at the present time is probably the 
progress of the trade unions and other mass organisations controlled by the 
,, 329 reformists. The Social Democrats use of Trade Unions granted them the 
support of mass organisations outside the State. This tactic was one of the key 
features of the Fascist dictatorship. In order to maintain ideological and 
organisational. unity, it was necessary for these unions to exclude any anti- 
Fascist tendencies, i. e. Communists. Clearly Gerber's analysis attempted to 
offer an explanation as to why Communists had been excluded from Social 
Democratic Trade Unions. His line of reasoning in no way attempted to address 
the reality of the economic situation existing at the end of the Weimar Republic. 
Consequence for German Communism 
In his definition of Social Fascism the American Communist Earl 
Browder asserted, "Fascism is a distinctive characteristic of the post-war period 
of capitalism. That is, it is one of the expressions of the efforts of the capitalist 
248/11598; Siegfried Bahne, " 'Sozialfaschismus' Deutschland zur Geschichte eines Politischen 
Begriffs, " International Review of Social History 10.2 (1965): 235. 
328 The World Situation & Economic Struggle: Theses of the Tenth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. 
(London: Dorrit Press, Limited, n. d. ) 9. 
329 R. Gerber, "The Face of German Social-Fascism, " The Communist International 6.21 (1929): 
807. 
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class to bolster up and defend its declining rule. ' 330 In his speeches he 
described Social Fascism as the "new prop" that held Capitalism in place and it 
was these Fascist forces that mobilised. Capitalism for the destruction of the 
working class. He also insisted that using the term Social Fascism to describe 
Social Democracy was not mere name calling, but was a scientific description. 
Browder's over simplified definition of Social Fascism summed up the logic 
behind referring to Social Democracy as Social Fascist. The consequences of 
the German Communist Party's development and adoption of Social Fascism 
were fairly disastrous for both the Comintern and the KPD. The Communists 
focus on Social Democracy as the main enemy prevented them from properly 
assessing the nature of Fascism. 331 
First, the theory of Social Fascism created an enemy within the working 
class - the Communists' fellow workers in the SPD. One of the 
key features of 
the theory of Social Fascism was that it insisted Social Democracy, in particular 
the "Left" wing, was the main enemy of the working class. 
332 This line of 
reasoning certainly intensified after the May Day events in 1929 and was 
reinforced at the Twelfth Party Congress of the KPD in which the "Left" wing's 
330 Earl Browder, The Meaning of Social-Fascism: Its Historical and Theoretical Background 
(New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1933) 1-4. 
331 In early 1933 Wilhelm Piek claimed, "If the Nazis come to power, they will be at the end of 
their rope in two months, and then it will be our turn. " As quoted in Babbette L. 
Gross, `Fhe 
German Communists' United-Front and Popular-Front Ventures, " The Comintern: Historical 
Highlights Essays, Recollections, Documents, ed. Milorad M. Drachovitch and Branko Lazitch 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishsers, 1966) 117. 
332 While the KPD propaganda conceded that it was incorrect to lump every single Social 
Democrat into a Social Fascist pile, this courtesy did not extend to the "Left" wing of the SPD. 
Lenzner referred to the "Left" Social Democracy as the "most dangerous" enemy of the 
proletarian revolution and the Communist movement. Lehrbrief Nr. 2: Faschismus und 
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methods were classified as dangerous and illusionary. 333 The Tenth Plenum 
further deepened the hostility toward the SPD Left and instructed all its sections 
to pay special attention to the struggle against the SPD's "Left" wing which 
"retards the process of the disintegration of Social Democracy by creating 
illusions that it... represents an opposition to the policy of the leading Social 
Democratic bodies, whereas a matter of fact, it whole-heartedly supports the 
,, 334 policy of Social Fascism. Essentially the "Left" wing of the SPD stood in 
the KPD's way as the revolutionary agent of the Germany working class. 
Indeed the Social Democrats were their greatest rivals and wielded more 
influence over the working class than the Communists. 335 The phraseology that 
they utilised was Marxist and pro-revolutionary in tone, but they still remained a 
part of the SPD as a whole and the KPD claimed they wholeheartedly 
supported the State's violent suppression of the working class. 336 
"The role of the 'Left', currently in the Social Fascist 
development phase of the SPD, is no better than its leadership. 
On the contrary, they mask Fascist party politics with left 
'Marxist' phrases, play the opposition, inspire in the workers 
333 Weber insisted that the Twelfth Party Congress was no longer a forum to discuss the party 
line but a show event with acclamation, which became the picture of a typical Stalinised party 
conference. Bericht des Zentralkommittees der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands an den 
12. Parteitag (Berlin: Internationaler Arbeiter-Verlag, G. m. b. H., 1929) 185; Waffen ffir den 
Klassenka! ppf: Bechliisse des XII. Parteigages- der K. P. D (Berlin: Internationaler Arbeiter- 
Verlag, G. m. b. H., 1929) 19; Herman Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die 
Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republic, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Europaische 
Verlagsantalt, 1969) 1: 226. 
334 The World Situation & Economic Struggle: Theses of the Tenth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. 
(London: Dorrit Press, Limited, n. d. ) 12; Kursmaterial Nr. 2: Grundiziige der leninistischen 
Stragegie und Taktik in der gegenwdrtige Periode (Zentral Kommittee der Kommunistschen 
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335 Hence the Central Committees insistence on the "liquidation of the Social Fascists mass 
influence. " J. Lenz, "Die Internationale des Sozialfaschismus in der Krise, " Die Internationale 
14.8 (1931): 365. 
336 Kursusmaterial Nr. 1 Was wollen die Kommunisten? Die Aufgaben des Proletariats in der 
Organisierung der Revolution (Zentralkommitee der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands, 
n. d. ) 16. Hoover Library: KPD Zentralkomitee. 
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the belief of the SPD's promotion of a revolutionary party, 
and take part in all Social Fascist swinishness and terrorist 
activities against the proletariat under the pretence of party 
discipline.... In any case their phrases and political methods 
are more dangerous than the open Social Fascist. , 337 
The KPD's attack on the SPD Left proved useful in subordinating the Gennan 
working class' desire for revolution. It may be assumed that the most natural 
ally for a radical Left wing party would be another Left wing party. That is also 
assuming that the parties involved wish to create a mutually beneficial change. 
The KPD's adoption of Social Fascism and its hostility toward the Left wing of 
the SPD made this impossible. With the SPD Left branded as Social Fascist 
and the "most dangerous" elements in Germany a useful enemy had been 
created. Social Democracy's involvement with the Weimar State - both as 
creator and protector of the State - made it an excellent target for 'Ienemy" 
status. The creation of an enemy was extremely important for the perpetuation 
of Social Fascism as a theory. Draper correctly asserted that Social Democracy 
was not the real issue. The concept of the enemy was something far more 
general. Anyone who posed any type of opposition to the Comintern could be 
branded a Social Fascist and ostracised. 338 
Second, the theory of Social Fascism removed itself from reality. 
Contrary to Comintern propaganda the reality of the world political and 
economic situation did not coincide with their claim of an "upsurge in 
revolutionary potential. " Trotsky, writing from exile in September 1930. ) 
pointed out that there was nothing to suggest that the revolutionary prospects of 
337 Lehrbrief Nr. 2: Faschismus und Sozialfaschismus! 1930 SANWO RY 1112nO7llOO FBS 
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the world had changed. There had been no changes in the "objective situation. " 
The tactical turn of the Third Period was "directly contradictory to the actual 
turn of the historic road. " The Comintern had adopted the notion of the "rise in 
revolutionary tide" during a time in which Communist parties throughout the 
world were becoming increasingly weaker, Capitalism appeared to be 
experiencing a commercial and industrial boom, and the working class appeared 
increasingly fragmented instead of united. 339 
The Wittorf Affair inadvertently accelerated the shift in attitude toward 
the SPD rank and file and helped lead to the acceptance of Social Fascism. 
Prior to 1928 the Right wing of the KPD was reluctant to adopt anti-Social 
Democratic propaganda. As previously discussed many had been members of 
the SPD and SPD Trade Unions prior the outbreak of the First World War. The 
purge of the "right deviators" coupled with a downward shift in the socio- 
economic conditions of the German working class brought on by the Great 
Depression led to shift in party membership. The party increasingly became the 
party of those who had nothing left to lose (not even their chains) - the 
unemployed. 340 Very often Communists were expelled or quite simply 
339 While Trotsky accurately described the flaws in the Comintern's proposed course, as an exile 
of the Communist movement, he was doomed like Cassandra to be ignored. Leon Trotsky, 
"The Turn in the Communist International and the Situation in Germany, " The Struggle Against 
Fascism in Germany, intro Ernest Mandel (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971) 55-56. 
340 The KPD failed to assess the damage that the waves of depression had had on all strata of 
German society. The working class were battling constant unemployment and the middle class 
and the peasantry were financially devastated. For Trotsky's assessment of the effect the "post 
war chaos" see Leon Trotsky, "What is National Socialism? (June 10,1933), " The Struggle 
Against Fascism in Germany, ed. Ernst Mandel (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971) 400-402. 
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excluded from the dominant Social Democratic Trade Unions. 341 In times of 
economic crisis, the Communists were the first to be laid off, thus furthering the 
working class division that already existed between skilled and semi-skilled 
workers and unskilled workers, as well as between young and old workers. As 
KPD became a party of the unemployed its members increasingly favoured 
confrontation with the SPD. This was naturally due to the SPD's association 
with the Weimar state and therefore, they were responsible party for the 
circumstances of the unemployed. However, the unemployed were extremely 
fickle and did not unconditionally support the KPD. Unlike the KPD Right who 
were interested in long-term campaigns, the unemployed tended to only support 
policies and participate in campaigns that reflected their immediate needs. 342 
The working class' reaction to the Demonstrationsverbot in May 1929 and 
their intentions of holding separate activities certainly signified something. 
However it was not an increase in revolutionary upsurge, but rather the 
opposite. The working class' insistence on holding separate events suggested 
that the two parties of the Left were becoming increasingly alienated from one 
another. With the working class thus divided, there was no chance of a 
revolutionary upsurge taking place. The Comintern's determination to create 
enemies - Right Deviators, Luxemburgists, Trotskyists, Concilliators, etc - 
meant that rather than seeking methods to unite the working class the true turn 
341 McDermott and Agnew claimed that "the behaviour of the social democrats themselves 
played an important role in legitimating 'social fascism'. The expulsion of communists from 
reformist trade unions in Germany and Britain the conciliatory stance of the SPD leaders 
towards capitalist rationalization provided longer-term evidence of social democracy's 
'degeneration'. " Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A HistoKy of 
Co imunism From Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 101,115-116. 
342 LaPorte referred to the unemployed as "paper soldiers. " Norman LaPorte, " 'Social 
Fascism', 'Stalinisation' and the Case of the Saxon Communist Party, 1928-9, " Labour His! M 
Review 67.1 (2002): 76. 
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that the Comintern was taking was not towards revolution, but towards a divide 
and conquer strategy that would subjugate and stagnate the working class. 
The outcome of the German Communist's adoption of the theory of Social 
Fascism was a catastrophic for the Marxist movement. History has told us the 
consequences of Social Fascism enabled the rise of Hitler's National Socialists 
and was disastrous for the German working class. 343 The Nazis made no 
distinction between the Social Democrats, Communists, and Trade Unionists 
when they rounded them up and placed them in concentration camps. The most 
common reason is the Communists failure to assess the dangerous nature of 
Fascism. KPD propaganda insisted that Fascism was "rooted" in Monopoly 
Capitalism and "Fascism is the direct dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in the 
present under the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism. , 
344 It was true 
that certain members of big business supported Hitler financially. 
345 However 
this did not mean that the National Socialists and the Social Democrats were the 
"instruments" of the bourgeoisie. 346 The point here is not merely that the KPD 
failed to assess the growth of Fascism during the Weimar Republic, but rather 
that the KPD had no intention of creating theory that reflected the reality of the 
Weimar period and this included assessing the nature of Fascism. The theory of 
343 Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of Communism From 
Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996) 117. 
344 KPD propaganda insisted that Fascism's economic basis - Monopoly Capitalism - 
differentiated it from backward forms of bourgeois reaction. "Arbeitsplan zurn Kampfkongress 
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Social Fascism had very little, if anything, to do with Fascism. The KPD and 
the Comintern utilised revolutionary rhetoric for the sole purpose of creating an 
enemy. The theory of Social Fascism epitomised the decay of Marxist theory in 
Germany. 
Summary 
The term Social Fascism experienced an interesting evolution. It originated 
from humble beginnings -a fusion of insults hurled at Social Democracy for 
their perceived betrayal of the working class movement. In his first attempts to 
validate this accusation, Zinoviev attempted to utilise the theory of Imperialism 
to explain why the alliance had taken place. Zinoviev's name calling was soon 
superseded by the Comintem's policy of Bolshevisation. The Maslow-Fischer 
group took up the anti-Social Democratic banner as a means of securing their 
own power. The former Social Democrats were targeted and purged from the 
party, thus leaving little Soviet opposition. 
Zinoviev possessed little capacity to offer a theoretical basis for Social 
Fascism. Zinoviev may have failed to provide the theoretical basis for Social 
Fascism, but his intensification of the hostility toward Social Democracy after 
1923 paved the way for what became the theory of Social Fascism. This task 
was inadvertently taken up by Bucharin and the Programme of the Sixth 
Congress. Bucharin provided the social, political, and economic rationale for 
the Social Fascist line that developed in the post-Sixth Congress Comintern. It 
is clear that Bucharin approached Social Fascism with moderation and 
attempted to make a distinction between Social Democracy and Fascism. But 
the distinctions he made were not significant enough to actually separate the 
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two. As a result Bucharin played a key role in the intensification of hostilities 
against the Social Democracy and the Left in particular. It is true that much of 
the Programme of the Sixth Congress was exaggerated and distorted to suite the 
needs of the Comintern spin doctors. Regardless of whether Bucharin's tone 
was too moderate for the German hardliners or not, Bucharin nonetheless 
pursued an anti-Social Democratic course in his attacks against the Left wing of 
the SPD. Each of the Comintern's leaders in his own way played a significant 
role in the development of Social Fascism into a theory. 
After Bucharin's demise Social Fascism was propagated as a theory. 
This theoretical shift was devastating. It created divisions within the working 
class pitting Social Democrats and Communists against one another. To a 
certain extent animosity already existed within the two parties of the Left, but in 
the past Comintern and Communists pursed a policy of cooperation. This was in 
an effort to lure SPD workers over to the side of the communists. Under Social 
Fascism these alliances no longer seemed natural. Social Fascism also marked 
the anti-theoretical and anti-Marxist path that the KPD and the Comintern had 
begun to pursue. While claiming to be a theory Social Fascism was not 
theoretical, but rather long winded propaganda. Its meaning was so ambiguous 
and detached from any theoretical underpinnings. The analysis that Social 
Fascism offered, in an effort to demonstrate its correctness, was taken from 
other sources and either watered down or manipulated to mean whatever the 
Comintern'required it to mean. Essentially each course that the KPD pursued 
under the guidance and pressure from Moscow led it to its Social Fascist end. 
Social Fascism used slogans to explain itself rather than draw on the already 
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existing theory. The use of slogans to explain theory was one of the enduring 
legacies of Social Fascism. 
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Chapter: Conclusion 
The game that was played in Germany has this singularfeature, that Hitler 
played checkers and his opponents played to lose. As for political genius, Hitler 
has no needfor it. The strategy of his enemy largely compensatedfor anything 
his own strategy lacked. 347 
This thesis has attempted to decipher how KPD theory changed from a 
revolutionary theory whose purpose was to improve the lives of the proletariat 
to an anti-Marxist theory whose purpose was to contain and control the 
revolutionary aspirations of the working class. This thesis has agued that the 
historical process was gradual and occurred in steps. While it is true that the 
history of the Weimar Republic was complex and turbulent, this thesis has 
attempted to point out the key events that significantly contributed to the course 
that the KPD pursued. Each step the KPD took brought it closer to the 
acceptance of Social Fascism. 
Rosa Luxemburg's influence in shaping the course of German Communism 
was limited but enduring. Throughout her time with German Social Democracy 
Rosa Luxemburg sought to develop Marxist theory that would bring the 
proletariat closer to fulfilling their revolutionary ambitions. This was very 
clearly demonstrated threw her contribution to the various debates within the 
SPD, but especially with her contribution to the Mass Strike debates after the 
1905 Russian Revolution. Luxemburg sought to utilise the lessons learned from 
the Russian experience and develop a theory that would solidify the bond 
between the consciousness of the masses and their actions - essentially she 
347 Leon Trotsky, "The German Catastrophe: The Responsibility of the Leadership (May 28, 
1933), " The Struggle Against Fascism in Germi! ny, intro. Ernest Mandel (New York: 
Pathfinder Press, 1971) 398. 
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sought to develop a theory that joined theory with political practice. But her 
efforts were thwarted by the changing nature of German Social Democracy. 
She had not realised until 1906 that German Social Democracy had changed to 
such a degree that they were slowly moving away from their Marxist rhetoric. 
Although Luxemburg and her supporters realised that the SPD was no longer 
revolutionary she remained within the party for fear of degrading into a sect, 
that was until the majority SPD expelled the Left and Centre in 1917. When 
Rosa Luxemburg and the other Spartacists formed the German Communist 
Party in 1918 she had a clear idea of the type of party she hoped to form. 
Indeed her pamphlet, Was will der Spartakusbund? (What does the Spartacus 
League Want? ) outlined a party that was similar to the pre-1906 SPD, but one 
that was not bureaucratic and more democratic. 
However from its birth the German Communist Party was plagued with 
problems. A few weeks after its founding conference Rosa Luxemburg and 
Karl Liebknecht were murdered by Freikorps and the party never recovered. 
Luxemburg and Liebknecht's successors were forced to take over the new party 
during a chaotic period. This thesis has argued that the KPD's inability to 
develop into a fully formed revolutionary party happened, in part, because the 
party leadership failed to acknowledge their role and duties as leaders of a 
political party and in part because of Bolshevik meddling. The successful 
Russian Revolution meant that the KPD's rank and file looked eastward - 
toward the Bolsheviks - rather than within for revolutionary guidance. 
Unfortunately the KPD's leadership was weak and could not control the 
influence that the Bolsheviks exercised. When faced with Comintern policies in 
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which they fundamentally disagreed with, the party leadership resigned their 
posts rather than fight the Bolsheviks or withdraw the party from the Comintern. 
This thesis has also argued that Lenin and the Bolsheviks' attempts to 
forcibly impose their model onto the German party were governed by their 
desperation to spread the revolution to Europe. Lenin believed that a revolution 
in Germany was imperative to the survival of the Russian revolution. Both 
Luxemburg and Lenin agreed that theory existed to guide the revolutionary 
movement and help the proletariat develop their consciousness as a class. 
Lenin's attempt to bypass the development of revolutionary consciousness of 
the working class by transplanting his model onto the German movement defied 
one of the fundamental features of Marxism. His insistence that the German 
party follow the Russian model did not force the revolution forward, but rather 
it merely served to undermine the fledgling party's efforts to develop a party 
that reflected the historic needs and traditions of the German movement. As a 
result, Bolshevik interference prevented the party from developing into a 
Marxist revolutionary party. Armed with arrogance and a victory in Russia the 
Bolsheviks truly believed that they possessed the correct revolutionary model 
that could be transplanted all over Europe. Desperation and arrogance 
prevented Lenin from seeing that the conditions that existed in Germany were 
fundamentally different than those that existed in Russia. 
In reality the Bolsheviks represented an outside force attempting to impose 
their will on the internal dynamic of the German working class. As a 
consequence of Bolshevik interference, the KPD did not develop the basic 
foundations to become either a revolutionary party or a main stream political 
party. During a crucial point in the development of the party the Gen-nan 
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leadership surrendered the ability to control the future course of the party. This 
initial surrender of power merely demonstrated the party's weakness in the face 
of the Comintern. By 1921 Paul Levi, the KPD leader, was expelled from the 
party over his controversial criticism of the "1921 March Action. " In expelling 
Levi the Comintem demonstrated their priorities - discipline, loyalty, and 
obedience above all. 
By the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921 Lenin had come to realise 
that the world revolution was not around the comer. Trotsky declared at the 
Third Congress of the Comintern, "The first revolutionary period of the 
revolutionary movement after the war ... may be regarded as by and large as 
terminated. )., 
348 In the Soviet Union this meant the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP). Through NEP the Soviet government began a process 
of industrialisation and collectivisation, as well as rebuilding trade relationships 
with Capitalist countries. 
In Germany the instability of the Weimar economy and the government 
meant that the Communists held onto to hope that revolution was still possible. 
The Ruhr crisis at the beginning of 1923 and the rising inflation sparked new 
revolutionary hope in Germany and the Comintern. However the disorganised 
efforts of the Communists and the Comintern shattered those hopes. By the end 
of 1923 the world socialist revolution had not materialised and many 
Communist Parties in Western and Eastern Europe operated on an illegal or 
semi-legal basis. The German party finally accepted that the revolutionary 
period had come to an end. The acceptance of the Dawes Plan in April 1924 
meant that Capitalism had managed to re-establish itself and a period of relative 
348 Leon Trotsky, "Theses on the International Situation and Tasks of the Comintern: Adopted 
unanimously at the Sixth Session, July 4,1921, " The First Five Years of the Communist 
International, 2 vols. (London: New Park Publications, Ltd., 1973) 1: 29 1. 
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stabilisation followed. The defeat of the "German October" marked a crucial 
turning point in the history of the KPD. From 1923 onward the German party 
became alienated from Marxism as a theory of revolution. It was during this 
transitional period that Marxism became dogmatic and associated with 
repression. So what happened? 
A combination of events changed the theoretical and practical course that 
the Comintern and the KPD pursued. This thesis has highlighted those events 
that the author felt to be the most crucial to the KPD's transition from a 
revolutionary party to a dogmatic party of repression. First, the failed 
revolution in 1923 and the subsequent economic stabilisation of the German 
economy was catastrophic. In the Comintern the failed revolution of 1923 
affected all the parties as the Soviets' struggle for power lurked in the 
background. Rather than analyse the events that led to the defeat of 1923 and 
draw on any lessons that could be learned, Zinoviev strategically removed any 
responsibility away from himself and blamed the German leaders and the Social 
Democrats. Regardless of the fact that Brandler did not believe the situation in 
Germany was revolutionary, he, Thalheimer, and Radek were removed from 
their positions. Trotsky was also implicated in the failure of the "German 
October. " It was during this period that Zinoviev began throwing around the 
term "Social Fascism" to describe the situation in Germany. 
Second, Lenin's death in 1924 struck a tremendous blow to the Russian 
party and the Comintern. His incapacitated state in the months leading up to his 
death created instability and confusion in the Soviet leadership, which resulted 
in a power struggle. This power struggle concluded with Stalin emerging as the 
premier lone leader and an increase in centralisation and bureaucratisation of the 
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Comintern's parties. In contrast to the revolutionary rhetoric put forth by Lenin, 
Stalin adopted a more sedentary approach in the forrn of the doctrine of 
Socialism in One Country. Socialism in One Country was adopted for the 
specific purpose of challenging Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. It 
focused inwardly and appealed to Soviet nationalism with its claim that the 
Soviet Union did not require an international revolution to be successful. The 
acceptance of Socialism in One Country changed the Russian party's 
relationship with the Comintern as it paved the way for the emergence of Third 
Period. 
The Soviets' struggle for power was reflected in the Comintern by the 
introduction of Bolshevisation at the Fifth Comintern Congress in June-July 
1924. Bolshevisation of the Comintern not only served to contain and control 
the member parties but also to neutralise any opposition. Bolshevisation set out 
to "Russify" the Comintern's parties by realigning the relationship between the 
Comintern central bodies and the Russian party. Bolshevisation set out to create 
strictly disciplined organisations that were loyal to the Russian party and were 
against the "Trotskyist opposition. " In reality "Trotskyist opposition" meant all 
opposition. 
In the German party Bolshevisation bitterly attacked all remnants of Social 
Democracy within the party. With the Right and the Centre wings of the 
German party bearing the blame for the 1923 catastrophe, the Left wing of the 
party was able to come to power. Although Maslow and Fischer were not 
Stalinists, their enthusiastic adoption of the policy of Bolshevisation helped lay 
the foundations for the Stalinisation of the KPD. With the Comintern's support 
the Gennan Left used the policy of Bolshevisation to destroy the KPD's 
218 
theoretical traditions by targeting the enduring legacy of Rosa Luxemburg. The 
main victims of the assault were her supporters - the Right and Centre wings of 
the German party. As the Social Democratic Party was the most influential 
party in the Second International most if not all of the old Spartacists had been 
members. 349 The old Spartacists were sceptical of Bolshevik interference and as 
a result they posed a threat to an increasingly bureaucratised and centralised 
Comintern. They targeted and either marginalised or purged. Under the banner 
of Bolshevisation the Left blamed the KPD's Social Democratic past for the 
party's failings. While the memory of Rosa Luxemburg lived on, the 
Comintern managed to manipulate the influence her ideas had on the party. 
They reduced her from being a Marxist revolutionary theoretician to a martyr - 
a woman who died for a cause she believed in and whose ideas were 
subordinated to those of Lenin. 
The impact of Bolshevisation on the German party was devastating. 
Bolshevisation, in many ways, was the predecessor of the theory of Social 
Fascism. Like Bolshevisation, the theory of Social Fascism served to 
exaggerate all ready existing divisions within the German working class. After 
Zinoviev's demise, Bucharin took over the Comintem. While Bucharin was 
reluctant to directly link Social Democracy to Fascism, the Programme of the 
Sixth Congress of the Comintern provided the much of the rationale for what 
became the theory of Social Fascism. The rhetoric of the Programme of the 
Sixth Congress claimed to strive for the advancement of the proletarian 
revolutionary movement, but it in fact further restricted the revolutionary 
349 Carr pointed out that as late as 1929 60% of all KPD members had once belonged to the SPD 
or the USPD. Therefore, the notion of purging all the remnants of Social Democracy out of the 
KPD was farcical. E. H. Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: Foundations of a Planned Economy 
1926-1929,3 vols. (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1979) 3: 463. 
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aspirations of the working class by removing any remaining autonomy away 
from the Comintern's parties. The Sixth Congress not only laid the foundations 
for the theory of Social Fascism it declared the arrival of the "Third Period. "' 
This thesis has argued that the development of Social Fascism as a 
campaign and as a theory was contrived. First by Zinoviev as a way of 
redirecting blame for the failed revolution in 1923 and later by the Stalinised 
Comintem who used the "Third Period" to rationalise their repressive measures. 
The Comintern used the suppression of the May Day demonstrations to prove 
that the Social Democrats had indeed become a wing of Fascism - Social 
Fascists. In reality the theory of Social Fascism replaced Marxism as the 
Comintern's dominant theory. It was here during this period that world 
Communists movements became anti-Marxist, anti-theoretical, dogmatic, and 
completely removed from reality. 
The consequence of theory of Social Fascism was disastrous for the 
German party and Communists movements around the world. By January 1933 
Hitler's Nazi party had ascended to power. Hitler made no distinction between 
the parties of the Left and by March both Communists and Social Democrats 
were arrested. Even then the Comintern did not retract its accusation that 
"Social Democracy was Social Fascist. " The Comintern succeeded in 
fragmenting the German working class and this was replicated in the other 
Comintern parties. Marxist theory as a theory of revolution was overshadowed 
by the Soviet Union's Stalinised interpretation. This thesis has showed how 
under the unique conditions of Weimar Germany Marxist theory arrived at the 
theory of Social Fascism. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ADAV - (Allgemeiner Deutsche Arbeiterverein) - General German Worker's Association 
Agit-prop - Department of the Central Committee for Propaganda and Agitation 
BVP - Bayerische Volkspartei) - Bavarian People's Party 
Bezirk - Party district 
BL - Bezirksleitung - Party leadership in a district 
CPSU - The Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
Comintern - Communist International 
DAP - (Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) -German WorkersParty 
DDP - (Deutsche Demokratische Partei) -German Democratic Party 
DNVP - (Deutschnationale Volkspartei) - German National People's Party 
DVP - (Deutsche Volkspartei) - German People's Party 
Deutsche Zentrumspartei or Zentrum - German Centre Party (often called the 
Catholic Centre Party or Centre) 
ECCI aka EKKI - Executive Committee of the Communist International 
KAPD - (Kommunistische Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands) - Communist 
Workers Party of Germany 
KPD - (Kommunistische Partei Deutchlands) - Gennan Communist Party 
NSDAP - (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) - National Socialist 
Gennan Workers'Party 
NEP - New Economic Policy 
PPS - (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna) - The Polish Socialist Party 
RBF - (Rote Frontkdmpferbund) - Red Front Fighters' League (Association) 
SA - (Sturmabteilung) - the "Brown Shirts" or Storm Troopers 
Sdchsische Volkspartei - Saxon People's Party 
SAP - (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei) - Socialist Workers' Party 
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SDAP - (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutchlands) - Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany 
SDKPiL - (Socja1demokraqja Krolestwa Polskiego i Litwy) - The Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania 
Spartakusbund - Spartacus League (Spartacists) 
SPD - (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) - Gennan Social Democratic 
Party 
SS - (Schutzstaffel) - Protective Squadron 
Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - USPD - Independent 
Social Democratic Party 
Zentrale - Centre - leadership of the Communist Party 
Zentralausschuss - Central Committee - broader leadership of the Party 
composed of representatives from various regions. 
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